Blanco v. U.S.

• Citation: 433 F.Supp.2d 190
• Decision Date: 17 May 2006
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 00-2208(SEC).
• Parties: Fernando BLANCO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

433 F.Supp.2d 190

Fernando BLANCO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 00-2208(SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

May 17, 2006.

Victoria A. Ferrer-Kerber, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Fidel A. Sevillano, United States Attorney's Office, Torre Chardon, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendants' renewed consolidated motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment (Docket # 25).¹ Plaintiffs have filed an opposition and cross motion for summary judgment (Docket # 28). Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' cross motion and replied to Plaintiffs' opposition (Docket # 32) and Plaintiffs sur-replied (Docket # 37). After carefully examining the parties' arguments, the case record and the applicable law, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED and Plaintiffs' cross motion will be DENIED.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs are current and former employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") Metropolitan Detention Center, in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico ("MDC"). At issue in this case is whether or not they were fully and properly compensated for the entire period of time that they were restricted to the MDC during the time Hurricane Georges passed over the island of Puerto Rico, in September of 1998.

During the morning of September 20, 1998, a hurricane warning was issued for the island of Puerto Rico. At approximately 6:00 a.m. that morning, MDC Warden Gonzalez opened the institution command center at the facility to monitor the progress of Hurricane Georges. In addition to opening the institution command center, Warden Gonzalez activated the family center at the MDC visiting room. When the Warden opened the command center and family center, Hurricane Georges was located approximately 85 miles from Puerto Rico, and had maximum sustained winds of 110 miles-per-hour.

By 2:00 p.m. the following day, Monday, September 21, 1998, the situation had shown no improvement. As such, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Warden Gonzalez declared an emergency. The staff was informed of the state of emergency both orally and by written memorandum, which stated:

[d]ue to the emergency situation and the safety of all staff, no one will be allowed to leave the institution until further notice. Hurricane Georges' winds are projected to exceed 110 mph and will reach the island within the next couple of hours. Also, since some staff might not be able to reach the institution due to the above-mentioned situation, it is necessary for all staff to remain at the institution to assist the relieving pasts. If you have any questions, please follow your chain of command through your respective Associate Warden

Pursuant to these orders, staff present at the institution were restricted to the institution for their own safety, and to ensure the continued safe and orderly operation of the institution, in the event that other staff members were unable to reach the premises. Staff and their families were provided with food, and when they were not assigned to work a post, staff were encouraged and expected to sleep in an empty housing unit designated for this purpose. Some of the staff decided to stay in the empty housing unit, others remained with their families in the family center, and the rest of the staff chose to sleep in their particular departments.

Although the memorandum indicated that staff members would be required to assist at the relieving posts during the state of emergency, in reality the need for such assistance never materialized. As such, no staff members reported being called to duty or performing any work during their designated rest period, and the Warden deactivated the command center at approximately 7:00 p.m. on September 22, 1998.

The following day, G. Joseph Kelly Jr., the Human Resources Director of MDC, issued a memorandum to all timekeepers regarding pay for staffers who remained at the institution during Hurricane Georges. In the memorandum, Mr. Kelly explained that for Monday, September 21, 1998, the day the hurricane passed through the island, most staff would be paid for sixteen (16) hours of work (applying overtime, compensatory time, night differential, or any special pay provisions applicable). For staff members to receive pay for more than sixteen (16) hours of work, however, their supervisor would need to certify that they were: (1) instructed to perform work beyond the sixteen (16) hours, and (2) they had in fact performed such work.

The staff members and their union representation were not in agreement with the Department of Human Resources' decision. On October 13, 1998, the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 4052 Council of Prisons Local ("Union"), submitted a grievance to Robert L. Matthews, the Regional Director for the Southeast Regional Office of the BOP. In its grievance, the Union complained that during the hurricane they were restricted to MDC and expected to remain in a state of readiness. This, the Union believed, entitled its members to standby pay under 5 C.F.R. § 551.431. Finding that the employees had been properly compensated for the time period in question, the Regional Director denied the grievance.

Dissatisfied with the director's decision, and in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Union and BOP, the staffers submitted the issue to a voluntary binding arbitration proceeding. On June 30, 1999, Arbitrator Mona Miller issued a decision in the matter of the Union's grievance. In her decision, the arbitrator found that:

Staff who were held in the institution beyond their twelve hour shift were paid for eight hours of regular duty, four hours of overtime, and four more hours of overtime for what the warden considered as standby time in order to compensate them to the limit allowed by regulation. The record shows the Agency was prepared to compensate the staff who actually worked beyond the sixteen hours. A memo from the Human Resources Manager indicated pay would be given to any staff whose supervisor certified the staff member was "instructed to and actually performed work beyond sixteen hours." The record is devoid of any such requests. Based on the entire record the arbitrator found no violations of the contract regulations, or law.

The Union filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which were denied.

After exhausting all administrative avenues, on September 19, 2000, Plaintiffs filed the above-captioned suit. Plaintiffs' first cause of action in the amended complaint alleges that Defendants have willfully and purposefully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA"), by failing to fully and fairly compensate them for the time period involving the passage of Hurricane Georges over the island of Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs' second cause of action alleged that Defendant Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), by enacting the regulation concerning deductible sleep time, 5 C.F.R. § 551.432, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) ("APA"). Plaintiffs believe that the OPM's regulation concerning deductible sleep time is inconsistent with the Department of Labor ("DOL") regulation on that same issue, 29 C.F.R. § 785.22; and therefore, "not in accordance with the law."

In turn, Defendants filed a consolidated motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. In their motion, Defendants make the following arguments: (1) since Plaintiffs were offered appropriate accommodations, were not expected to respond to emergencies, were not interrupted during sleep time and would have been paid for hours worked upon making a showing that they had actually worked during sleep time, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the second count of the amended complaint because the six-year statute of limitations for a facial challenge to the OPM's regulation has elapsed; and (3) the challenged OPM regulation is not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. Plaintiffs have filed an opposition to Defendants' motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment, where they argue that: (1) the challenge to the validity of the OPM regulation is not time barred; and (2) the OPM regulation is inconsistent with the DOL regulation, and is thus, contrary to law. Plaintiffs do not address, however, Defendants contention that they were given appropriate accommodations for their sleeping time and that not one of the Plaintiffs claimed to have worked during sleep time or sought payment for interrupted sleep time, pursuant to the directives set forth by the BOP Department of Human Resources.

Against this backdrop, we proceed to examine the arguments set forth by the parties. We will first address the statute of limitations argument and then discuss the validity of the OPM regulation at issue.

Standard of Review

Motion for Summary Judgment

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) provides that: "A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part [of the claims asserted against him/her]." The Court may grant the movant's motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986); NASCO, Inc. v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 29 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1994). "The principal judicial inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2725, p. 401.

In this regard,...