BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Oatis
| Decision Date | 20 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5: 19-284-DCR |
| Parties | BLC LEXINGTON SNF, LLC, doing business as Brookdale Richmond Place SNF, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KENDRA OATIS, Administratrix of the Estate of Clementine Garred, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Clementine Garred was a resident of Brookdale Richmond Place, a skilled nursing facility owned and/or operated by BLC Lexington SNF, LLC ("BLC Lexington") and others. Garred's daughter, Kendra Oatis ("Kendra" or the "defendant"), sued BLC Lexington and related entities in the Fayette County Circuit Court in February 2019, alleging that the entities' actions (or their failures to act) led to Garred's injury and subsequent death. In July 2019, and while the state-court action was pending, BLC Lexington and others brought the instant action against the defendant, alleging that her state-court claims against them must be submitted to arbitration.
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, and BLC Lexington and its related entities have filed a motion to compel arbitration. [Record Nos. 5, 9] Because Garred and the defendant agreed to arbitrate the claims raised in state court, these claims must be submitted to arbitration. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied and the plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration will be granted.
Garred was first admitted to Brookdale Richmond Place SNF in Lexington, Kentucky ("the Facility") on December 20, 2016. Garred signed an Admission Agreement, which included the following language:
[Record No. 1-1, pp. 11-14 (emphasis in original)]
These provisions were part of an Admission Agreement packet, which featured a signature line on the last page. It does not appear that residents had the option of rejecting the arbitration clause. Instead, arbitration was a condition of admission to the Facility.
The Admission Agreement also provided:
IX. ENFORCEMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT. . . This Agreement, along with any Attachments, which are hereby included by reference, is the onlyAdmission Agreement between the Provider and you except that amendments due to changes in State or Federal law or regulations are automatically deemed to be part of this Agreement. Any other changes to this Agreement are valid only if made in writing and signed by all parties. If changes in State or Federal law make any part of this Agreement invalid, the remaining terms shall stand as a valid Agreement. If there are any conflicts between the Agreement and any Attachment, the terms of the Agreement shall prevail.
Id. at p. 14. Garred was discharged on January 9, 2017.
Garred was re-admitted to the Facility on June 28, 2017, and was presented with a new Admission Agreement. [Record No. 1-3, p. 1] The terms of the new agreement appear to be identical to those of the first. This time, Garred's daughter Tavonne Oatis ("Tavonne") signed the agreement as Garred's "Resident Representative." Id. pp. 5-6, 17.
Garred was "temporarily discharged" on October 18, 2017. She was "readmitted" on October 30, 2017, and was presented with a "Memorandum of Readmission." [Record No. 1-4] The Memorandum is a one-page document indicating that Garred was admitted to the Facility on June 28, 2017, and that the Admission Agreement executed on that date was incorporated by reference. Additionally, the parties agreed to be bound by the terms previously set forth in the Admission Agreement. Kendra signed the Memorandum of Readmission as Garred's "Legal Representative." Id.
Garred was temporarily discharged again on November 7, 2017, but readmitted on November 20, 2017. The parties executed another Memorandum of Readmission, which Tavonne signed as "Legal Representative." [Record No. 1-5] Again, the Memorandum incorporated the Admission Agreement and the parties agreed to be bound by its terms.
Garred was discharged on November 30, 2017, but once again readmitted for the last time on December 5, 2017. [Record No. 1-6] Tavonne signed another Memorandum of Readmission stating that Garred was admitted to the facility on September 1, 2017, but thereis no record of an admission on that date. Aside from the dates, the Memorandum of Readmission is identical to the prior Memoranda, incorporating the Admission Agreement by reference. Garred remained a resident of the Facility until June 13, 2018. [Record No. 5, p. 1]
Garred passed away on August 23, 2018. [Record No. 1-2, p. 3] Kendra filed suit in state court on February 6, 2019, alleging a host of negligence and wrongful death claims against BLC Lexington and other entities and individuals involved in her mother's care. [Record No. 1-2] The facility and its related entities filed this action on July 16, 2019, seeking to compel arbitration pursuant to the Admission Agreements and Readmission Memoranda. Kendra contends that this action should be dismissed because there is no valid agreement to arbitrate any of her claims.
The defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (); 12(b)(6) (); and 12(b)(7) (). As the party asserting federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Global Tech., Inc. v. Yubei (Xinxiang) Power Steering Sys. Co., Ltd., 807 F.3d 806, 810 (6th Cir. 2015). When considering the defendant's factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the district court has "broad discretion" to consider evidence outside the pleadings to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2014).
When it comes to a challenge under Rule 12(b)(7), the defendant bears the initial burden of proving that the plaintiffs have failed to join a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19. See Hall v. Allen, No. 14-116-ART, 2014 WL 6882264, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 4, 2014). Similar to a factual challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. Camps v. Gore Capital, LLC, No. 3: 17-cv-1039, 2019 WL 2763902, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. July 2, 2019).
Finally, a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When presented with a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Generally, the Court only considers the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2001). However, the Court may consider documents attached to the Complaint and to the defendant's motion to dismiss "so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). To succeed on a motion to dismiss, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Directv, Inc v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).
While motions to compel arbitration may be evaluated under the same standard as motions under Rule 12(b)(6), parties often present matters outside the pleadings in support of their arguments. And because the parties have done so here, the Court will apply the standard applicable to ruling on motions for summary judgment under Rule 56(a). See Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002); Imagetec, L.P. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., No. 5: 18-CV-011-CHB, 2019 WL 4739686, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 27, 2019) (collecting cases). This means that the defendant must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. Id. A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016). If the defendant does not come forward with evidence placing the validity of the...
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