Blanken v. Harris, Upham & Co., Imcorporated

Decision Date30 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 9392.,No. 9416.,9392.,9416.
Citation359 A.2d 281
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals
PartiesSamuel BLANKEN et al., Appellants, v. HARRIS, UPHAM & CO., INCORPORATED, Appellee. HARRIS, UPHAM & CO., INCORPORATED, Appellant, v. Samuel BLANKEN et al., Appellees.

Jules Fink, Silver Springs, Md., with whom Isadore B. Katz, Silver Springs, Md., was on the brief, for appellants in No. 9392 and appellees in No. 9416.

Robert N. Kharasch, Washington, D. C., with whom Rosemary Boyd Avery, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee in No. 9392 and appellant in No. 9416.

Before GALLAGHER and MACK, Associate Judges, and PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired.

PER CURIAM:

In this dispute arising between stock investors and a brokerage firm, both parties appeal from the judgment of the trial court ordering a dismissal of a claim and a counterclaim for damages and for money due and owing as a result of two stock transactions, and from the order of the court denying requests for a new trial. We find that the trial court properly held that the plaintiffs-appellants, the Blankens, had failed to sustain the burden of proving their claim for damages for conversion and we therefore affirm as to this claim. As to the counterclaim of the defendantcross-appellant, Harris, Upham & Co., we conclude that the findings of the trial court are insufficient to show the basis for dismissal and we reverse and remand this cause for further findings.

At a time when Harris, Upham was holding (in the normal course of business) three hundred shares of Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) stock belonging to the Blankens, a dispute arose between the corporation and the Blankens with respect to another transaction. The controversy began when the brokerage firm purchased two hundred shares of Union Corporation (Union) stock on February 9, 1972 at the market price of $24.75. Although Mr. Blanken admitted that he had ordered two hundred Union shares by telephone from the firm's representative on" that date, Blanken denied that the purchase was made in accord with his instructions. He claimed instead that he had ordered the purchase at a fixed price of $24.50 and that on the same day, when informed of the purchase at market price, he informed the representative that the buying had been contrary to his instructions and that he did not want the stock. On the other hand the corporation's representative claimed that Blanken had ordered the Union stock at market price and had impliedly approved the purchase on those terms.

When Blanken left the city without making payment subject to cash and did not communicate with the firm by the settlement date (February 16th),1 the company's representative extended the time for payment until March 3rd. On that date when still no communication had been received from Blanken (despite the firm's warning to Blanken by telegram), the stock was sold at the market price of 15 1/8 per share at a loss of $2069.78 and Blanken's account (including his FNMA security) was transferred from a cash one to a margin one.2

Thereafter Harris, Upham made demands upon Blanken for the Union stock loss, and Blanken made demands upon Harris, Upham for the delivery of his FNMA stock. Blanken was told that his account could not be closed until the Union loss was satisfied, that he was free meanwhile to sell the FNMA stock and purchase other stock with the proceeds, but that the proceeds would not be released to him.

The Blankens brought suit in May 1972 seeking replevin, money due and owing, and damages for conversion. Harris, Upham, offering to lodge the FNMA stock with the court, counterclaimed for money due and owing on the Union stock purchase. On August 18, 1972, the court ordered the FNMA stock returned to Blanken. The court heard the case in November, ordered Harris, Upham to pay the Blankens a balance of $112.44 remaining in their account, and rendered the dismissals which are the subject of this appeal.

The trial court properly concluded that the Blankens had failed to establish an act on the part of Harris, Upham which would entitle the Blankens to compensatory or punitive damages in connection with the FNMA stock.

In order for there to be a conversion there must be an unlawful exercise of ownership, dominion and control over the personalty of another in denial or repudiation of his right to such property. See Shea v. Fridley, D.C.Mun.App., 123 A.2d 358 (1956). Or, as the Second Restatement of Torts sets out:

Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.3

In the instant case, the evidence showed that the FNMA shares, while held in a street name, were listed to Blanken; that the Blankens received all dividends; and that they were notified that the firm would honor any order for the sale of the stock and purchase of other security with the proceeds. At trial the firm's Vice President testified, and the court found, that at no time did the corporation assert ownership over the shares. These circumstances do not support the control necessary to a finding of conversion but even if this were not the case, we can discern no damages accruing to the Blankens because of the detention of the stock.4 Pursuant to the August order of the court, they received the stock, which they originally had acquired as a long term investment. There is no evidence that they sought to sell and they have received all dividends.

As to the trial court's conclusion that Harris, Upham had failed to sustain its burden in seeking damages for the Union stock,5 the issue becomes more complex. The purchase of this stock by the Blankens was disputed. Quite apart from the testimony of the investor, there is support in the broker's evidence that less than an ordinary standard of care was...

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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • June 24, 2011
    ...to do something that “seriously interferes” with the plaintiff's right to control the property in question. Blanken v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 359 A.2d 281, 283 (D.C.1976). While there may be other avenues for redress when the interference is less serious, suing for conversion is not amo......
  • Duggan v. Keto, 86-352.
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    ...another in denial or repudiation of his rights thereto." Shea v. Fridley, 123 A.2d 358, 361 (D.C. 1956); accord, Blanken v. Harris, Upham & Co., 359 A.2d 281, 283 (D.C. 1976). The traditional standard for calculating damages for conversion is the fair market value of the property at the tim......
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    ...or repudiation of his right to such property.’ ” Dennis v. Edwards, 831 A.2d 1006, 1013 (D.C.2003) (quoting Blanken v. Harris, Upham, & Co., Inc., 359 A.2d 281, 283 (D.C.1976)). Personalty means “[p]ersonal property as distinguished from real property.” See Black's Law Dictionary 1260 (9th ......
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    ...to do something that "seriously interferes" with the plaintiff's right to control the property in question. Blanken v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 359 A.2d 281, 283 (D.C. 1976).While there may be other avenues for redress when the interference is less serious, suing for conversion is not amo......
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