Bland v. Bland

• Decision Date: 09 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-CA-1157,91-CA-1157
• Citation: 629 So.2d 582
• Parties: Charles Vernon BLAND v. Frances Elaine Mims Bounds BLAND.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 582

629 So.2d 582

Charles Vernon BLAND v. Frances Elaine Mims Bounds BLAND.

No. 91-CA-1157.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Dec. 9, 1993.

Jerry L. DeLaughter, Brookhaven, for appellant.

Joseph A. Fernald, Jr., Brookhaven, for appellee.

Before PRATHER, P.J., and BANKS and McRAE, JJ.

PRATHER, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal from a decision of the Copiah County Chancery Court questions the chancellor's determination of various matters incident to the grant of divorce. Appellee Elaine Mims Bounds Bland ("Elaine") initially filed a complaint for divorce alleging irreconcilable differences. Appellant Charles Vernon Bland ("Charles") cross-claimed for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Elaine thereafter amended her complaint, seeking a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and seeking monetary and property settlements and medical insurance coverage for herself. Charles denied Elaine was entitled to the relief sought.

One day before the scheduled trial, the parties entered into a consent agreement for a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, leaving the issues of property division, attorney fees, alimony, and insurance to the court. Following a hearing on these matters, the chancellor awarded Elaine use, possession, and title to the automobile, certain personal property items, medical insurance coverage to be provided by Charles until her present pre-existing health condition no longer exists, Charles to pay certain outstanding medical bills, lump sum alimony of $15,000.00, and attorney fees of $2,500.00. ¹

Charles thereafter filed a motion for new trial on the grounds of witness tampering and unfair and prejudicial conduct; Elaine responded with a motion to strike. Charles' motion for new trial was denied by the chancellor after a hearing. Charles subsequently perfected an appeal to this Court, requesting review of the following issues:

1. Whether the chancellor abused his discretion in denying Appellant's motion for a new trial;

2. Whether the chancellor was manifestly wrong and committed reversible error in awarding lump sum alimony to Appellee;

3. Whether the chancellor was manifestly wrong and committed reversible error in awarding attorney fees to Appellee 4. Whether the chancellor abused his discretion and committed reversible error by mandatorily enjoining Appellant to maintain Appellee as a beneficiary on his health insurance policy and by mandatorily enjoining Appellant to pay all insurance premiums necessary to afford complete coverage to Appellee;

5. Whether the chancellor was manifestly wrong and committed reversible error in awarding Appellant's automobile to Appellee and ordering Appellant to transfer title to Appellee; and

6. Whether the chancellor was manifestly wrong and committed reversible error in the division of personal property between Appellee and Appellant.

For the reasons discussed herein, this Court affirms the chancellor's denial of the motion for new trial, award of lump sum alimony, attorney fees, possession and title of the automobile, and division of personal property. The order regarding health insurance is reversed and remanded to the Chancery Court of Copiah County.

II. FACTS

Francis Elaine Mims Bounds Bland was once employed at a pawn shop, with the expectation of a fifty percent (50%) ownership in the business after three years of "sweat equity." She quit this job, at Charles Vernon Bland's request, after she had invested a little over a year's time in it and married Charles Bland on October 19, 1986. The couple moved into a house Charles had built just prior to their marriage.

Although Elaine owned two automobiles at the time of her marriage to Charles, the day after the wedding, he insisted upon buying her a Mercury Marquis. After receiving the Marquis, Elaine sold both of her cars. Elaine alone drove this car during the marriage, except when the couple went out together. Charles contended that he never intended to give the Mercury to Elaine because he had lost one car to a previous wife and did not want that to happen again. For this reason, he titled the car in his name only. Charles charged Elaine with stealing this automobile after the parties separated, although that charge was subsequently dismissed.

Charles had a bulldozer business at the time of the marriage. Elaine first claimed her only involvement with this business was running errands, but she later stated that she did whatever an "employee" would have done and assisted in keeping the books beginning in 1987 or 1988, continuing until the time of the separation in February, 1991. Elaine never received any compensation for her work in the bulldozer business. However, Elaine testified that Charles paid for certain personal items for the couple with checks from the business account. Charles testified that Elaine never did anything connected with the dozer business.

During the course of the marriage, the couple started several business ventures: a tree planting service, venetian blind business, and interior decorating/custom design business. Neither Elaine nor Charles were paid any wages from any of these endeavors. Elaine thought all of the businesses were joint ventures with her and Charles as joint owners. There was conflicting testimony regarding which businesses' profits financed other businesses, which business accounts paid for what expenses, and who deposited money into which accounts.

Elaine testified, as did other witnesses, that she had done much of the physical labor involved in the tree planting business from 1987 until she went to work for Royal Maid in June, 1990. Charles agreed that Elaine had helped in this business. Elaine considered the tree planting business hers because she did most of the work while Charles was busy with his bulldozer business.

The venetian blind business, according to Elaine, was begun because Charles had some cash he wanted to filter into a business; Elaine investigated and determined there was a need for such a business. Charles claimed this business was instigated by Elaine and a Mr. C.O. Mathis, but that he (Charles) and Elaine were the only stockholders. Elaine owned 25% of the shares. Contrary to her previous testimony, Elaine claimed that she was not a partner nor did she own any percentage of the venetian blind corporation. The venetian blind business did not flourish, and it had ceased operations in February, 1990, before the parties separated. The company showed a loss of $12,127.00 for 1989.

Elaine's interior decorating business was apparently not a going concern for any substantial period of time. She sewed draperies, bedspreads, and dust ruffles. Elaine began working at Royal Maid, the substation Mississippi Industries for the Blind, as director of public relations in June, 1990, and was still in that position at the time of the divorce. She nets $1,100.00 monthly at Royal Maid.

The couple filed joint tax returns in 1987, 1988, and 1989. The couple's adjusted gross income was $6,633.21 in 1987; $9,199.00 in 1989. In 1988 only Profit or Loss From Business forms (Schedule C) were filed, reflecting a net profit of $12,016.89 for Bland Custom Tree Planting, a net loss of $698.18 for Custom Interiors, and a net profit of $10,066.61 for Bland Dozer Service. Charles claimed the $12,016.80 from the tree planting business went to Elaine via the joint tree planting account. In 1990, Charles individually filed a return for the venetian blind business, which showed a total loss of $5,290.00 for that year. The venetian blind business' S Corporation form showed a loss of $7,053.00. Elaine filed a separate return in 1990.

Elaine was in good health at the time of the marriage, but at the time of divorce she suffered an ulcer and was preparing to undergo a double mastectomy for breast cancer. Her employer-provided medical insurance did not cover her cancer. Elaine had been added to Charles' insurance in May of 1990. The monthly premiums for Elaine's coverage were $127.00 as of the time of trial and $160.00 one year later. The insurance coverage on Elaine provided by Charles was to cover the mastectomy, but Elaine claimed she was unable to pay the $1,000.00 deductible. The Blands separated on February 27, 1991.

III. ANALYSIS

A. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Whether to grant a motion for a new trial is a decision left largely to the trial court's discretion. Muhammad v. Muhammad, 622 So.2d 1239, 1250 (Miss.1993) (citing Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Miss.1987)). A trial judge's denial of a motion for new trial will be reversed by this Court only when that denial evidences an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Muhammad, 622 So.2d at 1250 (citing Bobby Kitchens v. Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association, 560 So.2d 129, 132 (Miss.1989)); Maxwell v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 513 So.2d 901, 908 (Miss.1987); Burnham, 508 So.2d at 1075).

Charles' motion for new trial was based on allegations of witness tampering by Elaine during the divorce trial. He claims that one of Elaine's friends and one of her relatives periodically left the courtroom to speak to sequestered witnesses who were waiting to testify. This violation of the sequestration rule, according to Charles, resulted in prejudice to him and deprived him of a fair and impartial trial. Elaine points out that although Charles presented six witnesses in support of his motion for new trial, none offered proof that any conversation between Elaine's friend or relative and the waiting witnesses concerned testimony offered at trial.

The purpose of "the rule" (M.R.E. 615) is "to discourage and expose falsification, inaccuracy, and collusion in witnesses' testimony." Moffett v. State, 540 So.2d 1313, 1317 (Miss.1989). Even if the rule was violated in the case sub judice, and there is no clear evidence that it...