Blanton v. North Las Vegas Mun. Court
| Decision Date | 31 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | 17976,17997,Nos. 17940,s. 17940 |
| Citation | 103 Nev. 623,748 P.2d 494 |
| Parties | , 56 USLW 2406 Melvin R. BLANTON, Appellant, v. The NORTH LAS VEGAS MUNICIPAL COURT, North Las Vegas, Nevada, and the Honorable Gary Davis, Municipal Judge Thereof, Respondents. Jeanette HILTON, Appellant, v. The CITY OF LAS VEGAS, COUNTY OF CLARK, State of Nevada, Respondent. Samuel Ray FLANAGAN, Appellant, v. The Honorable A. Loring PRIMEAUX, Municipal Court Judge, In and For the City of Las Vegas, Respondent. Patricia Ann COLLIE, Appellant, v. The Honorable A. Loring PRIMEAUX, Municipal Court Judge, In and For the City of Las Vegas, Respondent. Vincent H. WOODS, Appellant, v. The Honorable A. Loring PRIMEAUX, Municipal Court Judge, In and For the City of Las Vegas, Respondent. James ARCADE, Appellant, v. The Honorable Stephen C. WEBSTER, Municipal Court Judge, In and For the City of Las Vegas, Respondent. CITY OF LAS VEGAS, Nevada, and A. Loring Primeaux, Judge of the Las Vegas Municipal Court, Appellants, v. Joseph M. FEELY, Respondent. CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, Nevada, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF the STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK, and the Honorable Addeliar D. Guy, District Judge, Respondents. Mark D. Fraley, Real Party in Interest. CITY OF LAS VEGAS, Nevada, and Stephen Webster, Judge of the Municipal Court, Appellants, v. James P. CUNNINGHAM, Sr., Respondent. Anthony L. WILEY, Petitioner, v. The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF the STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK, and the Honorable Stephen L. Huffaker, District Judge, Respondents. City of Las Vegas, Las Vegas Municipal Court of the City of Las Vegas, the Honorable A. Loring Primeaux, Judge, Real Party in Interest. Timothy John CAHALIN, Appellant, v. The Honorable Stephen WEBSTER, Municipal Court Judge, In and For the City of Las Vegas, Respondent. to 18000, 18032, 18065, 18073, 18092 and 18140. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Mark D. Fraley, Real Party in Interest.
v.
James P. CUNNINGHAM, Sr., Respondent.
Anthony L. WILEY, Petitioner,
v.
The EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF the STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondents.
City of Las Vegas, Las Vegas Municipal Court of the City of
Las Vegas, the Honorable A. Loring Primeaux,
Judge, Real Party in Interest.
Timothy John CAHALIN, Appellant,
v.
For the City of Las Vegas, Respondent.
Nos. 17940, 17976, 17997 to 18000, 18032, 18065, 18073,
18092 and 18140.
Supreme Court of Nevada.
Dec. 31, 1987.
Graves, Leavitt & Koch and John G. Watkins, Las Vegas, for appellant Melvin R. Blanton.
Morgan D. Harris, Public Defender, Craig B. Davis, Deputy Public Defender, Las Vegas, for respondents Joseph M. Feely and James P. Cunningham, Sr., and for appellants Jeanette Hilton, Samuel Ray Flanagan, Patricia Ann Collie, Vincent H. Woods, James Arcade and Timothy John Cahalin and petitioner Anthony L. Wiley.
George F. Ogilvie, City Atty., Nancy A. Becker, and Lawrence M. Moore, Deputy City Attys., Las Vegas, for appellants, respondents City of Las Vegas, Stephen C. Webster and A. Loring Primeaux.
Roy A. Woofter, City Atty. and Mark Zalaoras, Deputy City Atty., North Las Vegas, for petitioner, respondents City of North Las Vegas and Gary J. Davis.
John G. Watkins, Las Vegas, for real party in interest Mark D. Fraley.
Brian McKay, Atty. Gen. and James L. Rankl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, for State of Nev., amicus curiae.
This court consolidated the instant appeals and petitions to consider two questions. First, is NRS 266.550, which precludes jury trials in municipal courts, constitutional? 1 1 Second, does either the United States Constitution or the Nevada State Constitution mandate that persons charged in the municipal courts with driving under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor, receive jury trials?
Appellants Melvin R. Blanton, Jeanette Hilton, Samuel Ray Flanagan, Patricia Ann Collie, Vincent H. Woods, James Arcade and Timothy John Cahalin were charged in the municipal court with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), a misdemeanor. 2 See NRS 484.379 and 484.3792(1)(a) and (b). Each of these individuals filed a pretrial petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eighth Judicial District Court challenging the denial by the municipal court of his or her individual demand for a jury trial. The district court denied each petition, and these appeals followed.
Respondents Joseph M. Feely and James P. Cunningham, Sr., were also charged in the municipal court with misdemeanor DUI. Each of these individuals successfully prosecuted a pretrial petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the denial by the municipal court of his demand for a jury trial. The district court declared NRS 266.550 unconstitutional in those cases, and directed that jury trials be set for Cunningham and Feely. The City of Las Vegas appeals from those orders.
Real party in interest Mark D. Fraley was convicted in the municipal court of misdemeanor DUI. Fraley appealed the conviction to the Eighth Judicial District Court; that court declared NRS 266.550 unconstitutional and remanded the case for a jury trial. The City of North Las Vegas subsequently filed in this court an original petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the district court's decision.
Petitioner Anthony L. Wiley was charged in the municipal court with misdemeanor DUI. Wiley filed in the Eighth Judicial District Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the denial by the municipal court of his demand for a jury trial. The district court denied relief on procedural grounds and Wiley's original petition in this court for a writ of prohibition followed.
NRS 266.550 provides municipal courts with the power and jurisdiction of justices' courts, except that the statute precludes municipal courts from conducting jury trials. Until 1985, each of the thirteen incorporated municipalities of this state had a provision in its charter applying NRS chapter 266 to its municipal courts. 3 In 1985, as part of a legislative removal of certain duplicative statutes, the legislature repealed those provisions from the charters of the thirteen cities. 4 The application of NRS chapter 266 to the municipal courts of these cities is now governed by NRS 266.005, which states:
The provisions of this chapter shall not be applicable to incorporated cities in the State of Nevada organized and existing under the provisions of any special legislative act or special charter enacted or granted pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of article VIII of the constitution of the State of Nevada.
Las Vegas and North Las Vegas, whose municipal courts are the subject of the instant dispute, are incorporated cities existing under the provisions of special legislative acts. See 1983 Nev.Stat. Ch. 517 at 1391-1437; 1971 Nev.Stat. Ch. 573 at 1210-1229. Consequently, the statutory prohibition against the holding of jury trials in the municipal courts, see NRS 266.550, does not apply to the cases presently before this court. 5 We therefore need not reach the question in the instant cases of whether NRS 266.550 is constitutional. Accordingly, we turn to the Nevada State and United States Constitutions to determine whether individuals charged with misdemeanor DUI offenses in the municipal courts of this state have a constitutional right to a jury trial.
The various appellants, respondents and petitioners claim that their right to jury trials in the municipal courts is guaranteed by the United States and Nevada State Constitutions. Article I, section 3 of the Nevada Constitution, and the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantee individuals a right to a jury trial. 6 Nevada's constitutional provision has been construed as confirming and securing the right to a jury trial as it was understood at common law. State v. Ruhe, 24 Nev. 251, 262, 52 P. 274, 277 (1898). Thus, the right to a trial by jury under the Nevada Constitution is coextensive with that guaranteed by the federal constitution.
It is well settled that the sixth amendment right of trial by jury does not extend to every criminal proceeding. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624, 57 S.Ct. 660, 661, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937). Almost one hundred years ago, the United States Supreme Court stated that a jury trial is not required "in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose...." Callen v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557, 8 S.Ct. 1301, 1307, 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888). Since the decision in Callen, the Supreme Court has grappled with the problem of drawing a line between those criminal cases requiring a jury trial, and those not included in the protections of the sixth amendment. For example, in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930), the Court considered the offense of reckless driving at an excessive speed, for which the maximum punishment for a first offender was a $100 fine and 30 days in jail. Although the penalty was not severe, the Court thought the offense too serious to be regarded as "petty." Id. at 73, 51 S.Ct. at 53. Later, in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 57 S.Ct. 660, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937), the court concluded that the offense of peddling without a license, which carried a maximum penalty of a $300 fine or 90 days in jail, was a "petty" offense. In reaching that conclusion the Court noted that the offense was not a crime at common law, and that the offense was "relatively inoffensive." Id. at 625, 57 S.Ct. at 662. The Court added, however, "the severity of the penalty [is] an element to be considered." Id. The Court concluded that 90 days was not so severe a maximum penalty as to take the offense out of the category of "petty." Id. at 627, 57 S.Ct. at 663.
In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has sought a more definite and workable standard by which to decide the question of the scope of the right to trial by jury. Consequently, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied on the severity of the maximum possible sentence rather than relying on other criteria. The search for an objective criterion can be found in Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966), where the court concluded that crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury...
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