Blanks v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:05CV137TSL-LRA.
• Citation: 568 F.Supp.2d 740
• Parties: David BLANKS and Rhonda Blanks, Plaintiffs v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Jack Johns, Steve Cobb, The Estate of Douglas Williams, John Does 1-10, and XYZ Professional Associations 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

568 F.Supp.2d 740

David BLANKS and Rhonda Blanks, Plaintiffs v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, Jack Johns, Steve Cobb, The Estate of Douglas Williams, John Does 1-10, and XYZ Professional Associations 1-10, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 4:05CV137TSL-LRA.

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

September 28, 2007.

Charles A. Becker, Jr., Charles A. Becker, Jr., Attorney, Water Valley, MS, David L. Calder, Law Office of David Calder, Kenneth A. Rutherford, Terry Dwayne Little, Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, PA, Oxford, MS, for Plaintiffs.

David L. Ayers, Mark D. Jicka, Robert B. Ireland, III, J. Collins Wohner, Jr., Watkins & Eager, Jackson, MS, Charles E. Guerrier, Birmingham, AL, Joseph H. Huff, Kilpatrick Stockton, LLP, Augusta, GA, J. Stewart Parrish, Malta & Parrish, PLLP, Meridian, MS, Nancy E. Rafuse, Daniel E. Turner, Ashe, Rafuse & Hill, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the motion of defendants Lockheed Martin Corporation, Jack Johns and Steve Cobb for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs David Blanks and Rhonda Blanks have responded to the to motion and the court, having considered the memoranda of authorities, together with attachments, concludes that the motion is well taken and should be granted.

Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by David Blanks (and for Mrs. Blanks' consequent loss of consortium) as a result of an incident that occurred at the Lockheed Martin plant in Meridian, Mississippi in July 2003, in which Blanks' co-worker, Lockheed employee Douglas Williams, went on a racially-motivated shooting rampage, during which he killed and wounded several of his coworkers before turning one of his guns on himself. Although Mr. Blanks was not physically injured during Williams' shooting rampage, he did witness the shootings and filed this suit alleging various theories for the recovery of damages for the emotional distress he suffered as a result of the incident.¹ Previously, by order dated June 23, 2006, this court dismissed Blanks' state law tort claims against Lockheed and plant managers Jack Johns and Steve Cobb based on the exclusivity bar of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act, and based, more particularly, on the court's conclusion that "Lockheed's actions and inaction which allegedly led to or caused Williams' rampage [were] not `intentional' ... because Lockheed did not have an actual intent to injure [its employees]." Blanks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., Civil Action No. 4:05CV137TSL-LRA, 2007 WL 2900397 at *1 (S.D.Miss. June 23, 2006).² The dismissal of those state law claims left a single claim in the case, that being David Blanks' claim for alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendants have now moved for summary judgment as to this claim.

Blanks' § 1981 claim was first set forth in his second amended complaint, in which he alleged that he "witnessed Doug Williams shooting and killing [Blanks'] co-workers and friends," that he "tried to help those who had been shot and then attempted to confront Williams," and that "because Doug Williams knew of David Blanks' friendship with some of the blacks who worked at Lockheed, David Blanks was threatened and put in fear of his own safety while in the zone of danger of Doug Williams' shooting rampage." On the basis of this final allegation, Blanks asserted his claim for violation of § 1981. The gist of Blanks' § 1981 claim, therefore, is that Doug Williams' shooting rampage was driven by his extreme racial hostility toward his black coworkers, of which Lockheed and its managers were acutely aware; that although Blanks is himself white, Williams was aware of Blanks' friendship with some of the black workers at Lockheed and, during his shooting rampage, witnessed Blanks attempting to render aid to some of his fallen black coworkers; and that as a result, Blanks was therefore "threatened and put in fear of his own safety while in the zone of danger of Doug Williams' shooting rampage."³ In other words, plaintiff is alleging he was subjected to racial harassment (a hostile work environment) because of his friendship with black coworkers. Defendants take the position that as plaintiff was not a member of the protected class that was the alleged target of discrimination, he has not standing to pursue his claim herein.

It is well established that § 1981 protects the rights of all persons, including white persons, to be free from racial discrimination and harassment in the workplace, and thus white persons have standing to sue under § 1981, just as do blacks, where they claim to have suffered racial discrimination and/or harassment. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976). It is also clear that to have standing to pursue a § 1981 claim, the plaintiff must himself have suffered harm as a result of the alleged discrimination and/or harassment. Thus, a plaintiff lacks standing to recover for injury to third parties from discrimination based on their protected classes, where plaintiff does not belong to that class.⁴ See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir.1980) (Title VII case, observing that a plaintiff "may assert only his own right to be free from discrimination that has an effect upon him and may not assert the rights of others to be free from discrimination").

Whether a plaintiff has standing to recover for discrimination directed against persons in a protected class of which he is not a member largely depends on the nature of the harm he claims to have suffered. Most courts will find standing where the plaintiff is able to point to a specific benefit or opportunity he has lost as a result of discrimination against others. See, e.g., Clayton v. White Hall School Dist., 875 F.2d 676 (8th Cir.1989) (white employee of school district whose child had been allowed to attend school within district notwithstanding fact that employee lived outside district had standing to sue under Title VII based on district's alleged racially-motivated enforcement of residency policy against black employee to keep his child out of district's schools, which resulted in district also enforcing policy against the white plaintiff); Anjelino v. New York Times, 200 F.3d 73, 92 (3d Cir.1999) (holding that male plaintiffs had standing to sue for loss of employment and seniority on a priority list resulting from the defendant's discrimination against female co-workers, where male plaintiffs alleged that hiring for work shifts would stop just before the names of women on the priority list were reached, so that males listed below those names would also not be hired); cf. Zielonka v. Temple Univ., No. Civ. A. 99-5693, 2001 WL 1231746 (E.D.Pa.2001) (finding white plaintiff had no standing to pursue claim for "indirect discrimination" because the plaintiff did not contend the employer's alleged racial discrimination aimed at a black co-worker resulted in the plaintiff's loss of tenure and promotion, which was instead alleged to have been caused by retaliation for her support of black candidate). But see Patee v. Pac. N.W. Bell Tel., 803 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.1986). (finding that male plaintiffs in same work/pay classification as female coworkers lacked standing to assert Title VII claim that discrimination against female coworkers also resulted in lower pay for them).

In contrast, some courts have denied standing where a plaintiff claims to have suffered emotional distress as a result of discrimination against coworkers. See, e.g., Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that white plaintiff lacked standing, stating, "If unease on observing wrongs perpetrated against others were enough to support litigation, all doctrines of standing and justiciability would be out the window."); cf. Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1209 (4th Cir.1998) (affirming dismissal for lack of standing claims of white male plaintiffs that defendant's unlawful discrimination against women and blacks in the workplace created sufficiently cognizable injury, namely, the breakdown of esprit de corps that results from working in a racially or sexually polarized environment).

There is, however, a rather substantial line of cases finding standing under Title VII and under § 1981 where plaintiffs who are not in the protected class have claimed that discrimination against third parties in a protected class caused them to lose the benefit of interracial association. Among these is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir.1980), in which the Fifth Circuit, while acknowledging that "a Title VII plaintiff may assert only his own right to be free from discrimination that has an effect upon him and may not assert the rights of others to be free from discrimination," id., held that a white teacher had standing to sue based on the defendant's alleged racially discrimination against blacks in recruitment and hiring. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was not asserting the rights of black applicants or prospective applicants to be free from discrimination, but rather was suing for her own injury that resulted from that discrimination. To the point, the court held, the plaintiff had standing because she "could claim that the discrimination deprived her of the benefits arising from association with racial minorities in a working environment unaffected by discrimination." Id. at 483 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972)); See also Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir.1989) (finding standing where plaintiff alleges hostile work environment injury from loss of association with minorities); Waters v. Heublein,...