Bledsoe v. Bledsoe

• Decision Date: 09 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 98,98
• Citation: 294 Md. 183,448 A.2d 353
• Parties: Donald L. BLEDSOE v. Pamela Jane BLEDSOE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 183

294 Md. 183

448 A.2d 353

Donald L. BLEDSOE v. Pamela Jane BLEDSOE.

No. 98.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 9, 1982.

Edward John Skeens, Suitland, for appellant.

Joseph L. Ely, Indian Head (Ely & Ely, Indian Head, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON and RODOWSKY, JJ., and J. DUDLEY DIGGES (Retired), Specially Assigned Judge.

COLE, Judge.

We shall determine in this appeal the validity of a pendente lite order from the Circuit Court for Prince George's County awarding use and possession of the family home to the wife and her two children, who are not the offspring of her husband. Specifically, we granted certiorari to decide whether the terms "child" and "children," as used in §§ 3-6A-01(b) and 3-6A-06(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, by definition include stepchildren and thereby authorize Maryland courts to award the use and possession of property to the natural parent and the stepchildren to the exclusion of the step-parent.

The facts giving rise to this controversy are not disputed. Donald and Pamela Bledsoe were married on March 5, 1977. Both parties had been married before and both had two children resulting from these marriages. Shortly after Donald married Pamela, Pamela and her two minor children moved into Donald's home which he had purchased sometime in 1972. Donald's children never lived in this home.

In May, 1977, Donald had the title to the property changed so that the current deed of record shows ownership by Donald and Pamela as tenants by the entirety. Donald Pamela, and her two children lived in the home for approximately four years, when Pamela left the home and filed for a divorce a mensa et thoro, alleging constructive desertion and requesting the court to award her use and possession of the home together with some personal property. After a hearing, a master for domestic relations causes recommended that Pamela be awarded use and possession of the home. Donald excepted and the Circuit Court for Prince George's County overruled the exception and entered an order declaring the home the couple shared to be the "family home", awarding Pamela the use and possession thereof, and requiring Donald to contribute one-half of the first trust, second trust, and real estate taxes upon the home, pendente lite. Donald appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. ¹ We granted certiorari prior to consideration by the intermediate appellate court.

In Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980), we held that Ch. 794 of the Acts of 1978, now codified as Maryland Code (1974, 1979 Cum.Supp.), §§ 3-6A-01 to 3-6A-07 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, dealing with the disposition of property pendente lite in divorce and annulment proceedings, was constitutional. While Pitsenberger addressed issues of procedural due process and whether there was an unlawful taking of property by the dispositions authorized by the statute, it did not discuss the specific issue in the case sub judice. However, we did observe that the General Assembly had set forth with particularity the purpose of the legislation in the preamble to the statute.

The General Assembly declares that it is the policy of this State that marriage is a union between a man and a woman having equal rights under the law. Both spouses owe a duty to contribute his or her best efforts to the marriage, and both, by entering into the marriage, undertake to benefit both spouses and any children they may have.

The General Assembly declares further that it is the policy of this State that when a marriage is dissolved the property interests of the spouses should be adjusted fairly and equitably, with careful consideration being given to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by the respective spouses to the well-being of the family, and further, that if there are minor children in the family their interests must be given particular and favorable attention. [1978 Laws of Md., Ch. 794 (emphasis supplied).]

With this statutory preface, we turn to the arguments of the parties. Donald first contends that the subject property is not a "family home" within the meaning of the term as defined in § 3-6A-01(b) of the Courts Article because he acquired the property prior to his marriage to Pamela. Section 3-6A-01(b) defines the family home as property in Maryland that:

(1) was used as the principal residence of the spouses when they lived together, (2) at the time of the proceeding is owned or leased by at least one of the spouses, and (3) is being used or will be used by at least one of the spouses and a minor child as their principal residence. It does not include property acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party, or property excluded by a valid agreement.

Donald argues that this section effectively prevents the Bledsoe home from being a "family home" irrespective of his 1977 transfer of the property to Pamela and him as tenants by the entirety. While we have uncovered no Maryland case addressing this exact point, we have recognized on many occasions the proposition that property purchased entirely by one spouse but titled in the names of both as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety amounts to a gift to the other spouse of an ownership interest in the property. McCally v. McCally, 250 Md. 541, 243 A.2d 538 (1968); Anderson v. Anderson, 215 Md. 483, 138 A.2d 880 (1958); Hillwood v. Hillwood, 159 Md. 167, 150 A. 286 (1930); Lewis v. Lewis, 140 Md. 524, 118 A. 65 (1922); Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 72 A. 414 (1909). Here, then, though Donald acquired the property prior to the marriage, when he created a tenancy by the entirety he made a valid gift to Pamela of an interest in the property. Therefore, this property, being the principal residence of the spouses, could not be excluded from the definition of "family home" solely because he had initially acquired it prior to the marriage. The real question is whether the Bledsoe home can qualify as a "family home" in light of the definition given to the term "child" as used in the statute.

Section 3-6A-01-(b) says, in part, that to qualify as a family home, the dwelling must be one which "is being used or will be used by at least one of the spouses and a minor child as their principal residence." Section 3-6A-06 of the Courts Article prescribes for the court the conditions under which it may award the use and possession of the family home for a period up to three years. In pertinent part, it provides:

§ 3-6A-06--Family home, family use personal property.

(a) The authority conferred by this section shall be exercised to permit the children of the family to continue to live in the environment and community which is familiar to them and to permit the continued occupancy of the family home and possession and use of family use personal property by a spouse with custody of a minor child who has need to live in that home.... In exercising its authority under this section, the court shall consider each of the following factors:

(1) The best interests of any minor child ;

(2) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use personal property or occupy or use the family home or any portion of it as a dwelling place;

(3) The respective interest of each spouse in continuing to use the family use personal property or occupy or use the family home or any part of it for the production of income;

(4) Any hardship imposed upon the spouse whose interest in the family home or family use personal property is infringed upon by an order issued under this section.

(b) When granting a limited or absolute divorce, or annulment, the court may determine which property is the family home and family use personal property. [Emphasis supplied.]

We reach two conclusions from reviewing the statute: (1) that for a spouse to be entitled to the use and possession of the family home, that spouse must have custody of a minor child; (2) that neither of these sections includes a definition of child or children of the family. Section 3-6A-01(d) does say that a " '[m]inor child' includes a child 18 years of age or older who, because of mental or physical disability, is dependent upon a parent." However, rather than defining the term, that section merely insures that the protection of the statute is extended to a class of dependents over eighteen who, because of some disability, have the same basic needs as those under eighteen. The statute does not explicitly indicate what relationship the child must bear to the parties to the divorce. A broad interpretation could include all children living in the family home no matter whether or how related to the parties to the divorce. A narrow reading of the terms would limit the definition to the natural or adopted children of each of the parties.

In determining which interpretation shall apply, it is the duty of the courts to declare the law as the General Assembly has made it, that is, to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. This we have said on many occasions is the cardinal rule of statutory construction. State v Berry, 287 Md. 491, 465-96, 413 A.2d 557 (1980); Police Commissioner of Baltimore City v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418, 379 A.2d 1007 (1977). In ascertaining the legislative intent we look to the language used, and when such language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses. However, where the language is ambiguous and of doubtful import, the duty of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the true legislative intent. In short, the judicial function of statutory construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity and uncertainty. When exercising this function the courts may resort to extrinsic aids such as examining the history of the passage of the law, the reports of committees and commissions, the introduction of amendments and testimony given before...