Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park

• Decision Date: 21 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC03-1685.,SC03-1685.
• Citation: 887 So.2d 1224
• Parties: Henry H. BLANTON, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. CITY OF PINELLAS PARK, Florida, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

887 So.2d 1224

Henry H. BLANTON, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. CITY OF PINELLAS PARK, Florida, et al., Respondents.

No. SC03-1685.

Supreme Court of Florida.

October 21, 2004.

Steven L. Brannock and Sarah C. Pellenbarg, Holland & Knight, LLP, Tampa, FL, for Petitioners.

James A. Helinger, Jr. of James A. Helinger, Jr., P.A., Clearwater, FL; and Amy S. Farrior and Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. of Schropp, Buell & Elligett, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Respondents Yale Mosk & Yale Mosk & Co.

Robert W. Goldman of Goldman Felcoski & Stone, P.A., Naples, FL; and John W. Little, III of Steel Hector & Davis, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL, for Amicus Curiae Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar.

PARIENTE, C.J.

The issue in this case is whether the Marketable Record Title to Real Property Act (MRTA), chapter 712, Florida Statutes (2003), can operate to extinguish a valid claim to a statutory way of necessity authorized by section 704.01(2), Florida Statutes (2003). Relying on this Court's decision in H & F Land, Inc. v. Panama City-Bay County Airport & Industrial District, 736 So.2d 1167 (Fla.1999), the Second District Court of Appeal answered this question in the affirmative. See Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 854 So.2d 729, 731 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, recognizing that H & F Land concerned a common law way of necessity and not the statutory right, the Second District certified the following question to be of great public importance:

Does the Marketable Record Title to Real Property Act, Chapter 712, Florida Statutes, operate to extinguish an otherwise valid claim of a statutory way of necessity when such claim was not timely asserted under the provisions of that Act?

Id. For the reasons that follow we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that MRTA does not apply to a valid claim to a statutory way of necessity.¹

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Henry Blanton, in his capacity as trustee for a profit-sharing plan, filed suit against Yale Mosk and Co., Yale Mosk individually (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Mosk"), and the City of Pinellas Park to force the defendants to allow access to a landlocked ten-acre parcel of land in Pinellas County, Florida, that Blanton purchased in 1975.² In his second amended complaint, Blanton asserted as one of several claims for relief that he was entitled to a statutory way of necessity as authorized by section 704.01(2). To support this claim, Blanton alleged that in order to access the nearest practical road he had to cross Mosk's property. Blanton further alleged that he attempted to negotiate access with Mosk, but that Mosk had demanded in excess of $1.1 million for use of a strip of land that, in 1997, had an assessed value for property tax purposes of $18,100.

Mosk filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The trial court found that Blanton's claim to the way of necessity was time-barred by MRTA under this Court's holding in H & F Land that "statutory or common law ways of necessity are subject to the provisions of the Marketable Record Title to Real Property Act." 736 So.2d at 1170. The trial court also found that Blanton was not entitled to relief on his other claims as a matter of law and dismissed the complaint. The Second District affirmed the dismissal and certified the question of great public importance set out above. See Blanton, 854 So.2d at 731.

ANALYSIS

Because this case is before us on the trial court's dismissal of Blanton's second amended complaint, all of the facts alleged in the complaint must be assumed to be true. See Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. S.A.P., 835 So.2d 1091, 1094 (Fla.2002). The trial court's ruling, which was based on a question of law, is reviewed by this Court de novo. See Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 583 (Fla.2000).

In H & F Land, the First District Court of Appeal certified the following question: "Does the Marketable Record Title Act, chapter 712, Florida Statutes, operate to extinguish an otherwise valid claim of a common law way of necessity when such a claim was not asserted within thirty years?" 736 So.2d at 1169 (emphasis supplied). We answered that question in the affirmative. See id. at 1170. We then broadly stated that "statutory or common law ways of necessity are subject to the provisions of the Marketable Record Title to Real Property Act." Id. We also broadly stated that "MRTA indeed encompasses all claims to an interest in property, including ways of necessity, unless such claims are expressly exempted from MRTA's provisions." Id. at 1172.

Mosk argues that we should adhere to these statements in H & F Land and reaffirm that statutory ways of necessity are subject to the provisions of MRTA. However, because the issue in H & F Land involved a claim to a common law way of necessity, the statements in that case are dicta to the extent they include statutory ways of necessity. Cf. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 So.2d 339, 344 (Fla.1986) (concluding that any statements in a prior case about the effect of MRTA on navigable waterbeds were non-binding dicta because there were no navigable waterbeds at issue in the prior case). Moreover, our review of the entire H & F Land opinion reveals that our discussion concerned section 704.01(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which codifies common law ways of necessity. There is no reference in the opinion to section 704.01(2), which creates the right to the statutory way of necessity at issue in this case. In fact, the plaintiff in H & F Land never claimed entitlement to a statutory way of necessity. We therefore decline to apply H & F Land to this case. Rather, we take this opportunity to consider and expressly address the precise issue currently before us — whether MRTA applies to statutory ways of necessity.

To answer this question we must interpret the provisions of MRTA and section 704.01(2) to determine whether the Legislature intended that MRTA operate to extinguish valid claims to statutory ways of necessity. See Florida Convalescent Centers v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis"). We begin with a review of the applicable statutes.

MRTA

MRTA was enacted in 1963 to simplify and facilitate land transactions, and specifically provides that its provisions are to be construed liberally. See § 712.10, Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 712.02, Florida Statutes (2003), provides that "[a]ny person ... vested with any estate in land of record for 30 years or more, shall have a marketable record title ... free and clear of all claims" except those set forth as exceptions in section 712.03.³ Section 712.04, Florida Statutes (2003), titled "Interests extinguished by marketable record title" provides in pertinent part:

Subject to the matters stated in s. 712.03, such marketable record title shall be free and clear of all estates, interests, claims, or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any act, title transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title.

"Root of title" is defined as

any title transaction purporting to create or transfer the estate claimed by any person and which is the last title transaction to have been recorded at least 30 years prior to the time when marketability is being determined. The effective date of the root of title is the date on which it was recorded.

§ 712.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). Stated differently, the root of title is "the most recent deed or other title transaction recorded in the unbroken chain of title at least [thirty years] in the past." William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 900 (3d ed.2000).

An interest in land that is not exempted from MRTA's provisions under section 712.03 can be preserved by recording that interest as prescribed by sections 712.05 and 712.06, Florida Statutes (2003), within the "30-year period immediately following the effective date of the root of title." § 712.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). In sum, MRTA is a comprehensive act that contains elements of a curative act, a statute of limitations, and a recording act. See City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co., 364 So.2d 439, 442 (Fla.1978).

STATUTORY WAYS OF NECESSITY

Section 704.01(2), Florida Statutes (2003), establishes the right to a statutory way of necessity and provides in full:

STATUTORY WAY OF NECESSITY EXCLUSIVE OF COMMON-LAW RIGHT. — Based on public policy, convenience, and necessity, a statutory way of necessity exclusive of any common-law right exists when any land or portion thereof outside any municipality which is being used or desired to be used for a dwelling or dwellings or for agricultural or for timber raising or cutting or stockraising purposes shall be shut off or hemmed in by lands, fencing, or other improvements of other persons so that no practicable route of egress or ingress shall be available therefrom to the nearest practicable public or private road. The owner or tenant thereof, or anyone in their behalf, lawfully may use and maintain an easement for persons, vehicles, stock, franchised cable television service, and any utility service, including, but not limited to, water, wastewater, reclaimed water, natural gas, electricity, and telephone service, over, under, through, and upon the lands which lie between the said shut-off or hemmed-in lands and such public or private road by means of the nearest practical route, considering the use to which said lands are being put; and the use thereof, as aforesaid, shall not constitute a trespass; nor shall the party thus using the same be liable in damages for the use thereof; provided that such easement shall be used only in an orderly and proper manner.

Thus, to obtain a statutory way of necessity, the landowner must establish that the land is (1) outside of a municipality, (2) "being used or...