Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, s. CV-91-0122-S
| Decision Date | 19 December 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. CV-91-0122-S,CV-91-0130-SA,s. CV-91-0122-S |
| Citation | 823 P.2d 1264,170 Ariz. 256 |
| Parties | Joseph K. BLEDSOE, a single man, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Stanley Z. GOODFARB, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent, and SALT RIVER VALLEY WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, an Arizona corporation, Real Party in Interest. SALT RIVER VALLEY WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Stanley Z. GOODFARB, Judge of the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Respondent, Joseph K. BLEDSOE, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Both plaintiff, Joseph K. Bledsoe (Bledsoe), and defendant, Salt River Valley Water Users Association (the Association), bring special action petitions to challenge the trial court's partial grant of a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action. The basic issues concern the tort immunity granted to landowners of recreational premises by A.R.S. § 33-1551 and to owners and operators of irrigation canals by the common law doctrine originating in Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Co., 12 Ariz. 124, 100 P. 441 (1909).
The Association sought summary judgment, asserting that Bledsoe's negligence claim is barred by both A.R.S. § 33-1551 and Salladay. The trial judge granted the Association's motion in part, ruling that both the statute and the common law granted the Association qualified immunity, thereby barring Bledsoe's simple negligence action. However, the court refused to dismiss the case because it believed Bledsoe might present facts at trial demonstrating willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition. Such a claim, the court held, would not be barred by the statute. Likewise, the court held that Harris v. Buckeye Irrigation Co., 118 Ariz. 498, 578 P.2d 177 (1978), might limit Salladay and allow Bledsoe to pursue his claim if he could show the Association acted willfully, maliciously, or with reckless indifference or a "public-be-damned" attitude. Minute Order, March 5, 1991. Bledsoe and the Association both seek special action relief 1 pursuant to Rule 1(a), Ariz.R.P.Spec.Act., 17B A.R.S.
Appeal after final judgment is generally the proper remedy for trial court errors in granting motions for summary judgment. We believe special actions challenging a trial court's denial of summary judgment motions are appropriate only under exceptional circumstances. See Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 302-03, 802 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (1990).
Both parties argue that this case is such an exception to this jurisprudential policy because the issues have statewide significance: the extent and continued viability of the Salladay doctrine protecting owners and operators of irrigation canals from liability, and the interpretation of a recreational use statute never before considered by this court. Indeed, approximately twenty water districts, companies, and associations appear as amici in this case, urging us to accept jurisdiction of these issues affecting water organizations statewide.
We agree and accept jurisdiction of these special action petitions directly from the trial court to resolve the questions presented and provide guidance on these matters of public import. See Kelley v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 154 Ariz. 476, 477-78, 744 P.2d 3, 4-5 (1987); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 469, 698 P.2d 712, 714 (1985). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Rule 8, Ariz.R.P.Spec.Act., 17B A.R.S.
The Association was formed in 1903 to promote irrigation in the Phoenix area. The Association is a private corporation that operates and maintains irrigation canals throughout the valley. It presently operates over one thousand miles of canals and laterals (secondary canals conveying water to specific irrigated lands) in Maricopa County. Because of the tremendous population growth in Maricopa County, the land surrounding some of these canals and laterals is now urbanized and heavily populated.
The Association built and still maintains roadways on the banks of the canals and laterals, using them for maintenance and construction. In 1972, the Association entered into agreements with various government entities, including the City of Phoenix, to open the canal roads and banks to the public for recreational activities such as fishing, jogging, and bicycling. One such roadway runs adjacent to an Association lateral near 31st Avenue and Camelback Road, a major east-west artery within the Phoenix city limits.
In the early morning hours of April 5, 1989, Bledsoe rode his bicycle on the canal roadway near 31st Avenue and Camelback on his way to work at the Phoenix Fire Department Fitness Center. This was his first attempt at bicycling to work, and he had never travelled this route before. The Association maintained several "cable gates" across the canal roads along Bledsoe's path to prevent access of unauthorized motor vehicles. A cable gate is an obstruction created by suspending a cable or chain across the canal road between posts anchored at each side. The cables were evidently marked by signs with reflective red and white stripes. Apparently not seeing one of the cables in the dark, Bledsoe ran into it at approximately 5:20 a.m. He was thrown from his bicycle and received severe injuries that caused quadriplegia.
Bledsoe subsequently sued the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging the Association was negligent in installing and maintaining the cable gate. The Association moved for summary judgment, claiming that A.R.S. § 33-1551 and the Salladay doctrine barred Bledsoe's claim. As noted, the trial judge partially granted the Association's motion, and both parties sought special action relief.
The parties raise numerous arguments, but they may be distilled as follows. The Association urges that the recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, provides it with complete immunity to Bledsoe's action. Bledsoe, on the other hand, claims the statute is inapplicable. If applicable at all, he argues, it confers immunity only for the Association's simple negligence, not for its willful or malicious failure to guard against a dangerous condition. The Association next argues that if the damage action can survive under the recreational use statute, then it is entitled to complete immunity under the Salladay doctrine. Bledsoe urges that the Salladay doctrine is inapplicable to this case or, if applicable, that it should be overruled or qualified. We turn first to an examination of the statute.
Many states have adopted recreational use statutes to reduce or eliminate the liability of property owners who open their lands to recreational users. There is a large body of case law interpreting those statutes. See 3 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & W. GANNS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 14:5 (1986). These statutes generally are designed to alter the common law rules regarding landowner liability to invitees, licensees, and trespassers by narrowing or obviating the owner's duty of care toward recreational users. See Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The Application of Washington's Recreational Use Statute Limiting Landowner Liability, 53 WASH.L.REV. 1, 3-8 (1977). The legislative history of Arizona's statute provides additional evidence that our act was designed to encourage landowners to open certain lands to recreational users by limiting liability for injuries to those users. 2
Arizona adopted its recreational use statute, A.R.S. § 33-1551, in 1983. It provides in pertinent part:
A. An owner ... of premises does not:
1. Owe any duty to a recreational user to keep the premises safe for such use.
2. Extend any assurance to a recreational user ... that the premises are safe for such entry or use.
3. Incur...
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