Blanford v. Dunleavy
| Decision Date | 08 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-00036-JWS |
| Citation | 566 F.Supp.3d 969 |
| Parties | Anthony L. BLANFORD and John K. Bellville, Plaintiffs, v. Michael J. DUNLEAVY, in his individual and official capacities; Tuckerman Babcock; and the State of Alaska, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Stephen Koteff, Joshua A. Decker, ACLU of Alaska Foundation, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiffs.
Michael Bruce Baylous, Peter C. Partnow, Brewster H. Jamieson, Lane Powell LLC, Anchorage, AK, for Defendants Michael J. Dunleavy, Tuckerman Babcock, State of Alaska.
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
At docket 54, Plaintiffs, Anthony L. Blanford and John K. Bellville (collectively "Plaintiffs"), filed a motion for summary judgment on their claims that Defendants, Governor Michael J. Dunleavy, Tuckerman Babcock, and the State of Alaska (collectively "Defendants"), violated their rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 5 of the Alaska Constitution. Defendants responded at docket 61. Plaintiffs replied at docket 64. Defendants filed their cross-motion for summary judgment at docket 55. Plaintiffs responded at docket 62. Defendants replied at docket 63. Oral argument was requested, but was denied at docket 66 because it would not be of further assistance to the Court's determination.
In November 2018, Defendant Michael J. Dunleavy was elected Governor of the State of Alaska. He selected Defendant Tuckerman Babcock to serve as the chair of his transition team. Part of any transition process requires appointing subordinate executive branch officials, which necessarily involves replacing officials that served under the prior administration. In past transitions, incoming administrations requested resignations from around 250 employees.1 Governor Dunleavy significantly broadened the scope of this practice when, on November 16, 2018, Mr. Babcock, as the chair of the Governor-Elect's transition team, sent a memorandum to most of the state's at-will employees—numbering at least 800 and including not only department heads, but also criminal prosecutors, state attorneys, medical doctors, psychiatrists, pharmacists, fiscal analysts, tax code specialists, investment managers, geologists, accountants, IT professionals, and administrative law judges.2 The memorandum required employees to submit a resignation, along with a statement of interest in remaining employed with the new administration. The memorandum stated in part as follows:
The memorandum was accompanied by a resignation form, which included a sentence where employees had to choose whether or not they wanted to be considered for their position with the Dunleavy administration.4
Plaintiffs were among the employees who received the resignation memorandum. At that time, Dr. Blanford was the chief of psychiatry and Dr. Bellville was a staff psychiatrist at Alaska Psychiatric Institute ("API"), the State's psychiatric hospital. Dr. Blanford was hired in 2016 as a staff psychiatrist and later was promoted to the chief of psychiatry position. Dr. Bellville started at API in the spring of 2018. Dr. Blanford was surprised that he received the resignation request and Dr. Bellville initially disregarded his receipt of the memorandum as a mistake, because they did not consider their jobs to be political in nature and both were professionally well-regarded at API.5
The demand for the resignations of all at-will employees was reported in the local newspaper. Governor Dunleavy explained his decision to a reporter: "We want to give people an opportunity to think about whether they want to remain with this administration and be able to have a conversation with us."6 Mr. Babcock was reported as saying as follows:
Upon reading these comments, Dr. Blanford became concerned about the propriety of having to sign what he considered a "pledge ... to a political agenda" in his role as chief of psychiatry at API.8 He voiced his opposition to the resignation demand in a letter to the editor of the newspaper.9 He indicated in the published letter that he wanted to keep his job at API, but would not submit a "symbolic gesture of deference" in order to keep it.10 He stated he was hired for his expertise and not his "political allegiance," and that he could not voice his support for the administration's agenda if it involved "further cuts and hiring freezes, because that's not what's needed at API at this time."11 He stated his "moral allegiance" is to the mentally ill and staff who care for them and that it was his belief that "[p]olitics have already cut deeply into our ability to care for the mentally ill."12 Dr. Bellville agreed with Dr. Blanford's position.13
Neither psychiatrist submitted his resignation. In the morning of December 3, 2018, the day Governor Dunleavy was sworn into office, Mr. Babcock notified Plaintiffs of their termination from service effective at noon that same day.14 While no basis was provided in the notifications, Defendants concede that Plaintiffs were fired because they failed to submit their resignations.15 Administration officials later requested to meet with Plaintiffs to encourage them to stay at API, but maintained the condition that Plaintiffs reapply with the new administration.16 Plaintiffs understood that they could have their jobs on the original condition—by submitting a letter of intent or otherwise specifically articulating their interest in being employed at API under the new administration, which they again refused to do, believing the demand to be a political one to which they objected.17
This lawsuit followed. Plaintiffs assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendants for violation of their First Amendment rights, as well as a free speech claim under Article I, § 5 of the Alaska Constitution. Plaintiffs also allege a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under state law. They seek monetary relief, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs now seek summary judgment on their federal and state free speech claims. Defendants, in turn, seek summary judgment on these same claims. They also ask for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ state claim for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."18 The materiality requirement ensures that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."19 Ultimately, "summary judgment will not lie if the ... evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."20 However, summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."21
The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.22 Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, the moving party need not present evidence to show that summary judgment is warranted; it need only point out the lack of any genuine dispute as to material fact.23 Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth evidence of specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.24 All evidence presented by the non-movant must be believed for purposes of summary judgment, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant.25 However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.26 "[W]hen simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are before the court, the court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material...
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