Blanding v. Lott
| Decision Date | 31 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-277,Appellate Case No. 2017-001124 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Reginald Andre Blanding, Wanda Blanding, and Brittani Blanding, by and through her Guardians ad Litem, Reginald Andre Blanding and Wanda Blanding, Plaintiffs, Of whom Reginald Andre Blanding, Wanda Blanding and Brittani Blanding are Appellants, v. Leon Lott, in his official capacity, Respondent. |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Deborah J. Butcher and Robert J. Butcher, both of The Camden Law Firm, PA, both of Camden, for Appellants.
Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann, Davis & Hughes, PA, and Robert David Garfield, of Crowe LaFave, LLC, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
Appellants, husband and wife Reginald and Wanda Blanding and their daughter, Brittani Blanding (collectively, the Blandings), appeal from an order of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of Respondent, Leon Lott (the Sheriff), on the Blandings' defamation cause of action against the Sheriff. The Blandings contend the trial court erred in finding issue preclusion based upon previous summary judgment orders in the case and then applying the precluded issue determination in entering summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff. They further assert error in the trial court "finding that a public affairs officer had a duty to communicate with the press when analyzing the defense of qualified privilege for the defamation claim." We affirm.1
As to the Blandings' issue preclusion arguments, we first note our review of the record reveals the trial court did not rely exclusively on the previous summary judgment orders in making its in limine rulings on the evidentiary matters. In its oral ruling, though the trial court generally granted the Sheriff's in limine motion to preclude certain evidence, it noted it was not a "per se exclusion" and indicated there would be some "wiggle room" for the Blandings to present relevant evidence. Also, while noting many of the matters had "been actually and necessarily determined in this matter already," the trial court further stated that many of the matters the Sheriff sought to preclude were "not relevant to this case." Therefore, the oral ruling on the motion in limine indicates the trial court did not rely solely on the previous summary judgment findings but also preliminarily determined the Blandings would be precluded from admitting certain evidentiary matters based upon the fact that the matters would not be relevant to the remaining defamation action. Further, in thereafter describing its previous in limine rulings in the written order that granted summary judgment, the trial court noted it had determined the Blandings "were estopped from presenting certain evidence and testimony unrelated to the sole remaining claim of defamation." (emphasis added). Thus, the written order indicates the trial court made its in limine rulings based upon a determination that the evidentiary matters in question would be inadmissible because they were not relevant to the defamation action, not because they had been previously decided in prior summary judgment orders in this case. The Blandings do not appeal from the trial court's in limine determination that some mattersshould be excluded because they were irrelevant to the defamation claim. "[S]hould the appealing party fail to raise all of the grounds upon which a lower court's decision was based, those unappealed findings—whether correct or not—become the law of the case." Dreher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 412 S.C. 244, 250, 772 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2015). See also Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 328, 730 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2012) ; Walbeck v. I'On Co., 426 S.C. 494, 526, 827 S.E.2d 348, 364 (Ct. App. 2019) ().
Second, we find no support for the Blandings' assertion that the trial court relied on its evidentiary in limine rulings in determining the Sheriff was entitled to summary judgment on the defamation claim. Contrary to the Blandings' position, there is nothing in the record to indicate "it dawned on" the trial court during the in limine hearing that the Blandings were precluded from introducing evidence that the complained of statement was defamatory. Further, the trial court's order granting summary judgment does not reveal it relied on any of the evidentiary preclusion rulings in finding the Sheriff was entitled to summary judgement on the defamation claim.
Finally, assuming arguendo the trial court relied on its issue preclusion determinations in finding summary judgment appropriate, the Blandings never raised the propriety of the trial court using its in limine evidentiary preclusion rulings in granting summary judgment. Therefore, this argument is not preserved for appellate review. See McCall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 359 S.C. 372, 381, 597 S.E.2d 181, 186 (Ct. App. 2004) (). If, as the Blandings contend, the court so relied, it was incumbent upon them to bring any such perceived error to the trial court's attention. See In re Timmerman, 331 S.C. 455, 460, 502 S.E.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1998) ; id. (); I'On, LLC v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406,422, 526 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2000) ( ...
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