Blangsted v. Snowmass-Wildcat Fire Protection

• Decision Date: 05 August 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 04-cv-02260-WDM-KLM.
• Parties: Paul BLANGSTED, Plaintiff, v. SNOWMASS-WILDCAT FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT and William Cowan, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

642 F.Supp.2d 1250

Paul BLANGSTED, Plaintiff, v. SNOWMASS-WILDCAT FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT and William Cowan, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 04-cv-02260-WDM-KLM.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

August 5, 2009.

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Bryan G. Polisuk, Douglas L. Steele, Woodley & McGillivary, Washington, DC, Thomas B. Buescher, Buescher, Goldhammer, Kelman & Dodge, P.C., Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Mark C. Overturf, Nikolai N. Frant, Overturf McGath Hull & Doherty, P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR A NEW TRIAL

MILLER, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before me on Defendants' Motion for a New Trial Based on the Excessive Size of the Verdict or—In the Alternative—Motion for Remittitur (Docket No. 138); Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Based on Plaintiff's Spoliation of Relevant Evidence (Docket No. 141); Defendants' Motion for a New Trial Because the Verdict was Against the Weight of the Evidence (Docket No. 154); and Plaintiff's request for reinstatement pursuant to a favorable jury verdict entered July 23, 2008. After a review of the pleadings and the parties' written arguments, I conclude oral argument is not required. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion for New Trial (Docket No. 138) shall be granted in part and denied in part and the motions shall otherwise be denied. In addition, Plaintiffs' request for reinstatement is conditionally granted.

Background

In this case, Plaintiff Paul Blangsted alleged that Defendant Snowmass-Wildcat Fire Protection District (the "District"), along with Defendant William Cowan, violated his First Amendment right of freedom of association when they terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for his instrumental role in organizing, forming, leading, and participating in a local firefighter's union. At trial, Plaintiff maintained that the reasons Defendants articulated for his termination were false and merely pretext for discrimination. Defendants argued that Plaintiff was terminated because management felt that he demonstrated undesirable and inappropriate behavior in connection with an alleged act of vandalism on a sign.¹ On April 16, 2004, upon Plaintiff's return from vacation, Assistant Chief John Mele met with and suspended Plaintiff for four days based on the vandalism incident. Four days later, on April 20, 2004, Plaintiff returned to the fire department and met with Chief Cowan and Assistant Chief Mele (the "Termination Meeting"). Defendants allege that they remained silent at the beginning of this meeting to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to admit to his involvement in the vandalism. When he did not do so, they terminated his employment with the fire department. The termination was later confirmed by the District's Board of Directors.

After a three-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff awarding him $572,145.00 in compensatory damages and $10,000.00 in punitive damages against Defendant Cowan individually. At trial, Plaintiff testified that his economic damages of lost wages and benefits were $72,145, and this number was essentially unrebutted. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that $500,000 of the compensatory damages award is for emotional distress, pain and suffering and other related factors.² In their three motions, Defendants seek either dismissal, a new trial, or remittitur of the non-economic compensatory damages award.

Discussion

1. Excessive Size of the Verdict

Defendants' first motion (Docket No. 138) seeks a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 based on the size of the verdict or, alternatively, remittitur of the $500,000 non-economic compensatory damages award to $50,000. Plaintiff opposes this request, arguing that neither remedy is appropriate in this case as the size of the verdict is not so excessive as to overcome the substantial deference afforded to jury verdicts.

"It [is] the jury's function, as the trier of fact, to determine the amount of damages that would fairly compensate [the plaintiff], and the jury has wide discretion in making that determination." Black v. Hieb's Enters., Inc., 805 F.2d 360, 362-63 (10th Cir.1986) (citing Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.1985) ("It is a fundamental legal principle that the determination of the quantum of damages in civil cases is a fact-finder's function. The trier of the facts, who has the first-handed opportunity to hear the testimony and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, is clothed with a wide latitude and discretion in fixing damages, pursuant to the court's instructions, deemed proper to fairly compensate the injured party.")). Indeed, "[i]t is within the virtually exclusive purview of the jury to evaluate credibility and fix damages." United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1230 (10th Cir.2000). Therefore, "`absent an award so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper cause invaded the trial, the jury's determination of the fact is considered inviolate.'" Hynes v. Energy West, Inc., 211 F.3d 1193, 1206 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Campbell v. Bartlett, 975 F.2d 1569, 1577 (10th Cir.1992)). "[I]f the court determines that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, or for any other reason it appears that the jury erred or abused its discretion not only on the issue of damages but also on the issue of liability, the court must unconditionally order a new trial and cannot give the plaintiff the option to accept a lesser amount." Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir.1983). If, however, "the court concludes there was error only in an excessive damage award, but not one also tainting the finding of liability, the ... court may order a remittitur and alternatively direct a new trial if the plaintiff refuses to accept the remittitur." Id.

In this case, Defendants argue that, given the limited evidence presented at trial regarding Plaintiff's emotional distress, the jury's award of $500,000 in noneconomic damages is so excessive that it requires a new trial or, in the alternative, a remittitur. The only evidence regarding Plaintiff's emotional distress was his own testimony which revealed that he had difficulties in telling his parents that he had been terminated from the fire department; in seeing his friends who were still employed by the District after the termination; in living in a small community where he had been accused of lying; and in dealing with the fact that he was terminated for working towards something positive for the fire department; i.e., the benefits of unionization. Plaintiff had wanted to be a firefighter since he was a child, following in his father's footsteps; he had worked for the District as a firefighter for nine years without any disciplinary action; and had taken on additional responsibilities in the department. He experienced trouble sleeping and testified that it "weighed on my mind what I was going to do, as far as how my life was going to continue, with employment and such." Otherwise, however, there was no evidence that Plaintiff suffered any physical manifestation of his emotional distress or that he sought any professional health care and he presented no corroborating evidence.

Shortly after his termination Plaintiff was able to find another job, albeit not as a firefighter, and his salary increased over time so that he was eventually making more than he was as a firefighter with the District. Although Plaintiff had to use his retirement money, at a penalty, to cover his living expenses during the periods when he was not employed or making less money than he did as a firefighter, there was no evidence of severe financial hardship as a result of his termination.

Given this and other evidence presented at trial regarding the circumstances of Plaintiff's termination, I "cannot conclude that some award for such anguish and distress is unsupported by substantial evidence." Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 875 (10th Cir.1989). Although the damage award in this case is quite large, it is not "`so excessive ... as to shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper cause invaded the trial.'" Hynes, 211 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Campbell, 975 F.2d at 1577). Accordingly, the jury's determination of liability is not so tainted and I am not constrained to order a new trial. See Malandris, 703 F.2d at 1168. Nevertheless, I must still consider whether the damage award was excessive, requiring a remittitur. Id. Of the damages awarded, clearly the specific amount of $72,145, precisely based on the Plaintiff's uncontested testimony, cannot be deemed excessive and the focus of the inquiry is whether the $500,000 compensatory award for emotional distress, pain and suffering, etc. is excessive.

When determining whether the $500,000 award is excessive, my consideration should include the following factors: (1) the nature and severity of the conduct violating the plaintiff's rights; (2) the nature and extent of the harm suffered by the plaintiff; (3) whether medical or other healthcare assistance was sought; (4) whether the plaintiff could continue to work in his chosen field; (5) the context or circumstances of defendant's acts; and (6) corroborating, objective evidence. See Smith v. Nw. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1416-17 (10th Cir.1997) (upholding a $200,000 award in a sexual harassment case). The jury concluded the Plaintiff lost his job for exercising his First Amendment rights to organize and participate in a union with his fellow firemen. That is a harsh consequence for the exercise of protected rights. The loss of the job in his chosen field is significant; however, the evidence is unclear whether his...