Blank v. Swan
Decision Date | 25 March 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 78 C 849.,78 C 849. |
Citation | 487 F. Supp. 452 |
Parties | Philomena BLANK, Plaintiffs, v. Donald G. SWAN; Barry Sherman; Daniel W. Burke; Arthur Fournier; Ronald Lundin; and York Township, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
George F. Galland, Jr., Davis, Miner & Barnhill, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Larry M. Karlin, George W. McGurn, Michael McGurn, Harry G. Fins, Chicago, Ill., Barry E. Garley, Villa Park, Ill., for defendants.
This matter comes before the court upon defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
Plaintiff, Philomena Blank (Blank) was hired by defendant Donald G. Swan (Swan) as an employee of defendant York Township (York) on March 15, 1970.1 In 1973 Swan made her chief welfare caseworker and office manager. Swan, who remained her supervisor, gave Malci Agnic (Agnic) a job in their office in March 1976. On April 21, 1976, Swan sent Blank a letter which reads as follows:
Yours very truly York Township Don Swan Supervisor, York Township.
There is evidence that Swan publicized the charges that Blank was emotionally or mentally disturbed and that she had tried to blackmail him both before and after he sent Blank this letter.
Blank informally requested a hearing before the York Township Board of Trustees, but received none. She never requested a hearing before Swan. Since her suspension2 became effective, Blank has received no further salary from York, no payments have been made on her behalf to the municipal retirement fund, and she has neither received nor been eligible for any benefits associated with employment with York.
After looking for a job for over a year, Blank obtained a clerical job with the Veterans Administration in Hines, Illinois. She held this position from September, 1978, until later in the year, when she moved to New York with her husband.
In Count I of her two-count Complaint, Blank alleges that defendants' actions during the course of this episode violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In Count II she seeks recovery from Swan for libel and slander under Illinois law.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law". Blank contends that defendants have unconstitutionally deprived her of a liberty interest by defaming her in connection with the change in her employment status.3
Paige v. Harris, 584 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1978).
As this court observed in Danno v. Peterson, 421 F.Supp. 950 (N.D.Ill.1976), this Circuit has interpreted Davis as formulating, in the employment context, a "stigma plus" analysis. Thus, in Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 960, 97 S.Ct. 1610, 51 L.Ed.2d 811 (1977), the court held that a liberty interest would be implicated where the State inflicted a stigma in conjunction with a failure to rehire or a discharge. And in Larry, the plaintiff was found to have a liberty interest at stake in a situation where a stigma was placed on him in connection with the rejection of his application for government employment, the effect of which was to totally debar him from all federal employment for up to three years.4
However, this court ruled in Danno that not every State-ordered alteration in an employee's employment status constitutes a sufficient "plus" to mandate the conclusion that that action, when accompanied by the State-inflicted stigmatization or defamation of the effected employee, implicates a liberty interest of the employee. More specifically, Danno holds that a school board's defamation of the plaintiff in conjunction with its determination to relieve him of his duties as principal and reassign him to a regular teaching position did not implicate the plaintiff's liberty interests.
424 U.S. at 711, 96 S.Ct. at 1165, as a manifestation of the Court's belief that a Roth-type liberty interest will only be recognized where there is an allegation of defamation plus termination or non-renewal of employment.
The holding of the Court of Appeals in Larry refutes this argument with regard to the second prong of the concept of liberty identified in Roth and the reasoning underlying that decision applies equally in the context of the other aspect of liberty discussed in Roth. The significant language in Davis is that quoted in Larry and reproduced above. The passage relied on by defendants was a reference to the facts of the Roth case. Roth was suing the Board of Regents because they failed to renew his teaching contract. In the portion of the Roth opinion that was being interpreted by the Davis Court when it made the statement upon which defendants rely, the Roth Court merely observed that Roth might have stated a cause of action for deprivation of liberty if he had alleged that the non-renewal of his contract was accompanied by the directing of a defamatory accusation against him.
However, the court's rejection of the extreme position urged by defendants does not resolve the question of whether an indefinite suspension without pay is the type of "plus" that will suffice to allow a finding that a liberty interest exists. It is to that question that the court will now direct its attention.6
Defendants have cited no cases holding that this type of change is employment status in an insufficient "plus", and this court has found none. To the contrary, the court's researches have revealed that every court to decide this issue since Davis has found that suspension without pay does satisfy the "plus" requirement of the "stigma plus" test. See Victor v. Brickley, 476 F.Supp. 888 (E.D.Mich.1979); Doe v. Anker, 451 F.Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Allison v. City of Live Oak, 450 F.Supp. 200 (M.D.Fla. 1978); Bagby v. Beal, 439 F.Supp. 1257 (M.D.Pa.1977); Faulkner v. North Carolina Department of Corrections, 428 F.Supp. 100 (W.D.N.Car.1977).7 These decisions are supported by the reasoning found in numerous other opinions. See e. g., Ventetuolo v. Burke, 470 F.Supp. 887, 896-897 n.7 (D.R.I. 1978); Virgin Islands v. Anderson, 434 F.Supp. 1204 (D.V.I.1977); De Bono v. Vizas, 427 F.Supp. 905 (D.Col.1977). Finally, they are consistent with this court's holding in Danno. That decision was premised on the court's finding that because the plaintiff was still employed by the school system, he "did not have to seek further employment and the alleged stigma was minimized by his continued employment." 421 F.Supp. at 954. Blank, on the other hand, was indefinitely suspended without pay. Thus, she did not have the luxury of merely "wishing to seek other employment opportunities". Id. (emphasis added).8 Therefore, the court concludes that Blank's suspension was a sufficient "plus" to allow the court to find that her liberty...
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Perry v. F.B.I.
...Bank of Chicago, 586 F.Supp. 106, 108-109 (N.D.Ill.1984); Zurek v. Hasten, 553 F.Supp. 745, 747 (N.D.Ill.1982); Blank v. Swan, 487 F.Supp. 452, 455, 456-457 (N.D.Ill.1980).Bone v. City of Lafayette, 763 F.2d 295 (7th Cir.1985), is not contra, because there the defamation did not affect empl......