Bledsoe v. Capital One Auto Fin. of Capital One (Usa) N.A., 1:14-cv-02109-SEB-DML
| Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1:14-cv-02109-SEB-DML |
| Parties | MONIQUE BLEDSOE, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE AUTO FINANCE A Division of CAPITAL ONE (USA) N.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter comes before us on the remaining Defendant's, Capital One Auto Finance, a division of Capital One, N.A ("Capital One"), Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Monique Bledsoe's Second Amended Complaint, filed on July 31, 2015, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Dkt. No. 37.] For the reasons explained below, Capital One's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.1
Ms. Bledsoe has brought this action against Capital One alleging numerous claims associated with the repossession of her vehicle, a 2011 Mitsubishi Galant (the "Vehicle"). The operative complaint is the Second Amended Complaint filed on July 21, 2015. [Dkt.No. 34 ("SAC").] In the SAC, Ms. Bledsoe alleges that she purchased the Vehicle on October 18, 2013 and that Capital One financed that purchase. [SAC ¶¶ 1-2.]2
Although not attached to Ms. Bledsoe's SAC, Capital One requests that we consider the Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement (the "Contract") signed by Ms. Bledsoe for the purchase of the Vehicle. "[I]f a document is specifically referenced by the complaint and central to the plaintiff's claim, [the Court] may consider that document as part of the pleadings if it is attached to a defendant's motion attacking the sufficiency of the complaint." Hirata Corp. v. J.B. Oxford & Co., 193 F.R.D. 589, 592 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (citing WRIGHT & MILLER § 1337, at 762-63). According to Capital One, Ms. Bledsoe's allegations against it stem from her purchase of the Vehicle, her inability to pay the loan, and Capital One's repossession of the Vehicle. Although Ms. Bledsoe rejoins that "[t]he Contract is not central to the Plaintiff's Complaint," [Dkt. No. 39 at 4], she repeatedly refers to the Contract arguing that it is invalid and voidable, and that she lacked the ability to perform her obligations required by the Contract. As a result, we will consider the Contract in determining whether Ms. Bledsoe has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Pursuant to the Contract, Ms. Bledsoe borrowed $13,805.58 to purchase the Vehicle and agreed to make monthly payments of $325.18 to Capital One for 72 months beginningin November 2013. [Contract.] The loan was secured by the Vehicle. [Id.] According to the terms of the Contract, if Ms. Bledsoe "fail[ed] to perform any obligation that [she had] undertaken in the Contract" or if Capital One in good faith believed that she cannot or will not perform her obligations, she would be in default [Id.] The parties agreed that if Ms. Bledsoe defaulted on her obligations, Capital One could immediately take possession of the Vehicle, sell the Vehicle, and apply the proceeds to Capital One's expenses and the balance due. [Id.] Capital One also had the right to possess personal property contained in the Vehicle at the time of repossession; however, Ms. Bledsoe had the right to recover that property. [Id.]
Ms. Bledsoe failed to make monthly payments on the Vehicle and, as of October 2014, owed an unpaid balance of $1,276.08. [Amended Compl. at Ex. 1 at p. 12.] According to Ms. Bledsoe, Capital One ordered its agent, Dynamic Recovery Service,3 to pick up the Vehicle, which it did on October 18, 2014. [SAC ¶¶ 4-5.] Dynamic Recovery Service charged Ms. Bledsoe $60 for the return of the personal belongings that were in the Vehicle at the time of its repossession during which its employees were apparently rude to her. [SAC ¶¶ 9, 11-12.] Capital One informed Ms. Bledsoe that it would return her Vehicle if she paid the balance of the loan or reinstated the Contract. [See Dkt. No. 9-1, Am. Compl. Ex. 1 at p. 12 ().] Ms. Bledsoe maintains that Capital One requiredproof of employment to reinstate the Contract, which she did not have. [SAC ¶¶ 5-6.] On October 19, 2014, Ms. Bledsoe demanded that Capital One return the Vehicle or pay her the Vehicle's value plus reasonable fees, totaling $13,692.05 (which corresponds to the amount she financed to purchase the Vehicle). [Id. ¶¶ 8, 14-15 (Ms. Bledsoe sent two additional letters demanding the Vehicle and/or damages); Dkt. No. 38-1 (Contract).]
The essence of Ms. Bledsoe's claims in this lawsuit are that Capital One repossessed the Vehicle after she was unexpectedly unemployed and temporarily unable to make the payments due under the Contract. Despite her attempts to renegotiate the terms of her Vehicle loan, Ms. Bledsoe complains that Capital One refused to return her Vehicle. Included in her SAC are claims for conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, extortion, tortious interference, breach of duty, willful disregard, abuse of process, and misrepresentation.
Ms. Bledsoe is proceeding here in forma pauperis and, as a result, her complaint must be assessed under the standard established in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). That statute directs the court to dismiss a complaint or any claim within a complaint which "(1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. In the procedural context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and draw all ensuing inferences in favor of the non-movant. Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059,1060 (7th Cir. 2009).4 The complaint must therefore include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Stated otherwise, a facially plausible complaint is one which permits "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Ms. Bledsoe has been granted two opportunities to amend her complaint. Most recently, on the grounds that Ms. Bledsoe may intend to plead a Federal Debt Collection Practices Act claim, the Magistrate Judge allowed Ms. Bledsoe to amend her complaint. As the district court, we have a "special responsibility to construe pro se complaints liberally and [] allow ample opportunity for amending the complaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant would be able to state a meritorious claim." Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d548, 555 (7th Cir.1996)). It is through this lens of solicitousness and liberal construction that we consider Capital One's Motion to Dismiss.5
Capital One seeks to dismiss the SAC on the grounds that Ms. Bledsoe fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Dkt. No. 38.] In her rejoinder, Ms. Bledsoe contends that the Contract is invalid and voidable because her capacity to pay changed in a material way after she became unemployed, an event that was not foreseeable by either party. [Dkt. No. 39 at 2-3.]
Ms. Bledsoe alleges that Capital One had no lawful right to take the Vehicle from her and in doing so committed criminal conversion under Indiana Code § 35-32-2-2. [SAC ¶¶ 20-23.] She contends that Capital One's repossession breached the peace in contravention of the parties' Contract. [Dkt. No. 39 at 2-3.]
"To prove conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant exerted unauthorized control over property of another." Meridian Fin. Advisors, Ltd. v. Pence, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1058 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Ms. Bledsoe maintains that the Contract is unenforceable and, as a result, Capital One did not have the right to repossess her Vehicle. Capital One rejoins that Ms. Bledsoe failed tomake payments as required by the parties' agreement and that the Contract gave Capital One the right to repossess the Vehicle. [Dkt. No. 37 at 4.] If Capital One had the right to repossess the Vehicle, it could not be deemed to have committed conversion and no conversion claim exists for which relief can be granted.
Ms. Bledsoe does not expressly allege in the SAC that she failed to make the requisite Contract payments; however, she impliedly admits as much in the SAC and her response to Capital One's Motion to Dismiss. Ms. Bledsoe agrees that the Contract required her to make payments equal to or greater than $325.18 [Dkt. No. 39 at 2], but that she made partial payments to Capital One in May, June, and July of 2014 [id. at 3].6 Further, Ms. Bledsoe "attaches" to her SAC (by reference to the exhibits filed with the prior versions of her complaint) letters from Capital One detailing the past due amounts on the Contract. She does not dispute the veracity of those documents.
At a minimum, Ms. Bledsoe alleges reasons sufficient to form a good faith belief that she could not and would not perform her obligations under the Contract. Contending that her unemployment status made the Contract "impossible to perform" as written, Ms. Bledsoe states that she had an "inability to remit payment" and the Contract was "temporarily impossible." [Dkt. No. 39 at 2, 3; SAC at 2.] She does not allege in her SAC, or elsewhere, that she was fulfilling her Contract obligations at the time of Capital One'srepossession.7 Because Ms. Bledsoe admits that she was not making and, indeed, could not make her Vehicle payments as required by the Contract, Capital One had the right to repossess the Vehicle. [Contract at 2 ().]...
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