Blankenship v. U.S., 97-2299

• Decision Date: 06 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2299,97-2299
• Citation: 159 F.3d 336
• Parties: Kenneth BLANKENSHIP, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 336

159 F.3d 336

Kenneth BLANKENSHIP, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 97-2299.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 1998.

Decided Oct. 6, 1998.

Howard Eisenberg, Milwaukee, WI, argued, for Appellant.

Thomas Meehan, Assistant United States Attorney, St. Louis, Missouri, argued, for Appellee.

Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, HEANEY and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Kenneth Blankenship appeals the district court's summary denial of his postconviction motion attacking his sentence on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1996). He argues that the district court erred by denying his motion without a hearing and by not providing any case-specific reasons for the summary disposition. We affirm.

I.

In 1992, Blankenship entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988), and a panel of this court affirmed his conviction. See United States v. Blankenship, 67 F.3d 673, 678 (8th Cir.1995). Our prior panel opinion set forth the facts of this case, see id. at 674-75, 678, which we briefly summarize here. A man named John Kellick, his girlfriend, and two others, went to Blankenship's trailer home late one night seeking money that Kellick claimed Blankenship owed him. Id. at 674. An argument ensued between Kellick and Blankenship. Id. Blankenship said Kellick was intoxicated and threatened to harm Blankenship's family. Id. at 678. When the argument escalated, Blankenship returned inside his trailer (which did not have a telephone), left through a back door, and walked to his father's nearby trailer (which also had no telephone). Id. at 674, 678. There, he retrieved a shotgun and returned to the confrontation at his own home in an asserted effort to protect his family. Id. When a scuffle broke out, the shotgun Blankenship carried discharged, killing Kellick. Id.

Blankenship pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, but conditioned his guilty plea upon preserving his right to raise two issues on appeal: (1) the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174; and (2) the district court's rejection of his asserted justification defense. A panel of this court rejected Blankenship's arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. Id. at 678.

Currently pending is Blankenship's first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, in which he claims that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing for not requesting a downward departure from the federal Sentencing Guidelines on the ground that the wrongful conduct of Kellick, the victim, contributed significantly to provoking the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (1995) (Policy Statement). The district court summarily denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing and without providing reasons for the summary disposition. Blankenship appealed, and this court granted a certificate of appealability for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

II.

On appeal, Blankenship argues that the district court erred by summarily denying habeas relief without holding a hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision to deny a section 2255 motion without a hearing, and we review de novo the district court's rejection of the claims involved. Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir.1996). A section 2255 "petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle him to relief," id. (internal quotations omitted), unless the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Engelen v. United States, 68 F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir.1995). "Accordingly, a petition can be dismissed without a hearing if (1) the petitioner's allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact." Id. Thus, to determine whether Blankenship was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, we must consider the validity of his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the record in his case.

The district court's summary dismissal does not expressly state its reasons for rejecting Blankenship's claim of ineffective assistance, and Blankenship seeks a remand to allow the district court to articulate its reasons. While the preferred practice would most certainly be for the district court to have enumerated its reasons for the summary dismissal, our review of the district court's rejection of the claims involved is de novo. See Payne, 78 F.3d at 347. We conclude that a remand is not necessary, and we may affirm the district court on any basis supported by the record. ¹

To prevail on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, Blankenship must show both (1) that his attorney's performance was deficient, falling below professional standards of competence; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Wajda v. United States, 64 F.3d 385, 387 (8th Cir.1995). In assessing counsel's performance, courts defer to reasonable trial strategies and "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Henderson v. Norris, 118 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1081, 140 L.Ed.2d 138 (1998). When considering whether the defense suffered prejudice, a court must determine whether "there is a reasonable probability [sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Wise v. Bowersox, 136 F.3d 1197, 1206 (8th Cir.1998). We also consider "whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).

Turning first to the prejudice prong of the familiar Strickland test, we recognize that we need not address the competency of counsel's performance if the prejudice issue is dispositive. See 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (noting "a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies"); see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir.1996). We consider whether the motion for downward departure, which Blankenship asserts his counsel should have made, had a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome or fundamental fairness of Blankenship's sentencing. No prejudice arises from counsel's failure to raise a claim that had little likelihood of success on the merits. See Thomas v. United States, 951 F.2d 902, 904-05 (8th Cir.1991).

The federal Sentencing Guidelines provide that a district court may grant a downward departure "below the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense" in cases where "the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior." USSG § 5K2.10, p.s. This policy statement further provides factors to consider "in deciding the extent of a sentence reduction" on this basis. Id. These factors include the relevant physical characteristics of the victim in comparison with those of the defendant, the defendant's efforts to prevent a confrontation, the danger either reasonably perceived by the defendant or actually presented by the victim, and "any other relevant conduct by the victim that substantially contributed to the danger presented." Id. § 5K2.10(a)-(e), p.s.

In his affidavit in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Blankenship states that he was awakened one night by Kellick and a group of people outside his trailer home. He asserts that Kellick appeared to be drunk and threatened to harm Blankenship's father. Fearing for his family's safety, Blankenship then left his trailer by the back door, retrieved a gun from his father's trailer, and returned, intending to scare Kellick into leaving. After a struggle, the shotgun discharged, killing Kellick. Blankenship then had his wife call the police from a neighbor's house. Blankenship asserts that Kellick had a reputation for violence. (See Appellant's Adden. at 15-17.) We note that these same facts were before the district court and this court on direct appeal in support of Blankenship's justification defense, which was rejected as a matter of law. See Blankenship, 67 F.3d at 678. Aware of these facts (as well as the Presentence Investigation Report's recommendation of an upward departure on the ground that the seriousness of his criminal history was under-represented), the district court sentenced Blankenship at the top of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range. In his direct appeal, we held that even if this circuit recognized a justification defense, Blankenship's evidence did not satisfy the requisite elements of such a defense because he "recklessly placed himself in the situation," purposefully returned to continue the confrontation after retrieving a gun, and had "reasonable alternatives" aside from escalating the confrontation, including avoiding the confrontation by staying inside his home. Id. Additionally, we concluded that "there was no evidence that Kellick was armed or presented a real threat of serious harm to Blankenship or his family." Id. While a defendant need not prove the elements of a justification defense in order to obtain a downward departure on the basis...