Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nevada, No. 87-1437

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MARSHALL
• Citation: 103 L.Ed.2d 550,489 U.S. 538,109 S.Ct. 1289
• Docket Number: No. 87-1437
• Decision Date: 06 March 1989
• Parties: Melvin R. BLANTON and Mark D. Fraley, Petitioners v. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

489 U.S. 538 109 S.Ct. 1289 103 L.Ed.2d 550 Melvin R. BLANTON and Mark D. Fraley, Petitioners

v.

CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA.

No. 87-1437. Argued Jan. 9, 1989. Decided March 6, 1989. Syllabus

Under Nevada law, a first-time offender convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) faces up to six months of incarceration or, in the alternative, 48 hours of community work while identifiably dressed as a DUI offender. In addition, the offender must pay a fine of up to $1,000, attend an alcohol abuse education course, and lose his license for 90 days. Penalties increase for repeat offenders. Petitioners, first-time offenders, were charged with DUI in separate incidents. The Municipal Court denied each petitioner's demand for a jury trial. On appeal, the Judicial District Court again denied petitioner Blanton's request but granted petitioner Fraley's. The Nevada Supreme Court remanded both cases, concluding that the Federal Constitution does not guarantee a right to a jury trial for a DUI offense.

Held: There is no Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury for persons charged under Nevada law with DUI. This Court has long held that petty crimes or offenses are not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision. The most relevant criterion for determining the seriousness of an offense is the severity of the maximum authorized penalty fixed by the legislature. Under this approach, when an offense carries a maximum prison term of six months or less, as DUI does under Nevada law, it is presumed to be petty unless the defendant can show that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense is a "serious" one. Under this test, it is clear that the Nevada Legislature does not view DUI as a serious offense. It is immaterial that a first-time DUI offender may face a minimum prison term or that some offenders may receive the maximum prison sentence, because even the maximum prison term does not exceed the constitutional demarcation point of six months. Likewise, the 90-day license suspension is irrelevant if it runs concurrently with the prison term. The 48 hours of community service in the specified clothing, while a source of embarrassment, is less embarrassing and less onerous than six months in jail. Also, the $1,000 fine is well below the $5,000 level set by Congress in its most recent definition of a petty

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offense, while increased penalties for recidivists are commonplace and are not faced by petitioners. Pp. 541-545.

103 Nev. 623, 748 P.2d 494 (1987) affirmed.

MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

John J. Graves, Jr., Las Vegas, Nev., for petitioners.

Mark L. Zolaoras, North Las Vegas, Nev., for respondent.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether there is a constitutional right to a trial by jury for persons charged under Nevada law with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Nev.Rev.Stat. § 484.379(1) (1987). We hold that there is not.

DUI is punishable by a minimum term of two days' imprisonment and a maximum term of six onths' imprisonment. § 484.3792(1)(a)(2). Alternatively, a trial court may order the defendant "to perform 48 hours of work for the community while dressed in distinctive garb which identifies him as [a DUI offender]." Ibid. The defendant also must pay a fine ranging from $200 to $1,000. § 484.3792(1)(a)(3). In addition, the defendant automatically loses his driver's license for 90 days, § 483.460(1)(c),¹ and he must attend, at his own

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expense, an alcohol abuse education course. § 484.3792(1)(a)(1). Repeat DUI offenders are subject to increased penalties.²

Petitioners Melvin R. Blanton and Mark D. Fraley were charged with DUI in separate incidents. Neither petitioner had a prior DUI conviction. The North Las Vegas, Nevada, Municipal Court denied their respective pretrial demands for a jury trial. On appeal, the Eighth Judicial District Court denied Blanton's request for a jury trial but, a month later, granted Fraley's. Blanton then appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, as did respondent city of North Las Vegas with respect to Fraley. After consolidating the two cases along with several others raising the same issue, the Supreme Court concluded, inter alia, that the Federal Constitution does not guarantee a right to a jury trial for a DUI offense because the maximum term of incarceration is only six months and the maximum possible fine is $1,000. 103 Nev. 623, 748 P.2d 494 (1987).³ We granted certiorari to consider whether petitioners were entitled to a jury trial, 487 U.S. 1203, 108 S.Ct. 2843, 101 L.Ed.2d 880 (1988), and now affirm.

Page 541

It has long been settled that "there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1452, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); see also District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624, 57 S.Ct. 660, 661, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 1307, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888).⁴ In determining whether a particular offense should be categorized as "petty," our early decisions focused on the nature of the offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73, 51 S.Ct. 52, 53, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930); Callan, supra, 127 U.S., at 555-557, 8 S.Ct., at 1306-1307. In recent years, however, we have sought more "objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense." Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148, 89 S.Ct. 1503, 1505, 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969).⁵ "[W]e have found the most relev nt such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty." Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1887, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970) (plurality opinion); see also Duncan, supra, 391 U.S., at 159, 88 S.Ct., at 1452. In fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature "include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of the offense." Frank, supra, 395 U.S., at 149, 89 S.Ct., at 1505. The judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is "far better equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the

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recognition and correction of their misperceptions in this respect." Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (CA5 1988) (en banc), cert. pending, No. 88-5043.

In using the word "penalty," we do not refer solely to the maximum prison term authorized for a particular offense. A legislature's view of the seriousness of an offense also is reflected in the other penalties that it attaches to the offense. See United States v. Jenkins, 780 F.2d 472, 474, and n. 3 (CA4), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161, 106 S.Ct. 2283, 90 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). We thus examine "whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial." Duncan, supra, 391 U.S., at 161, 88 S.Ct., at 1453 (emphasis added); see also Frank, 395 U.S., at 152, 89 S.Ct., at 1507 (three years' probation is not "onerous enough to make an otherwise petty offense 'serious' ").⁶ Primary emphasis, however, must be placed on the maximum authorized period of incarceration. Penalties such as probation or a fine may engender "a significant infringement of personal freedom," id., at 151, 89 S.Ct., 1506, but they cannot approximate in...