Bland v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., S.F. 22740
Decision Date | 26 October 1970 |
Docket Number | S.F. 22740 |
Citation | 475 P.2d 663,90 Cal.Rptr. 431,3 Cal.3d 324 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 475 P.2d 663 William O. BLAND, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, McPhail's, Inc., et al., Respondents. |
Levy & Van Bourg and N. Michael Rucka, San Francisco, for petitioner.
Rupert A. Pedrin and Marcel L. Gunther, San Francisco, for respondents.
Petitioner seeks review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (hereinafter board), after recomsideration, in which the board decided that petitioner should receive further medical treatment for his injuries but not compensation for temporary disability. The board refused such compensation on the sole ground that the petition to reopen did not specifically request it.
After having worked steadily for some 17 years as a cement mason, petitioner undertook employment with McPhail's, Inc., in Greenbrae, California. The McPhail job of finishing cement largely required kneeling and bending. While in the course of his employment on December 16, 1963, petitioner, then 48 years old, sustained an injury to his left knee. After considerable medical treatment petitioner underwent surgery upon that knee.
Petitioner filed an application for workmen's compensation benefits on October 29, 1964; the referee, at the hearing on the petition, considered petitioner's knee injury as well as a number of unrelated injuries, and awarded petitioner temporary disability compensation for the period December 18, 1963, through April 4, 1965. In addition, the referee found that the knee injury had resulted in 16 percent permanent disability and awarded compensation in that amount.
In January 1968 petitioner again suffered pain in his left knee. Upon examining petitioner on May 23, 1968, Dr. Colloff, an orthopedic specialist, found increased disability from the knee injury, and proceeded with treatment provided by Travelers Insurance Company, the insurance carrier. On August 23, 1968, petitioner filed a petition to reopen his compensation claim, ap pending Dr. Colloff's report. Petitioner requested 'that the Appeals Board take such steps as may be necessary to a redetermination of this matter and for an increase in the benefits payable to petitioner on account of said permanent disability.'
A referee conducted a hearing concerning this petition on November 25, 1968; the stipulated issues were 'Good cause to reopen for further medical treatment and for further permanent disability.' The referee found good cause for reopening, concluded that petitioner had suffered 9 1/2 percent additional permanent disability due to his knee injury, and awarded medical treatment and compensation for a total of 25 1/2 percent permanent disability.
During the pendency of these proceedings before the referee, petitioner's condition had steadily retrogressed; surgery was indicated for the knee. On January 22, 1969, petitioner filed a petition for reconsideration on the ground that his condition could not be considered permanent in view of the impending surgery. (Lab.Code, § 5903, subd. (d).) The board granted reconsideration on February 21, 1969, requesting an examination of petitioner by the medical bureau of the Division of Industrial Accidents.
The medical examiner, thereafter, concluded that petitioner's condition had not become permanent but had deteriorated since September 20, 1965, the date of petitioner's last disability rating. On May 28, 1969, the board found good cause to reopen; held that petitioner suffered temporary total disability from May 23, 1968, through March 28, 1969, and continuing thereafter, and concluded that petitioner's condition was not yet permanent. Hence, the board provided for further medical care and treatment, awarding temporary disability compensation from May 23, 1968, through December 16, 1968, less the amounts petitioner had already received on account of the referee's award of January 6, 1969. 1 Furthermore, the board reserved its jurisdiction to find on the issue of permanent disability at such time as petitioner's condition becomes permanent.
In order to upset the award the insurance carrier and employer thereafter petitioned for reconsideration on the ground that the board lacked jurisdiction to award compensation for temporary disability for the period May 23, 1968, through December 16, 1968, because petitioner had not specifically requested such compensation prior to the expiration of five years from the injury of December 16, 1963. After again reconsidering the case, the board found merit in the proposition that 'inasmuch as the issue of additional temporary disability was not raised by the applicant in his Petition to Reopen, or at the hearing subsequent to the filing thereof, the Board lacked jurisdiction to find such additional temporary disability.' Although the board remained convinced that petitioner's condition was not yet permanent and stationary, it refused to award compensation for his temporary disability. 2 The board did, however award further medical care and expressly reserved its jurisdiction to consider the issue of permanent disability when and if petitioner's condition became permanent.
We granted a writ of review after its denial by the Court of Appeal in order to decide whether the board could exercise jurisdiction to award temporary disability compensation to an employee who is otherwise entitled to it but who did not in the circumstances of this case specifically plead for this type of compensation.
At the outset we face the narrow question whether the board retained jurisdiction to award temporary disability to this petitioner, who had filed a petition to reopen within the limitations period, or whether the board lacked jurisdiction to do so because Labor Code, sections 5803 and 5804 barred the claim. We shall explain why we have concluded that in light of the strong policy in favor of liberal treatment of workmen's claims for disability, the petition to reopen sufficiently preserved the board's jurisdiction to award temporary disability. Not only did the petition itself literally pray for the widest exercise of the board's jurisdiction by asking it to 'take such steps as may be necessary to a redetermination of this matter' but, also, inherently, the petition, even if considered to be constricted to a claim for permanent disability, necessarily sought compensation for temporary disability in the event petitioner's medical condition had not stabilized. Finally, the decisions support petitioner's position.
Two statutory provisions pertain to the jurisdiction of the board in the instant matter. Labor Code, section 5803 provides that the board Section 5804 of the Labor Code establishes a five-year limitation upon reopening a case under section 5803: 'No award of compensation shall be rescinded, altered, or amended after five years from the date of the injury Except upon a petition by a party in interest filed within such five years and any counter petition seeking other relief filed by the adverse party within 30 days of the original petition * * *.' (Italics added.) 3
In determining whether, under these sections, the petition to reopen suffices to preserve the jurisdiction of the board to render the temporary disability award, we must follow certain mandates of interpretation. Pursuant to article XX, section 21 of the Constitution, the Legislature enacted the workmen's compensation laws, endowing the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board with authority to adopt 'reasonable and proper rules of practice and procedure' (Lab.Code, § 5307, subd. (a)), and further stipulating that the board 'shall not be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure, but may make inquiry in the manner, through oral testimony and records, which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit and provisions' of the workmen's compensation laws. (Lab.Code, §§ 5500, 5708.) As this court observed in French v. Rishell (1953) 40 Cal.2d 477, 481, 254 P.2d 26, the board 'from its early days, has' been 'allowed to receive hearsay evidence and to proceed informally * * *.' 4
The board has appropriately enforced the legislative mandate regarding informality of pleading, as the following instances exemplify: by prohibiting demurrers to workmen's compensation claims, 5 by permitting any party in interest to file an application, 6 by not dismissing incomplete applications but rather attempting to obtain the necessary information on its own motion, 7 by treating a new application for benefits filed more than five years after the date of injury as a valid petition to reopen because an earlier application relating to the same injury had been improperly dismissed, 8 by interpreting a reasonably detailed letter from an injured workman as an application, 9 by waiving the requirement of separate applications for separate injuries in the interests of justice, 10 and by liberally permitting amendment to applications to conform to proof. 11
In the same manner, the courts and the board, recognizing the legislative mandate of liberal interpretation, have applied it to cases, such as the instant one, that involved statutory limitations. As we observed in Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 569, 577, 68 Cal.Rptr. 164, 169, 440 P.2d 236, 241, 'Limitations provisions in the workmen's compensation law must be liberally construed in favor of the employee unless otherwise compelled by the...
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