Blaustein v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.

• Decision Date: 21 June 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2975-61.
• Citation: 207 F. Supp. 223
• Parties: B. N. BLAUSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

207 F. Supp. 223

B. N. BLAUSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 2975-61.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

June 21, 1962.

Bernard H. Conn, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

James C. McKay, Edward J. Grenier, Jr., Covington & Burling, Washington, D. C., for defendant.

SIRICA, District Judge.

This is an action for a declaratory judgment brought under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201 and 2202.

On August 1, 1960, plaintiff obtained a $7,500 life insurance policy from defendant through his participation in a group known as the National Office Furniture Association, Inc. The pertinent portion of the policy insofar as this action is concerned is as follows:

"CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE. If any employee while insured under the policy and prior to his 60th birthday, shall become totally disabled from bodily injury or disease which wholly and continuously prevents such employee from engaging in any occupation or employment for wage or profit, and if such total disability continues after the payment of premiums for such employee is discontinued by the Policyholder, then the Insurance Company will continue the insurance in force on such employee, without further payment of premiums, during the period he remains totally and continuously disabled but not exceeding one year from the date of termination of premium payment for such employee, unless due proof of such total disability is submitted as provided herein." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is conceded that plaintiff was an "employee" under the terms of the policy.

On August 6, 1960, plaintiff suffered a severe heart attack which resulted in a myocardial infarction. On that date he was 55 years of age. Following four weeks of hospitalization, on the advice of his attending physician, plaintiff sold his office equipment business and neither obtained nor sought further employment. In December 1960 defendant was informed that plaintiff had become totally disabled but after a thorough review of his claim, defendant notified plaintiff that he did not qualify for the benefits under the total disability section of his insurance contract. Shortly after the denial of his claim, plaintiff filed this complaint for a declaration of his rights under the contract.

The provision of the insurance policy set out above is termed a "non-occupational" or "general" disability clause since it insures against a disability which prevents the insured from engaging in any occupation or employment for financial gain.¹ "Occupational" policy provisions insure against a disability which prevents the insured from pursuing a particular occupation. Some courts have allowed recovery under a general disability clause when it has been demonstrated that the insured is unable to follow his regular employment, even though he could be gainfully employed in some other area of activity. Other courts have given a somewhat literal interpretation to this general disability clause. There is a clear majority of cases, however, which has rejected both constructions and has adopted what this Court considers to be a reasonable rule. The Court adopts the rationale of this last group of judicial interpretations, there being no controlling authority on the precise question in the District of Columbia.

"Total" disability does not mean that the insured must be utterly helpless or that he is able only to perform mild sedentary activities. Plaintiff was self-employed and prior to his attack performed supervisory and managerial functions as well as a considerable amount of manual labor. If after his heart attack he could only participate in very limited supervisory and managerial activities, he would be totally disabled. Dittmar v. Continental Cas. Co., 29 N.J. 532, 150 A.2d 666 (1959).

It is equally unreasonable to require a policyholder to demonstrate that he is unable to engage in "any" occupation or employment before he can recover those benefits for which he has paid substantial premiums. Although life insurance contracts containing non-occupational waiver of premium clauses are less costly than policies with occupational clauses, this factor does not compel a literal construction of the former. The Court agrees with the long list of authorities which have embraced the well-reasoned language found in Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Bryant, 296 Ky. 815, 823, 177 S.W.2d 588, 592, 153 A.L.R. 422 (1943):

"In such contracts (nonoccupational) the insured should be required to show physical inability not only to follow his regular occupation but also any occupation for which he may be fitted by education, training and experience, which may yield a reasonably substantial gain or profit, rising to the dignity of an income or livelihood."

Thus, a person trained and experienced in a highly skilled trade or profession need not seek out work which is personally degrading and insubstantially remunerative. Likewise, no insured is required to engage in an occupation which would expose him to great pain or further endanger his health. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States v. MacKirgan, 86 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1936); Walker v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 123 F.Supp. 306 (E.D.Ill.1954).

Bearing these principles in mind, it must be determined whether the facts presented demonstrate that plaintiff has sustained his burden of proof.

For over twenty-five years prior to his attack, plaintiff owned and operated a small office equipment business. As is generally the case in most small businesses, in...