Blessey v. Walton Cnty.
| Decision Date | 07 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18cv1415/MCR/CJK |
| Parties | WALTER W BLESSEY, JR, Plaintiffs, v. WALTON COUNTY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
In an effort to prevent what he perceives to be a taking of his property, Plaintiff Walter W. Blessey, Jr., filed suit against Walton County, seeking a declaration that Florida's common law customary use doctrine is unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The County moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). The Court finds that the motion is due to be granted and the case be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Complaint alleges that Blessey owns beachfront property, which includes a dry sand beach extending seaward to the mean high-water line along the Gulf of Mexico in Walton County, Florida. Blessey challenges "the County's deprivation of rights under color of state law," stating that "the County's consistent assertion of customary use" over Blessey's and others' beachfront property creates a cloud on his title and instills in tourists and the public a "false and illegal basis by which they believe they can freely utilize private property." ECF No. 1, at 5, ¶ 20. The Complaint alleges few facts and many conclusions of law. In reviewing a complaint, "courts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)), but because the claims at issue here demand an understanding of Florida's property law, the Court finds that a brief review of the law will be helpful.
"Generally speaking, state law defines property rights," and in Florida, the mean high-water line marks the boundary between privately owned beach property and state-owned land held in trust for the public. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 707-08 (2010). Florida courts have recognized a "customary use right," which originates in English common law, under which the public maintains a right to use the dry sand beach adjacent to the mean high-water line without interference by the property owner, on proof that the public's recreational use of a particular area has been "ancient, reasonable, withoutinterruption and free from dispute." City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974); see also Trepanier v. Cty. of Volusia, 965 So. 2d 276, 288 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Consistent with this case law and effectively codifying that common law, the Florida Legislature recently enacted a statutory procedure that must be followed before a governmental entity may seek to regulate a parcel of property based on the customary use doctrine. See Fla. Stat. § 163.035 (HB 631 effective July 1, 2018). That process requires (1) public notice and a hearing at which the governing board must "adopt a formal notice of intent to affirm the existence of a recreational customary use on private property," detailing the property at issue and the source of proof it intends to offer, and (2) a lawsuit by the governmental entity in the circuit court of the county in which the property lies to obtain a judicial determination and declaration that the customary use right exists. See id.
Turning to the instant Complaint, the general allegations acknowledge that the Florida Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of customary use and that the County in the past has asserted customary use over Blessey's property and all sandy beaches in Walton County, through an ordinance that took effect in April 2017. The Complaint also recognizes as a factual matter that the Florida Legislature's recent enactment of Fla. Stat. § 163.035 effectively invalidated Walton County'scustomary use ordinance because it was not based on a judicial declaration, as now required by the statute. See Fla. Stat. § 163.035(2) (), and (4) (limiting the applicability of the statute, stating it does not apply to any ordinance or rule adopted and in effect on or before January 1, 2016). It is alleged that the County presently intends to initiate the new statutory process in an effort to obtain a judicial declaration of customary use for the entire shoreline of Walton County, including Blessey's property. Blessey claims that the County's "assertion of customary use" amounts to state action that has created a cloud on his title; "instill[ed] in the public and tourists a false and illegal basis by which they believe they can freely utilize private property;" and "caused great uncertainty regarding the enforcement of trespass laws by the Walton County Sheriff's Office and landowners themselves." ECF No. 1 at 5-6 ¶¶ 20-21. Blessey seeks a declaration that the common law doctrine of customary use is unconstitutional because it takes property for public use with no just compensation (Count I) and is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause (Count II).
Subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, either factually or facially. Walton County has made a facial challenge. In such a case, the Court construes the allegations of the complaint as true and considers only whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.1 See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Similar to a facial jurisdictional challenge, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is reviewed by construing all allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). The Court accepts all well-pleaded facts alleged as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and considers whether the complaint contains factual matter sufficient "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (). Plausibility requires "enough [factual assertions] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.Discussion
"Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual cases and controversies." Cone Corp. v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1203 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). The cases or controversies limitation must be "strictly observe[d]." See National Advert. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). Standing is an integral part of the case or controversy requirement. Cone Corp., 921 F.2d at 1203; see also Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) ("In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues" (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). Three elements comprise "the irreducible constitutional minimum" of Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The plaintiff must show: (1) an injury in fact to a "legally protected interest" that is (a) "concrete and particularized" and (b) "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;" (2) a causal connection showing the injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action;" and (3) that it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 560-61 (internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff's failure to show any one of these threeelements requires dismissal. See Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2004).
The law is well settled that "a plaintiff seeking only injunctive or declaratory relief must prove not only an injury, but also "a 'real and immediate threat' of future injury in order to satisfy the 'injury in fact' requirement." Koziara, 392 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003)). Absent "a distinct and palpable injury" caused by the defendant, "the exercise of federal jurisdiction would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation." Gladstone Realtors, 441 U.S. at 99, 100 (internal quotations omitted); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978). Thus, each element of standing is "an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case," Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, and this is true regardless of whether the claim presents a facial or an as-applied constitutional challenge. See KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay Cty., Fla., 482 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2007) () (citing Bischoff v. Osceola County, Fla., 222 F.3d 874 (11th Cir. 2000) ()); see also Harrell v. The Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1253(11th Cir. 2010) ().
The County maintains that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is required because the Complaint establishes on its face that there is no actual case or controversy in this matter or threat of injury, where the claim is founded merely on allegations that the County intends to follow the new state procedure regarding customary use. The County argues that this suit is "no more than a poorly...
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