Bledsoe v. Crowley
| Decision Date | 10 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-7168,87-7168 |
| Citation | 849 F.2d 639,270 U.S.App.D.C. 308 |
| Parties | Theodore R. BLEDSOE, M.D., Appellant, v. Brian CROWLEY, M.D. v. Sylvia FRIEDMAN, M.D. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civil Action No. 86-00928).
Charles R. Claxton, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Paul Kemp, Rockville, Md., for appellees. Joseph Montedonico and Judith R. Catterton, Rockville, Md., were on the brief for appellees.
Katherine D. Savage, Rockville, Md., also entered an appearance for appellees.
Before EDWARDS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and WEIGEL *, Senior District Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
This appeal concerns the question whether the trial court, in a diversity action brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia, correctly applied a Maryland statute requiring arbitration of medical malpractice claims. Appellant Theodore Bledsoe, a District of Columbia resident who sought treatment in Maryland, argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his suit for failure to comply with the Maryland statute.
We find, contrary to appellant's argument, that District of Columbia choice of law principles require application of Maryland law in this case. We also reject appellant's contentions that the Maryland legislature intended the arbitration provisions to be applied only with respect to suits in Maryland courts and that appellees somehow waived the arbitration requirement. While we agree with the substantive conclusion reached by the District Court, we believe that a stay pending arbitration, rather than dismissal of appellant's case, is the appropriate disposition. We therefore affirm the District Court's judgment on the merits, vacate the order of dismissal and remand the case for entry of a stay pending completion of the arbitration process.
Appellant Theodore Bledsoe, a medical doctor, brought suit in the District Court against Dr. Brian Crowley and Dr. Sylvia Friedman, alleging negligence in their failure to diagnose his brain tumor during the twelve years they treated him for psychiatric disorders. Bledsoe first consulted Dr. Crowley, a psychiatrist, in 1969, because of "occasional inability to control impulsive behavior." He underwent psychoanalysis with Crowley for the next eleven years. In 1979, Crowley referred Bledsoe to another psychiatrist, Dr. Friedman, with whom he engaged in group therapy for two and one-half years. In 1984, some time after Bledsoe had discontinued therapy with both doctors, he was admitted to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C., where a CAT scan revealed a brain tumor. According to the complaint, the tumor had been present and growing for many years. While Bledsoe's condition improved following removal of the tumor, he allegedly suffered permanent brain damage and loss of vision, which prevented him from pursuing his practice of radiology.
Although Bledsoe resided in Maryland when he began seeing Dr. Crowley, he moved to the District of Columbia at some time thereafter and was a District resident at the time the suit was filed. His radiology practice was at all times in Maryland. Drs. Crowley and Friedman both resided in Maryland. Their practice was located in Maryland, although both were also licensed to practice in the District of Columbia. All of Bledsoe's therapy sessions with both doctors took place in Maryland.
The Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute, MD.CTS. & JUD.PROC.CODE ANN. Secs. 3-2A-01 to -09 (1984 & Supp.1987), provides that all medical malpractice claims alleging damages in excess of a With the consent of all parties, the District Court proceedings in this case were conducted by Magistrate Patrick Attridge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c). Following discovery, the defendants moved for dismissal on the ground that Bledsoe had failed to follow the Maryland arbitration procedure. The Magistrate initially denied the motion, but then granted a renewed motion to dismiss on June 30, 1987, after Judge Joyce Hens Green of the District Court had dismissed a case in which the same issue was raised. The Magistrate held that District of Columbia choice of law principles required application of an "interest analysis," and that this approach dictated applying Maryland law because of the greater interest expressed by that state in the manner in which malpractice claims were to be handled. The trial court also rejected appellant's position that, even if Maryland law governed, the arbitration provisions were applicable only to cases brought in Maryland state courts. Bledsoe v. Crowley, No. 86-0928 (D.D.C. June 30, 1987).
certain jurisdictional amount must be submitted initially to an arbitration panel established pursuant to the statute's provisions. Either party is free to reject the arbitration award, but in such a case the award is admissible in a subsequent court action as the presumptively correct judgment. The party rejecting the award bears the burden of rebutting the presumption and must pay court costs if the verdict ultimately obtained is not more favorable than was the arbitration award. The statute provides, in section 3-2A-02(a)(2), that "[a]n action or suit of [the type covered by the statute] may not be brought or pursued in any court of this State except in accordance with this subtitle."
Appellant now advances three points in pursuit of this appeal: (1) District of Columbia law, not that of Maryland, should apply; (2) even assuming Maryland law controls, the arbitration provisions should not apply because they were intended to be applied only in Maryland courts, because they are "procedural," and because it would be unconstitutional to apply them here; and (3) the defendants waived application of the arbitration provisions by failing to raise this defense at an early stage of the proceedings.
To determine the applicable law in a diversity case, a federal court must follow the choice of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). Therefore, in this case, adhering to the rules of the District of Columbia, we must apply a "governmental interest analysis," which requires a court "to evaluate the governmental policies underlying the applicable conflicting laws and to determine which jurisdiction's policy would be most advanced by having its law applied to the facts of the case under review." Williams v. Williams, 390 A.2d 4, 5-6 (D.C.1978); see also Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 222-24 (D.C.Cir.1968); Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268, 1270-71 (D.C.1987). Under this approach, potential conflicts of law are assessed as follows:
When the policy of one state would be advanced by application of its law, and that of another state would not be advanced by application of its law, a false conflict appears and the law of the interested state prevails. Where each state would have an interest in application of its own law to the facts, a true conflict exists and the law of the jurisdiction with the stronger interest will apply.
Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1360 (D.C.Cir.1984) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985). 1
The District Court resolved the conflict in favor of the application of Maryland law by determining that Maryland, through passage of the arbitration statute, had Appellant maintains that the District Court's analysis was defective because it failed to inquire into the law that a court in the foreign jurisdiction would apply: in other words, if a Maryland court, applying that state's choice of law principles, would apply District of Columbia law in this case, then Maryland's interest to be weighed against the District's would be much diminished. While we agree that such an inquiry has a place in the governmental interest analysis, see Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1362; Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468, 473-75 (D.C.Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 1195, 16 L.Ed.2d 206 (1966), 2 we reject appellant's contention that Maryland would apply the law of the District of Columbia in this case. Maryland--unlike the District of Columbia--adheres to the more traditional principle of lex loci delicti, which determines the applicable law in tort actions according to the place "where the wrong occurs." Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1983). Appellant argues that "[w]hile defendants' negligence here occurred primarily in Maryland, Dr. Bledsoe's injury occurred in the District of Columbia." Appellant's Brief at 9. We disagree. Appellant's attempt to separate the place where the injury occurred from the place where the negligence took place makes no sense in the context of an alleged failure to diagnose a slowly growing brain tumor. 3 Since it is impossible to make such a distinction, a Maryland court would, we believe, apply the general principle that the applicable law is that of the place where the "wrong" occurred. If Dr. Bledsoe was wronged anywhere, it was certainly in Maryland. 4
manifested a strong public policy concerning the manner in which malpractice claims should be resolved. It found that the District of Columbia, by contrast, had expressed no such interest, because it had adopted no legislation on the subject. The District Court thus decided that there was no true conflict, and that since no other factor outweighed Maryland's strong interest, Maryland law should be applied.
Appellant also argues that the District Court gave insufficient weight to the District of Columbia's interests in having its own law applied. He contends that the District government's silence on the question of...
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