Blanton v. State

• Citation: 886 So.2d 850
• Parties: Thomas Edwin BLANTON, Jr. v. STATE of Alabama.
• Decision Date: 29 August 2003
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

886 So.2d 850

Thomas Edwin BLANTON, Jr. v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-00-1665.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

August 29, 2003.

Rehearing Denied October 24, 2003.

John Charles Robbins, Birmingham, for appellant.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Joseph G.L. Marston III, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

BASCHAB, Judge.

In 2001, the appellant, Thomas Edwin Blanton, Jr., was convicted of four counts of first-degree murder, a violation of Title 14, § 314, Ala.Code 1940 (Recomp.1958), and his punishment was fixed at imprisonment for life on each conviction. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied after conducting a hearing. This appeal followed.

The evidence showed that, in 1963, the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham was frequently used in connection with the civil rights movement. On September 15, 1963, a bomb exploded near or under some steps at the church. As a result of the explosion, four young black girls — 11-year-old Carol Denise McNair, 14-year-old Addie Mae Collins, 14-year-old Cynthia Wesley, and 14-year-old Carole Robertson — who were in the basement preparing for a church service were killed.

I.

The appellant's first argument is that the trial court erred when it allowed his former girlfriend to testify about his alleged prior bad acts toward and comments about black people. At trial, Waylene Vaughn Wise, who dated the appellant in the early 1960s, testified about the following acts that occurred in approximately late 1962 and early 1963:

1) On two occasions, the appellant went to a grocery store parking lot; pulled out a bottle that he said contained some kind of acid; explained that the acid would burn skin but would not burn fabric; and poured the substance on the seats of four or five vehicles that belonged to black people.

2) On another occasion, the appellant took what he said was a bottle of some kind of acid and went into a grocery store; came out and said, "`[T]hey'll be closing this damn place in a little bit because I just put it in the meat counter'"; and added, "`[T]his damn store is ran by Jews that wait on nobody but damn niggers.'" (R. 1207.)

3) One evening, she and the appellant drove past a black nightclub; the appellant took a bottle from under his seat, threw it at a group of black people who were patrons of the nightclub, and drove away; some of the patrons followed him in another vehicle, got in front of his vehicle, and blocked the intersection; some of the black people got out of their vehicle and threatened her and the appellant; the appellant pulled out a 45-caliber semi-automatic pistol, held it out the window, and chambered a round; and the black people got into their vehicle and left.

4) Finally, on one occasion, as a black male was crossing a street onto which he was turning, the appellant aimed his vehicle at the male and said, "`[A]ll I want is a chance to kill one of those black bastards.'" (R. 1211.)

A.

First, the appellant contends that Wise's testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid., which provides, in pertinent part:

"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident...."

We addressed a contention similar to the appellant's in Chambliss v. State, 373 So.2d 1185, 1207-08 (Ala.Crim.App.1979), as follows:

"Evidence of appellant's membership in an organization such as the Ku Klux Klan, which espouses white supremacy and racial hatred, certainly furnishes a possible motive for the church bombing. The motive for a homicide is always a proper subject of inquiry and proof. Brothers v. State, 236 Ala. 448, 183 So. 433; Balentine v. State, Ala. Cr.App., 339 So.2d 1063; Bynum v. State, Ala. Cr.App., 348 So.2d 804.

"In cases where, as here, the evidence is circumstantial, a wide range of testimony is admissible to show the motive of defendant for committing the crime charged. Turner v. State, 224 Ala. 5, 140 So. 447; Harden v. State, 211 Ala. 656, 101 So. 442.

"In a case where the evidence is circumstantial, evidence of motive becomes of great importance. Harden v. State, supra; Hardy v. State, 51 Ala.App. 489, 286 So.2d 899. When circumstances point to the guilt of an accused, evidence of his motivation, even though weak, is admissible. In McClendon v. State, 243 Ala. 218, 8 So.2d 883, the Supreme Court said:

"`"When it is shown that a crime has been committed and the circumstances point to the accused as the guilty agent, then proof of a motive to commit the offense, though weak and inconclusive evidence, is nevertheless admissible."'

"Appellant's membership in the Ku Klux Klan evidenced his hatred of black people and his willingness to resort to violence to vent his ingrained feelings toward that race. His criticism of this proof goes to its weight and credibility rather than to its admissibility."

We also addressed a similar contention in Stoner v. State, 418 So.2d 171, 183 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), as follows:

"Appellant next asserts that certain questions asked appellant concerning his views of the use of violence against minorities and his views of minorities in general constituted reversible error. We do not agree.

"Appellant, just prior to his questioning on this issue, emphatically stated that he had never advocated the use of violence against other segments of society. The majority of statements appellant was questioned about dealt with such use of violence. Thus the questioning was properly conducted to impeach the witness.

"Also, the remaining statements, if not directly advocating violence, certainly evidenced an intense hatred and aversion towards blacks and Jews. Such questioning was proper to prove motive for the bombing."

(Emphasis added.)

Likewise, in this case, Wise's testimony about the appellant's prior acts toward and comments about black people was relevant to show his motive for bombing the church. Therefore, Wise's testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ala. R. Evid.

B.

Second, the appellant contends that the prejudicial effect of Wise's testimony substantially outweighed its probative value and that the testimony should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. Specifically, he asserts that Wise never reported the acts about which she testified to law enforcement authorities; he was never questioned about, arrested for, or charged with any of the acts; and Wise's testimony was not corroborated. However, such concerns would affect only the weight the jury gave the testimony and not its admissibility. Further, the testimony about his prior acts and comments had an extremely high probative value for the reasons set forth previously. Finally, the trial court gave the following limiting instruction during its oral charge:

"Thomas Blanton is not on trial for any act, language, personal opinions or conduct which are not alleged in the indictment. Any such evidence presented in this trial may be considered only as evidence of motive to commit the acts charged, and then only if you judge the evidence to be plain, clear and conclusive as to the act, language, personal opinion or conduct. Such evidence may not be used to infer something about the defendant's general nature, and you cannot consider that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offense for which he is charged because of that general nature."

(R. 1879-80.) Therefore, the probative value of Wise's testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

II.

The appellant's second argument is that the trial court improperly admitted a recording of a June 28, 1964, conversation between him and his wife. On the recording, the appellant makes references to a meeting about making a bomb and being at the Modern Sign Shop to make a bomb.

In May 1964, John Colvin, who was an electronic technician for the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), rented an apartment in the house where the appellant lived. His apartment shared a common wall with the appellant's kitchen. In June, he and Special Agent Ralph Butler installed some electronic equipment in his closet.

During the State's direct examination of Butler, the following occurred:

"[PROSECUTOR]: ... Tell the jury the nature of the place that you installed this equipment and how you did it, if you will, please.

"....

"[BUTLER]: And so [John Colvin] rented the place and I went out and took a look to see what type of equipment and what type of work we'd have to do to make the installation and found that the only way that I could see at the particular time to do some of the work was to — we had a common wall in our closet with the, supposedly, the kitchen area of Mr. Blanton. But to get from that closet area with the wiring necessary to get out of the place to hook the equipment to, John Colvin talked to Mrs. Blanton at that time and told her that we needed to put some shelving in the closet so that if we did any hammering and so forth, it would not be unusual. She said make all the noise you want. It's all right with me. So we went in and I — of course I did put some shelving in there. But also I had to take up some boards in the flooring in order to get the wire from one point to another.

"[PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

"[BUTLER]: And then, thereafter, found that there was a passageway, that is, between the walls. A passageway. You could see the little light which would give an air hole necessary for the installation of the microphone without having to penetrate or go physically into the other room. And that's the way we put that little microphone in there.

And then I touched those wires off the microphone into the recording equipment. And then hooked up the earphones so I could listen to it to see that it was working properly, because you have to do this step by

...