Se. La. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Louisiana ex rel. Jindal
| Decision Date | 17 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 13-370 |
| Parties | SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, AFL-CIO, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, EX REL. BOBBY JINDAL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA; JAMES D. "BUDDY" CALDWELL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before this Court are defendants' and intervenors' Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1). (Rec. Doc. 20 and 21). After reviewing the pleadings, memoranda, and relevant law, the Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
In its complaint, the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Louisiana's "Open Competition Law" and alleges the following facts. Louisiana Act No. 134 enacted the Open Competition Law in Louisiana Revised Statute 38:2225.5 ("Act 134"), a "comprehensive prohibitory scheme directed at public entities who may engage in procurement of services or the letting of contracts for construction, manufacture, or public works operation." (Rec. Doc. 1, at 3). Louisiana Revised Statute 38:2225.5 provides:
Section (A)(1) of the statute effectively prohibits public entities from entering into "project labor agreements," a type of prehire agreement in the construction industry. A "prehire agreement" is a collective bargaining agreement that is negotiated before the start of a construction project. (Rec. Doc. 22, at 2). Project labor agreements ("PLAs") are multi-craft prehire agreements negotiated between building and construction managers to govern labor relations and terms and conditions of employment on a construction project. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 4). Section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f), authorizes the use of prehire agreements in the building and construction industry, while section 8(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e), authorizes prehire agreements to include contracting and subcontracting agreements whereby an employer agrees to contract or sub-contract work only to an employer who abides by the PLA. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 4). Taken together, plaintiff alleges that both sections of the NLRAvalidate the practice of adopting PLAs as a means of "systemizing the terms and conditions of employment that will prevail throughout the length of a construction project." (Rec. Doc. 1, at 4).
Plaintiff Southeast Louisiana Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO is an unincorporated association and labor organization comprised of member labor organizations. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 2; Rec. Doc. 22, at 4). The Council represents the member labor organizations or building and construction trade unions, enabling building and construction workers to "achieve a powerful voice in government, in bargaining, and in their communities." (Rec. Doc. 22, at 4-5). The Council's representation includes negotiation of project labor agreements ("PLAs"). (See Rec. Doc. 22, at 3). Because Act 134 prevents the Council's member organizations from entering into PLAs with public entities, the plaintiff asserts that "[g]enerally, the Council will directly suffer the loss of PLA's [sic], thereby causing its member unions a loss of signatory contractors." (Rec. Doc. 22, at 6). Such contracts "provide jobs to union members at a negotiated wage rate, contributions to these members' pension and employee benefit funds, and dues to local unions." (Rec. Doc. 22, at 6). Louisiana has employed PLAs on a variety of public works projects, including projects of the City of New Orleans at the Louis Armstrong International Airport. (Rec. Doc. 22, at 3). The City of New Orleans and its New Orleans East Hospital District A announced in January of 2013 its intention to build a new hospital through a PLA. (Rec. Doc. 22, at 3). Despite the City of New Orleans' intention to enter into a PLA—and according to Mayor Mitch Landrieu, potentially with the Council—the Housing Authority of New Orleans informed the Council that Act 134 prohibits the City from entering into such an agreement with the Council. (Rec. Doc. 22, at 7-8). Therefore, due to its inability to enter into PLAs with public entities, such as with the City of New Orleans and New Orleans East HospitalDistrict A, the plaintiff contends that Act 134 interferes with the plaintiff's rights under the NLRA.
Plaintiff, Southeast Louisiana Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO ("Council"), initiated the instant suit on February 27, 2013. Plaintiff's complaint names as defendants Bobby Jindal in his official capacity as Governor of Louisiana and Louisiana Attorney General James D. Caldwell in his official capacity, and asserts that the enforcement of Louisiana Act No. 134 of the 2011 Regular Session violates the Supremacy Clause and Contract Clause of the United States Constitution and violates the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). Specifically, plaintiff raises a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 asserting that Act 134 interferes with plaintiff's rights under §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA. Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, requesting that Act 134 be declared invalid and unenforceable as preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the NLRA and violates NLRA §§ 7 and 8 as well as enjoining the enforcement of Act 134 by the defendants. Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. (Louisiana, New Orleans-Bayou, and Pelican Chapters) ("intervenors") intervened on May 2, 2010, having an interest in the constitutionality of Act 134 as proponents of the Open Competition Law. (Rec. Doc. 11 and 12).
Defendants and intervenors filed the instant Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) on July 29, 2013 and August 6, 2013, respectively. Both defendants and intervenors argue that the plaintiff does not have standing to bring the instant action, and, therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. (Rec. Doc. 20, at 3; Rec. Doc. 21, at 3). In addition, in the event the Court finds that the plaintiff does have standing, the defendants argue that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. (Rec. Doc. 20, at 6). They contend thatplaintiff may not sue the defendants under Ex Parte Young's exception to the Eleventh Amendment.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court. A claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim. See Home Builders Assoc., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998). A 12(b)(1) motion may be appropriate when a plaintiff's claim is barred by sovereign immunity, as well as in the typical situation where a defendant alleges that there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties, jurisdictional amount, and/or the plaintiff's claim does not involve a federal question. See 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1350 (2d ed.2003).
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. See, e.g., Stockman v. Federal Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir.1998). Thus, a federal court must dismiss an action whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. Stockman, 138 F.3d at 151.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "a court may evaluate (1) the complaint alone, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir.2001). Thus, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court is entitled to consider disputed facts as well as undisputed facts in the record. See Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir.1986). Uncontrovertedallegations of the complaint, however, must be accepted as true. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As, 241 F.3d at 424.
A plaintiff must have standing before a federal court may entertain his or her suit. Standing "is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Supreme Court has noted the following:
It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts,...
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