Bland v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. EV 87-38-C.,EV 87-38-C. |
| Citation | 761 F. Supp. 82 |
| Parties | Edward A. BLAND, Plaintiff, v. ATLAS VAN LINES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Fred S. White, Bamberger Foreman Oswald & Hahn, Evansville, Ind., for plaintiff.
Alan N. Shovers, Kahn Dees Donovan & Kahn, Evansville, Ind., for defendant.
In March, 1970 plaintiff began working for Atlas Van Lines in Canada, a subsidiary of defendant, Atlas Van Lines, Inc. (Atlas). Plaintiff remained with Atlas Canada until September, 1978 when he began working for Atlas in Evansville, Indiana. Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his move from Atlas Canada to Atlas that he and the defendant reached an agreement that gave the plaintiff credit, for the purpose of plaintiff's pension, for the time that he worked at Atlas Canada.
On January 1, 1981 plaintiff was promoted to President of the defendant corporation. The parties entered into an "employment agreement" on that day which was signed by the plaintiff for himself and by the Chairman of the Atlas Board of Directors and Secretary of the Corporation on behalf of the defendant. The document was also signed by a witness. This contract was to become effective immediately — January 1, 1981.
The plaintiff terminated his employment with defendant on or about December 19, 1983. A "termination agreement" was entered into by the parties that same day.
Subsequently, plaintiff made demand on defendant for retirement benefits. The defendant refused to pay the plaintiff the benefits he claims to be entitled to and as a result the plaintiff filed his complaint with this Court on March 10, 1987.
Plaintiff asserts diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as the basis for jurisdiction. The Complaint essentially alleges that the defendant breached the contracts of September, 1978 and December 19, 1983 by refusing to pay him retirement benefits equal to what employees under the Atlas pension plan would receive for service from 1970 to 1983.
Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Renewed Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. The defendant asserts that plaintiff's State law claims are preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. In addition, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust the requisite administrative procedures and remedies; to name the proper party defendant; and to name a necessary co-plaintiff. The plaintiff has responded to both the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Renewed Motion for Dismissal and Summary Judgment and claims that he and defendant entered into contracts which are independent and separate from the Atlas pension plan, and as such, his contract claims are not preempted by ERISA.
Today this Court is called upon to rule on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss which also requests in the alternative, summary judgment. Since the defendant filed its original motion to dismiss much discovery has taken place and the parties have briefed the issues extensively. The plaintiff filed his brief in opposition to defendant's Motion to Dismiss; the defendant filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss jointly with its Motion for Summary Judgment; the plaintiff responded to the defendant's Renewed Motion and new Motion for Summary Judgment; oral arguments have been heard and pre-trials conducted; the parties have provided the Court with supplemental authority in support of their respective claims on numerous occasions; and affidavits and depositions have been submitted to the Court for consideration. For this reason, the Court has chosen to treat the defendant's Motion as one requesting summary judgment. This is consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) which states that "if, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment...."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 governs summary judgment and subsection (c) states that "the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial on the disputed facts, rather it is intended to dispose of those cases which have no genuine issue of material fact to litigate. Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Williams, 599 F.Supp. 1184 (D.C.Md.1984). By granting a motion for summary judgment the court is concluding that, based upon the evidence which the court has available, no reasonable jury could return a verdict favoring the party against whom the summary judgment has been granted. Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683 (7th Cir.1985).
Generally, the purpose of Rule 56 is to avoid unnecessary protracted litigation. Summary judgment allows the court to dispose of meritless claims before becoming entrenched in frivolous and costly trials. Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs., 834 F.2d 54 (2nd Cir.1987). Although, if disposing of a summary judgment requires as much time as a full trial on the merits, Rule 56 no longer serves the purpose of economizing the court's and the litigants' time. Elliott v. Elliott, 49 F.R.D. 283 (D.C.N.Y.1970); 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Summary Judgment Proceedings § 2728 at 557-58.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment a court must give the benefit of all inferences to the party opposing a motion for summary judgment and to examine the record in a light favorable to that party. Johnson v. Educational Testing Service, 754 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.), cert. den. 472 U.S. 1029, 105 S.Ct. 3504, 87 L.Ed.2d 635 (1985).
A court is to act with caution when granting summary judgment and may deny the motion when reason exists to believe that the better course is to proceed to a full trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This is not to say that a court should be reluctant to grant a motion for summary judgment when the record reflects that no genuine issue of material fact exists. The purpose of summary judgment procedure is to eliminate trial in cases where trial is unnecessary and results in delay and expense, and, with ever-increasing burden upon judiciary, persuasive reasons exist for utilization of summary judgment procedures whenever possible; courts therefore will not strain to find existence of genuine issue where none exists. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Devalk Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 600 F.Supp. 1547 (D.C.Ill.1985). The Supreme Court stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) that:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. Id. at 326-27, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55.
Using this standard the Court will now address the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
ERISA was enacted by Congress to protect employees from the abuse and mismanagement of funds that are accumulated to finance various types of employee benefits. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 15, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2219, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); see also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112-13, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 1671-72, 104 L.Ed.2d 98 (1989). ERISA is a broad sweeping statute and covers reporting and disclosure requirements for retirement plans; duties and liabilities of plan administrators; establishes rules for vesting and accrual of benefits; contains provisions for enforcement of the act; has special provisions relating to multi-employer plans; and makes provision for joint and survivor annuity. ERISA also has a section specifically preempting state law. That section reads:
The preemption provision has been construed broadly so that it stretches beyond the subject matter contained in ERISA. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1982) the Supreme Court held that State law need not deal "with the subject matters covered by ERISA-reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility,...
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...to rescind the contract, the court must not look beyond that language to discover the parties' intent. See Bland v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 761 F.Supp. 82, 86 (S.D.Ind.1989); Lewis v. Burke, 248 Ind. 297, 226 N.E.2d 332, 337 8. Under Indiana law the test for determining whether a contract is......