Bland v. Cox, 2:20-CV-0715-DMC-P
| Decision Date | 26 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-CV-0715-DMC-P |
| Parties | JOSHUA DAVIS BLAND, Plaintiff, v. DEREK COX, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Plaintiff's first amended complaint. ECF No. 12. Several defects remain in the amended complaint. The Court grants Plaintiff further leave to amend.
The Court must screen complaints from prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P 8(a)(2). The complaint must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive screening, a plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, ” the complaint does not state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The complaint need not identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016).
The Court must construe a pro se litigant's complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.'” Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Court may dismiss a pro se litigant's complaint “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff names seventeen employees or officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) as defendants: (1) Derek Cox, (2) C. Reynolds, (3) L. Rochay, (4) M. Courtney, (5) F. Rodriguez, (6) H. Von Rader, (7) C. Goforth, (8) Munoz, (9) Anaya, (10) P. Rose, (11) Parker, (12) D. Neland, (13) J. Quam, (14) Jones, (15) W. Hume, (16) M. Voong, (17). R. Diaz. Id. Cox, Reynolds, Rochay, Courtney, Rodriguez, Von Rader, Goforth, Munoz, and Anaya are correctional officers at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). ECF No. 12 at 1- 2. Rose, Parker, and Neland are each employed in some capacity at HDSP. Id. Jones and Hume are correctional officers at California Medical Facility (CMF). Is. Diaz is the former secretary of CDCR. Id. Voong and Quam are appeals coordinators. Id. Quam specifically works at HDSP. Id.
Plaintiff's complaint is mostly vague, and his discrete claims lack significant detail. Id. at 3-12. He brings a varied assortment of claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 3-12. See id. Plaintiff's claims jump forward and backward throughout 2019 and 2020, and the Court has here placed these allegations in what the Court has interpreted as the logical order of those allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that, around February 2019, Cox ransacked Plaintiff's cell while he was in the emergency room following a seizure. Id. at 3. Cox allegedly stole hearing aids, stamps, and law books. Id. A few weeks later, Goforth and Munoz falsely accused Plaintiff of “gassing” Goforth. Id. at 4. They fabricated a rules violation report accusing Plaintiff of battery on a peace officer. Id. Plaintiff contends that he has been denied property and injured by “slander, reprisal, criminal charges, [and] fraud.” Id. Plaintiff contends that Cox, Goforth, and Munoz violated the Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
Another few weeks later, around May 2019, Cox purportedly read aloud one of Plaintiff's grievances in front of other inmates. Id. at 6. Inmates threatened Plaintiff afterwards whenever he left his cell. Id. Cox allegedly read the grievance aloud out of retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of a grievance against him. Id. Plaintiff believes Cox thus violated the Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
Plaintiff suffered another seizure in June 2019. Id. at 7. When he woke up, Rodriguez, Cox, Von Rader, and Anaya were assaulting him. Id. Reynolds, Rose, Parker, and Neland stood by and watched the assault. Id. They did not intervene. Id. Plaintiff received injuries to his eyes, lips, and teeth. Id. He suffers from agoraphobia and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. Plaintiff sues under the Fourth, Fifth, Eight, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
Plaintiff filed a grievance after he was assaulted. Id. at 8. He apparently received a notice saying a grievance appeal would be processed by mid-August 2019. Id. When it was not processed on time, Plaintiff filed a new grievance. Id. Quam allegedly rejected that grievance. Id. Plaintiff made other submissions, but no response came. Id. Although Plaintiff alleges First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, he really appears to state he was denied due process. Id. He also contends that appeals coordinators made administrative remedies “disappear.” Id.
Sometime following the first grievance filing, in July, Rocha allegedly falsely stated that Plaintiff had been assigned staff assistance for some sort of disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 5. Defendant Courtney allegedly fabricated a staff assistant's report. Id. Plaintiff was not able to collect evidence, call witnesses, or prepare for the disciplinary hearing. Id. As a result, Plaintiff lost 150 days of credit. Id. Plaintiff cites the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments but again really appears to mean to raise a due process claim. See id.
Plaintiff had other disciplinary hearings in August 2019. Id. at 9. Defendant Hume supposedly denied Plaintiff the right to be present at hearings for allegedly biting Cox's finger and gassing Goforth. Id. Plaintiff was unable to call witnesses or present a defense. Id. Again citing multiple constitutional amendments, Plaintiff once more apparently seeks to just raise a due process claim. See id.
The following year, in April 2020, prison officials allegedly cancelled a grievance that Plaintiff filed. Id. at 10. CDCR denied the appeal as untimely. Id. Plaintiff contends, however, that a notice in the grievance falsely reflected that Defendant Jones delivered the violation report to Plaintiff a month earlier than he actually did (thus affecting the time period in which to challenge the grievance). Id. Plaintiff contends that he was denied due process but once more cites the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
Plaintiff alleges a further due process violation related to the administrative grievance process. Id. at 11. Voong allegedly would not accept administrative grievances, thus preventing Plaintiff from exhausting his remedies. Id. Plaintiff cites the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that former Secretary Diaz knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally housed Plaintiff in dangerous “zones” with inmates and officers who meant to do Plaintiff harm. Id. at 12. Plaintiff claims violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
Liberally construed, for the purposes of screening, Plaintiff's complaint states a few claims. Plaintiff states viable First and Eighth Amendment claims. To the extent Plaintiff may raise the First Amendment, Plaintiff's fourth claim states a cognizable First Amendment action for Cox's alleged retaliatory reading aloud of Plaintiff's grievance. That claim also raises an Eighth Amendment issue sufficient to pass screening. Plaintiff also states cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claims where he alleges that Rodriguez, Cox, Von Rader, and Anaya assaulted him, and that Reynolds, Rose, Parker, and Neland stood watching the assault. Plaintiff's other claims are defective. Insofar as Plaintiff alleges that Secretary Diaz was somehow personally and knowingly involved in housing Plaintiff in units that posed a risk of serious harm, he states an Eighth Amendment claim. At least for the limited purposes of screening, Plaintiff has also stated a due process claim related to the procedures (or alleged lack of procedural protections) employed at the alleged disciplinary proceedings. Finally, to the extent that the allegations of interference in the grievance procedure may be liberally construed as First Amendment claims, those claims are also cognizable at this early stage.
Plaintiff's viable claims notwithstanding, several claims are defective. Plaintiff also restates defective claims that the...
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