Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. G-02-061.,G-02-061.
• Parties: Michael "Shawn" BLANSETT and Modesta N. Blansett, Individually and as Next Friends of McKenna Blansett and Blake Blansett, Minors, Plaintiffs, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

203 F.Supp.2d 736

Michael "Shawn" BLANSETT and Modesta N. Blansett, Individually and as Next Friends of McKenna Blansett and Blake Blansett, Minors, Plaintiffs, v. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

No. G-02-061.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

April 26, 2002.

A. Craig Eiland, Houston, TX, for plaintiffs.

Barclay A. Manley, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, TX, for defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' NON-WARSAW CONVENTION STATE LAW CLAIMS

KENT, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Michael "Shawn" Blansett and Modesta Blansett (collectively "the Blansetts") bring this lawsuit against Defendant Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Continental") seeking to recover damages under the Warsaw Convention for injuries allegedly sustained by Shawn Blansett while riding as a passenger onboard a Continental Airlines flight from Houston, Texas to London, England on June 18, 2001. Specifically, Plaintiffs aver that Shawn Blansett suffered a debilitating cerebral stroke approximately one hour prior to arriving in London that was ostensibly caused by a blood clot that formed during the lengthy flight, a phenomenon typically referred to as "Deep Venous Thrombosis Syndrome" or "Economy Class Syndrome." Plaintiffs further allege that Continental never warned or advised Shawn Blansett of the likelihood of developing a blood clot in the lower extremities, nor allowed an onboard physician to examine or treat Shawn Blansett after he became visibly ill, nor consulted with any third party medical advice service regarding Shawn Blansett's condition, nor relayed critical information to the London ambulance and hospital personnel that eventually treated Shawn Blansett. As a result of this stroke, Plaintiffs claim that 36-year-old Shawn Blansett, who was once an able-bodied husband, father, and corporate executive earning a six-figure salary, is now bound to a wheelchair, unable to walk or talk normally, or even take care of his own basic needs. On the basis of these events, Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court on January 25, 2002. Shortly thereafter, Continental filed two dispositive motions, a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Non-Warsaw Convention State Law Claims on March 8, 2002, and a Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) on March 11, 2002. Plaintiffs responded to both Motions on April 23, 2002. For the reasons articulated below, Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue is hereby DE- NIED, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

I.

A. Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Defendant Continental seeks a transfer pursuant to the Court's discretionary venue powers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating to the Court that it should transfer the case. See Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir.1989) (requiring the defendant to make a showing that the forum sought is more convenient); Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir.1966) ("At the very least, the plaintiff's privilege of choosing venue places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate why the forum should be changed.").

The decision to transfer a case rests within the sound discretion of the Court, and such determinations are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Peteet, 868 F.2d at 1436 ("A motion to transfer venue is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."); Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Decisions to effect a 1404 transfer are committed to the sound discretion of the transferring judge, and review of a transfer is limited to abuse of that discretion."); Marbury-Pattillo Constr. Co. v. Bayside Warehouse Co., 490 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir.1974) (declaring that whether to transfer venue is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion).

In determining whether a venue transfer is warranted, the Court considers the following factors: the availability and convenience of witnesses and parties; the location of counsel; the location of pertinent books and records; the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses and other trial expenses; the place of the alleged wrong; the possibility of delay and prejudice if transfer is granted; and the plaintiff's choice of forum, which is generally entitled to great deference. See, e.g., Henderson v. AT & T Corp., 918 F.Supp. 1059, 1065 (S.D.Tex.1996) (Kent, J.); Dupre v. Spanier Marine Corp., 810 F.Supp. 823, 825 (S.D.Tex.1993) (Kent, J.); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 805 F.Supp. 1392, 1395-96 (S.D.Tex.1992) (Kent, J.) (discussing the importance of the plaintiff's choice of forum in light of the policies underlying § 1404(a)).

Continental maintains that Plaintiffs' case should be transferred to the Houston Division principally because: (1) the vast majority of fact witnesses are located in the Houston Division, including the entire Continental flight crew; (2) Plaintiffs reside in Harris County, an area within the Houston Division; (3) Defendant is headquartered in Houston; (4) both Parties' counsel have offices in Houston; (5) any relevant business or medical records can be found in either Houston or London; (6) the events of September 11, 2001 have so severely crippled the airline industry as to make it unduly burdensome for Continental to assume the unnecessary travel expenses associated with trial in Galveston, especially if multiple lawsuits of this type are filed here; and (7) the alleged wrong occurred either in Houston or London. In response, the Blansetts point out that: (1) Continental does not adequately identify witnesses or their actual places of residency; (2) all of the witnesses identified by Continental, with the exception of a lone passenger witness in Norway, are also employees of Continental whose convenience should be accorded less weight; (3) Plaintiffs' counsel is located in Galveston; (4) it is improbable that Continental will incur significant additional expenses by defending this lawsuit in Galveston rather than Houston; and (5) the alleged wrong occurred somewhere over the Atlantic Ocean or the United Kingdom.

1. Availability and Convenience of the Witnesses and Parties

The Court has previously stated that the convenience of key witnesses is the most important factor in a motion to transfer venue. See Gundle Lining Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 844 F.Supp. 1163, 1166 (S.D.Tex.1994); Continental Airlines, 805 F.Supp. at 1396. In the instant case, Continental stresses that almost all of the fact witnesses, including Plaintiffs, are located in the Houston Division. Specifically, Continental argues that Plaintiffs' case should be transferred because the entire Continental flight crew is "Houston based," including fourteen flight attendants and three pilots. Continental further stipulates that other Continental employees with pertinent knowledge of Continental's practices and procedures are also located in Houston. At an absolute minimum, a Defendant must identify key witnesses and provide a brief summary of their likely testimony in an effort to demonstrate to the Court why it would be inconvenient for them to testify in Galveston. See LeBouef v. Gulf Operators, Inc., 20 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1060 (S.D.Tex.1998) (Kent, J.). Without a realistic and comprehensive summary of the testimony, it is impossible for the Court to determine if a witness' appearance is cumulative or unnecessary for trial. In the instant case, Continental has provided nothing more than a vague listing of various groups of individuals who Defendant believes may possess pertinent knowledge of the events giving rise to Shawn Blansett's illness and subsequent injuries. This amorphous list is accompanied by inadequate one-line blips regarding these witnesses' potential testimony at trial. Initially, the Court notes with some skepticism that Continental only identifies four of these individuals by name, two of whom are the Blansetts.¹ Even more significantly, Continental wholly fails to specify the exact places of residency of the fourteen flight attendants and three pilots who are supposedly "Houston based," or to explain why their testimony would be relevant and/or noncumulative. Rather, Continental only avers that these crewmembers do not live in Galveston. Continental's subtle yet seemingly meticulous omission strikes this Court as singularly peculiar, understandably causing this Court to query whether some, if not all, of these crewmembers live remotely to Houston or even entirely outside of the state of Texas, or alternatively, in a location in the Houston area that is equidistant or even nearer to the Galveston Division Courthouse than to the Houston Division Courthouse. As Continental is well aware, having dutifully served Texas cities for literally more than sixty years,² the greater Houston metropolitan area is comprised of nearly four million people sprawled across hundreds of square miles. People can live in the greater Houston area, and literally live eighty miles apart! It is perfectly conceivable, then, that an individual could live within the purview of the huge, multicounty Houston Division, but experience an exponentially greater inconvenience by traveling to the Houston Division Courthouse than to the Galveston Division Courthouse, both in terms of the actual number of miles traveled, as well as the degree of headache and hassle suffered along the way. See Chretien v. Home Depot, 169 F.Supp.2d 670, 674 (S.D.Tex. 2001) (Kent, J.) (determining that "it is preposterous for Defendants to...