Blank v. Islamic Republic of Iran

• Decision Date: 17 July 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-3645 (BAH)
• Parties: EDITH BLANK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

EDITH BLANK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-3645 (BAH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 17, 2021

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 25, 1996, a devastating terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed United States military personnel and contractors, resulted in the deaths of nineteen service-members and severe injuries to scores of others, including three individual Air Force service members, whose five immediate family members are plaintiffs in this action. Compl. at 1-2, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs allege that defendant, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is liable under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, for "provid[ing] material support and resources to Hezbollah," id. at 4, "which caused, enabled and facilitated the terrorist attack at the Khobar towers," id. at 8. Plaintiffs have complied with the FSIA's requirements for service on defendant, which has failed to enter an appearance or otherwise defend against this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4); Return of Serv., ECF No. 15; Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 17. Four of the five plaintiffs now seek the entry of a default judgment against defendant as to liability and damages. Four Pls.' Mot. to Take Judicial Notice of Evid. in Prior Related Cases and for Entry of Default J. as to Liab. and Damages ("Pls.' Mot."), ECF No. 18.¹ For the reasons detailed below, default judgment as to liability and damages is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Several prior decisions of this Court have found defendant, among others, liable for the Khobar Towers bombing. See Christie v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-1289 (BAH), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116378, at *2-4, *55-57 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020) (Howell, C.J.); Aceto v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-464 (BAH), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22084 at *2-5, *46-49 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2020) (Howell, C.J.); Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-1376 (BAH), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108011 at *6-8, *291-294 (D.D.C. June 27, 2019) (Howell, C.J.); Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10-11, 35-37 (D.D.C. 2018) (Howell, C.J.); Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169-70, 181-82 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran ("Heiser I"), 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 263-65 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.); Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.). In Blais and Heiser I, the Court heard evidence and witness testimony. See Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 46-52; Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 250. In Heiser I alone, the evidentiary hearing took seventeen days and included examination of witnesses, including seven expert witnesses. See id.² Rimkus, Akins, Schooley, Aceto, and Christie eachconcluded that judicial notice of the findings of fact in Blais and Heiser I was appropriate, see Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172-73; Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 10-11; Schooley, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108011, at *5-8; Aceto, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22084, at *2-5; Christie, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116378, at *2-5, and the plaintiffs here request that this Court "take judicial notice of prior findings of fact and supporting evidence imposing liability under Section 1605A (and its predecessor, Section 1605(a)(7)) on Iran for providing material support and resources to" those responsible for the Khobar Towers attack, Pls.' Mem. at 7-8.

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to "judicially notice" adjudicative facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute because" they "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(b).³ Rule 201 is used frequently to judicially notice factual evidence developed in other FSIA proceedings "involving the same conduct by the same defendants," Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11, "even when those proceedings have taken place in front of a different judge," Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009)). This avoids "the formality of having that evidence reproduced." Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011)); see alsoOveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran ("Oveissi II"), 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding courts permitted "in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation" (quoting Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172)); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (taking "judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases").

Taking judicial notice of prior findings "does not conclusively establish the facts found in those cases" in the later FSIA case. Foley, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 191. Rather, "based on judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases[,] . . . courts may reach their own independent findings of fact." Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172. In fact, "courts in FSIA litigation have adopted a middle-ground approach that permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation—without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced—to reach their own, independent findings of fact in the cases before them." Id. (citing Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2010)). Notably, the D.C. Circuit has endorsed the use of judicial notice to establish facts in FSIA terrorism cases. In Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiffs had "met their burden of producing evidence 'satisfactory to the court'" to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, where the only evidence linking North Korea to the victim's disappearance was a South Korean court's conviction of a North Korean agent, of which the district court had taken judicial notice. 774 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

This Court is persuaded that this approach is both "efficient and sufficiently protective of the absent defendant['s] interests," Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11, and will therefore adopt it and grant the plaintiffs' request to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in Heiser I, Blais,Rimkus, Akins, and Schooley, see id. (stating that factual evidence developed in other cases "involving the same conduct by the same defendants is admissible and may be relied upon in this case"); Pls.' Mot. at 2. The evidence regarding the Khobar Towers bombing is summarized below, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case.

A. The Attack on Khobar Towers

The Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia "housed the coalition forces," including the U.S. military forces, "charged with monitoring compliance with [United Nations] security council resolutions." Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47. About ten minutes before 10:00 pm on June 25, 1996, "a large gasoline tanker truck pulled up" and parked "alongside the perimeter wall of the Khobar Towers complex." Id.; Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252; see also Compl. ¶ 16. Security guards near the top of one of the towers, Building 131, "started to give warnings about the unusual vehicle location," but the truck exploded "within about 15 minutes." Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252; see also Compl. ¶ 16. The blast "sheared off the face of Building 131," Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252, and "caused structural damage in buildings a quarter mile away," Compl. ¶ 16. "The explosion killed dozens of persons including nineteen American servicemen, [and h]undreds of others were injured and burned." Id. Subsequent "investigation determined that the force of the explosion was the equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT. The Defense Department said that it was the largest non-nuclear explosion ever up to that time." Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252.

B. Defendant Iran's Role

Iran "has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism" by the U.S. Department of State "since January 19, 1984." Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47; see also, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran ("Fritz I"), 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 77 (D.D.C. 2018); BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/. Prior proceedings have found that Iran planned and supported the Khobar Towers bombing.⁴ Both the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran at the time, and the Minister of Intelligence and Security "approved" the attack. Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252. The truck bomb used was "assembled" at a base in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley "jointly operated by the [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC")] and by the terrorist organization known as Hezbollah;" the individuals who carried out the bombing called themselves "Saudi Hezbollah." Id.

These conclusions are based in part on the testimony of four key expert witnesses in Blais and Heiser I. Louis Freeh, who was director of the FBI at the time of the bombing, and Dale Watson, then deputy counterterrorism chief of the FBI, testified in Heiser I based on their oversight of the FBI's "massive and thorough investigation of the attack, using over 250 agents." Id.; see also id. at 260-62. "Based on that investigation, an Alexandria, Virginia, grand jury returned an indictment . . . against 13 identified members of the pro-Iran Saudi Hezbollah organization." Id. at 252. During its investigation, the FBI interviewed six members of Saudi Hezbollah who "admitted to the FBI their complicity in the attack on Khobar Towers, and admitted that senior officials in the Iranian government provided them with funding, planning, training, sponsorship, and travel...