Blessing v. City of Latrobe
| Decision Date | 12 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-1212 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER BLESSING, CODY GIOVANNAGELO, FABIAN GIOVANNAGELO, NICO GIOVANNAGELO and RYAN JONES, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LATROBE, ROSEMARIE M. WOLFORD, Mayor, LATROBE VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, JOHN BRASILE, Fire Chief, and CHUCK McDOWELL, Fire Department President, Defendants. |
W Scott Hardy, United States District Judge.
The above-captioned matter involves civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a group of former volunteer firefighters against the City of Latrobe, the Mayor of Latrobe, the Latrobe Volunteer Fire Department, the Fire Chief, and the Fire Department's President. Presently before the Court are the motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and briefs in support thereof, filed by the City of Latrobe and its Mayor (collectively, the “City Defendants”) (Docket Nos. 23, 24) and by the Latrobe Volunteer Fire Department, its Fire Chief, and its President (collectively, the “Fire Department Defendants”) (Docket Nos. 21, 22), the materials in opposition thereto filed by Plaintiffs (Docket Nos. 25, 26 27), the replies filed by Defendants (Docket Nos. 28, 29) and the sur-reply filed by Plaintiffs (Docket No. 33). For the reasons set forth herein, the Fire Department Defendants' motion is denied, and the City Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
As alleged in the Amended Complaint, [1] Plaintiffs Christopher Blessing, Cody Giovannagelo, Fabian Giovannagelo, Nico Giovannagelo, and Ryan Jones (“Plaintiffs”) all previously served as volunteer firefighters for Defendant Latrobe Volunteer Fire Department (“the Fire Department”). (Docket No. 17, ¶¶ 4-8, 14). Plaintiffs aver that they were wrongfully and illegally expelled from their positions with the Fire Department by its Fire Chief, Defendant John Brasile (“Brasile”), who acted in concert with the Fire Department's President, Chuck McDowell, Jr. (“McDowell”), in retaliation for Plaintiffs' engagement in speech as citizens on matters of public concern. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 22). As further alleged, Defendant Rosemarie M. Wolford, Mayor of the City of Latrobe (“Mayor Wolford”), thwarted Plaintiffs' attempts to remove Brasile from his position as Fire Chief, and the City of Latrobe (the “City”) confirmed, adopted and ratified the actions of Mayor Wolford and others who were its supervisory or management level employees or agents. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10).
More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that on November 7, 2019, Plaintiff Nico Giovannagelo was nominated to run for the position of Fire Chief in opposition to Brasile, in an election scheduled to be held on December 5, 2019. (Docket No. 17, ¶ 34). Plaintiffs allege that on December 2, 2019, Brasile ordered the shutdown of the station where Plaintiffs served, Hose Company No. 1. (Id. ¶ 48). Plaintiffs also allege that a number of firefighters were suspended by Brasile, although it is unclear from the Amended Complaint which individuals were suspended and when their suspensions occurred.[2] (Id. ¶¶ 51, 57, 62).
Plaintiffs further allege that for the December 2019 election, “Brasile removed his opponent from the ballot and declared himself the fire chief by acclamation.”[3] (Docket No. 17, ¶¶ 104, 131). For a period of some months around that time, Plaintiffs allege that they participated in a number of meetings involving the Fire Department and/or the City's Council, and that before, during, and after such meetings, they voiced certain concerns to Fire Department and City Council members and members of the public. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53, 75-79, 95-102, 106-08, 115, 119, 123). Plaintiffs allege that they spoke about the December 2019 suspension of seven firefighters, Brasile's December 2019 re-election, allegations regarding Brasile's conduct as Fire Chief, and fire safety issues at the Fire Department. (Id.). During that time, Plaintiffs also allegedly attended Fire Department meetings in which members voted to investigate Brasile, to remove Brasile as Fire Chief, and to replace Brasile with Nico Giovannagelo. (Id. ¶¶ 103, 132). Plaintiffs allege that another election was held on March 5, 2020, in which Nico Giovannagelo and Brasile were the candidates for Fire Chief, and of which Nico Giovannagelo was the winner. (Id. ¶¶ 130, 132). As further alleged, Mayor Wolford and other supervisory/management level agents/employees of the City refused to intervene in the parties' dispute when Plaintiffs sought their help in dealing with complaints about Brasile. (Id. ¶¶ 78-80, 106-09). Plaintiffs also allege that after the second election was held, Mayor Wolford wrongfully intervened in the election process and improperly failed to recognize Nico Giovannagelo as Fire Chief. (Id. ¶¶ 136-38).
On August 14, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this matter, and on January 11, 2021, Defendants filed their first motions to dismiss. (Docket Nos. 1, 12, 13, 14, 15). On January 25, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, which includes five Counts: (I) retaliation in violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment freedom of speech rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Plaintiffs v. all Defendants); (II) violation of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Plaintiffs v. all Defendants); (III) municipal/Monell liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Plaintiffs v. the City); (IV) conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (); and (V) supervisory liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Plaintiffs v. Mayor Wolford). (Docket No. 17).
To summarize Plaintiffs' claims, Count I alleges that because Plaintiffs participated in the various meetings described, and because they spoke out as they did, Defendants improperly terminated Plaintiffs' Fire Department membership in retaliation for their exercise of their First Amendment freedom of speech rights. (Docket No. 17, ¶¶ 187, 275-91). Count II alleges that Defendants denied Plaintiffs proper notice and a proper appeal hearing regarding their termination from the Fire Department in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. ¶¶ 292-320). Count III is actually redundant of other Counts against the City in the Amended Complaint as it alleges a theory of liability for those Counts, which is that the City is liable for the conduct described therein under the theory of municipal liability. (Id. ¶¶ 321-39). Count IV alleges that certain Defendants, Brasile, McDowell, and the City, conspired together to deny Plaintiffs their constitutional rights. (Id. ¶¶ 340-54). Finally, Count V alleges an additional theory of liability against Mayor Wolford, that she is liable for the acts of her subordinates who violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the theory of supervisory liability as set forth in the Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 355-63).
The Fire Department Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The City Defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and they join in and incorporate sections of the Fire Department Defendants' brief into their own brief. Both motions to dismiss have been fully briefed and are now ripe for decision.[4]
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court must “‘determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” the complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (). Moreover, while “this standard does not require ‘detailed factual allegations, '” Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
It should be further noted, therefore, that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a court accept as true all factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Iqbal, 556...
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