Bland v. Fairfax Cnty.
| Decision Date | 07 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | 1:10cv1030 (JCC/JFA) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | MARY GETTS BLAND Plaintiff, v. FAIRFAX COUNTY, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Mary Getts Bland's Petition for Award of Costs Including Reasonable Attorneys' Fees (the Petition). For the following reasons, the Court will grant fees and costs in the amount of $306,705.69.
This case concerns incidents of sexual harassment by a male Fairfax County firefighter in the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department against a female firefighter. Plaintiff alleged that by allowing Lieutenant Timothy Young to harass her, the Defendant Fairfax County, Virginia (the County) violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e17 (Title VII). Plaintiff prevailed in her Title VII hostile work environment claim, as a jury awarded her$250,000 in damages [Dkt. 75], which the Court later remitted to $50,000 [Dkt. 126]. Plaintiff now seeks to recover attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Title VII. [Dkt. 134.]
Plaintiff filed suit against the County on September 15, 2010. [Dkt 1.] Plaintiff originally asserted three claims, but on May 3, 2011, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 8] with respect to Plaintiff's claims that the County was liable for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the County was liable for retaliation under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. [Dkt. 35.] The Court, however, denied the Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff's Title VII hostile work environment claim involving sexual harassment. [Dkt. 35.]
Jury trial began on May 23, 2011. On May 24, 2011, after the close of Plaintiff's case, Defendant orally made a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's case as time-barred, after which Defendant filed a corresponding written motion (the Motion to Dismiss as Time-Barred). [Dkt. 70.] The Court took the motion under advisement, permitting the trial to be completed so that the record would be complete.
On May 25, 2011, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $250,000, and the Clerk of theCourt entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff. [Dkt. 77.] After the jury was discharged, the Court addressed the Motion to Dismiss as Time-Barred and the parties request for further briefing and a hearing on the issue. At that time, Plaintiff's counsel orally requested an extension of time to file a request for attorneys' fees. (J. I. Tr. 27:20-28:17.) The Court stated that it would set a date to file such a request after it heard argument on the Motion to Dismiss as Time-Barred and determined whether the judgment would stand. (J. I. Tr. 27:20-28:17.)
With leave of the Court, both Plaintiff, [Dkt. 72], and Defendant, [Dkt. 70], filed written briefs on the time-barred issue. Defendant filed further briefing on June 3, 2011. [Dkt. 78.] There, Defendant went beyond the time-barred issue and argued, for the first time in this case, that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter due to Plaintiff's failure to allege exhaustion of her administrative remedies. (D. Supp. Mem. [Dkt. 78] at 2-3.) Because Defendant had not previously raised this issue at any point, and had not done so in its mid-trial Motion to Dismiss as Time-Barred, the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond and Defendant to reply. [Dkt. 79.] Plaintiff, [Dkt. 80], and Defendant, [Dkt. 85], did so. The Court held oral argument on June 17, 2011, and took the issueunder advisement. [Dkt. 91.] On June 29, 2011, the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss as Time-Barred both as to the time-barred issue and jurisdictional issue. [Dkt. 117.]
Prior to that denial, on June 22, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Motion for New Trial, and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment. [Dkt. 102.] On August 3, 2011, the Court denied those motions, but granted Defendants alternative motion for remittitur and remitted Plaintiff's jury award to $50,000. [Dkt. 126.] The Court directed Plaintiff to accept or reject the remittitur within ten days and stated that if the remittitur is not accepted, "the Court will stay the new trial pending any appeal by the parties. . . ." [Dkt. 126.]
On August 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. 127], which the Court denied on August 24, 2011 [Dkt. 130]. This time, the Court directed Plaintiff to accept or reject the Court's order of remittitur by August 26, 2011. [Dkt. 130.] On August 26, 2011, Plaintiff accepted the order of remittitur. [Dkt. 131.] On September 7, 2011, the Court in a written order (the Counsel Fees Order) stated: Plaintiff having accepted the remitter in this case and therefore it is appropriate to award counsel fees to plaintiff, it is accordingly ORDERED:
[Dkt. 132.]
On September 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed the Petition for Award of Costs Including Reasonable Attorneys' Fees [Dkt. 133], which was corrected on September 23, 2011 [Dkt. 134]. On October 7, 2011, Defendant filed a Reply [Dkt. 135] and on October 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Rebuttal [Dkt. 139]. On October 26, 2011, Defendant filed a Supplemental Opposition [Dkt. 143] and Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Memorandum [Dkt. 144]. On October 31, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Second Supplement to the Petition. [Dkt. 146.]
Plaintiff's Petition is before the Court.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act provides that in federal civil rights actions, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "As the Supreme Court has recognized, 'the purpose of § 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances.'" Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1076 (4th Cir. 1986)(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act specifically states that such fees are permitted in "any action or proceeding to enforce provisions of . . . title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. And, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act states that the court may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorneys' fee as part of the costs. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k)(2006). The Fourth Circuit has noted, "[t]he standard for granting attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is identical to that under Title VII." Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1359 n.10 (4th Cir. 1995)(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7). Plaintiff petitions this Court for an award of the costs of bringing and prosecuting this civil action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to Title VII.
The party requesting fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of what it seeks to recover. Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990); Cook v. Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d 733, 736 (E.D. Va. 1998). The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the amount of a reasonable fee in the circumstances. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
The requesting party does so by producing evidence, such as the requesting attorneys' own affidavits. "'In addition to the attorney's own affidavits, [however,] the fee applicant must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award.'" Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Plyler, 902 F.2d at 277). "Examples of what constitutes satisfactory specific evidence 'sufficient to verify the prevailing market rates are affidavits of other local lawyers who are familiar both with the skills of the fee applicants and more generally with the type of work in the relevant community.'" Textron Financial Corp. v. AIC of Manassas, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1202, 2010 WL 2928789, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 23, 2010) (quoting Robinson, 560 F.3d at 245); see also Plyler, 902 F.2d at 278 ()
"The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v.Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 174 (4th Cir. 1994). The product of the reasonable fee and reasonable rate is referred to as the "lodestar amount." See Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d at 1076 n.2.
In determining "what constitutes a 'reasonable' number of hours and rate . . . a district court's discretion should be guided by the . . . twelve factors" adopted from Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). Robinson, 560 F.3d at 243-44 (citing Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978)).
Those Johnson/Kimbrell's factors are: (1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5)...
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