Blitz v. Beth Isaac
Decision Date | 14 December 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 72,72 |
Citation | 720 A.2d 912,352 Md. 31 |
Parties | Marcel BLITZ v. BETH ISAAC ADAS ISRAEL CONGREGATION. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Aaron I. Lubling (Aaron I. Lubling, P.C., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
Brian H. Silver, Towson, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER and WILNER, JJ., and ROBERT L. KARWACKI, Judge (Specially Assigned).
The question we are asked to answer in this case is whether, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 3-228(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (the "Act"), the prevailing party in a binding arbitration proceeding may recover reasonable attorneys' fees when the losing party's unjustified refusal to comply with the award requires the prevailing party to institute and successfully prosecute an action in order to confirm and enforce the arbitration award.
Rabbi Marcel Blitz ("the petitioner") and the Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, ("the respondent" or "the Synagogue"), entered into a written arbitration agreement in an attempt to resolve a dispute concerning the petitioner's service as the Synagogue's rabbi. The agreement provided for the submission of the dispute to an arbitration panel consisting of three rabbis and called a Beth Din.1 In addition to naming the three rabbis, the agreement also stated that "[i]t is further understood that the Beth Din is binding on both parties, is final and with no appeal." In an unanimous decision, the arbitration panel awarded the petitioner $5000.00 payable in two installments. One installment of $3,000 was due for payment by July 9, 1994, and the second installment of $2,000, by July 28, 1995. Although the respondent did not seek to vacate, modify, or correct the award and despite demand by the petitioner, the Synagogue did not make either of the installment payments as required.
Consequently, the petitioner filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, a Petition to Confirm and Enforce Arbitration Award and Complaint for Damages.2 In addition to the $5,000.00 awarded by the arbitration panel, he requested "the cost of this petition, of any subsequent proceedings, disbursements and reasonable attorneys' fees." The petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. When the respondent failed to respond timely to the petition or to file an opposition to the summary judgment motion, the court entered summary judgment for the amount requested, "plus the cost of this action and any attorneys' fees incurred by the [petitioner] in connection with the [petitioner's] Petition to be determined by the Court upon submission of sufficient evidence in support thereof." On May 15, 1996, the day after the Summary Judgment Order was signed and the day before it was filed, the respondent filed its Response To Motion For Summary Judgment, a Petition to Vacate or Modify, and an Answer and Petition For Modification. In the Answer and Petition For Modification, the respondent alleged only that "the arbitrators exceeded their authority in this matter."
The petitioner submitted, in compliance with the Summary Judgment Order, his affidavit in support of attorney's fees in the amount of $1200.00 and costs and disbursements of $415.00, totaling $1,615. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of petitioner in the amount of $415.00, representing the costs and disbursements, but refused to award attorney's fees. The record does not reflect the basis for the refusal.3 When the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied without a hearing, he noted his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
In that court, the petitioner argued, inter alia, that the terms "costs" and "disbursements," as used in § 3-228(b) includes attorney's fees. The Court of Special Appeals rejected that argument, holding instead that "the Legislature did not intend in C.J. § 3-228(b) to permit recovery of legal fees, under the guise of `costs' or `disbursements,' incurred in confirming and enforcing an arbitration award." Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 115 Md.App. 460, 481, 694 A.2d 107, 117 (1997). Aware that § 3-232 of the Act provides for the interpretation and construction of the Act "as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it," and that other jurisdictions have construed § 3-228(b) as the petitioner does, the court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, stated:
Id. at 487, 694 A.2d at 120. At the request of the petitioner, we granted certiorari to consider this important issue. We shall reverse.
I
The petitioner argues that he is entitled to an award of the attorneys' fees he incurred in confirming and enforcing the arbitration award, as well as for the attorneys' fees he has incurred in connection with this appeal. He relies on both § 3-228 and § 3-232. Section 3-228 provides:
(2) The judgment may be enforced as any other judgment.
(b) Costs and disbursements.—A court may award costs of the petition, the subsequent proceedings, and disbursements."
Although subsection (b) uses broad terms to describe what expense items the court may award in connection with a confirmation petition, it does not specifically mention attorneys' fees. The broad language of § 3-228(b), in particular, the word, "disbursements," the petitioner argues, encompasses the attorneys' fees incurred by a party who, because the losing party refuses to pay, is required to confirm an arbitration award. He points out that the courts that have construed § 3-228 have so interpreted "disbursements." Furthermore, the petitioner submits, to be effective, uniform acts must be interpreted uniformly and consistently by the States that adopt them. In support of that proposition, the petitioner cites § 3-232. That section provides: "This subtitle shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it." Maryland law is consistent. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978);4Continental Oil Co. v. Horsey, 177 Md. 383, 385, 9 A.2d 607, 608 (1939) (); Whitcomb v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 123 Md. 612, 616, 91 A. 689 (1914). See also Williams Constr. v. Constr. Equip., 253 Md. 60, 63, 251 A.2d 864, 865 (1969) (); Public Service Comm'n of Maryland v. Balto. Transit Co., 207 Md. 524, 534, 114 A.2d 834, 838 (1955) (). The petitioner thus urges this Court to give to the word "disbursements" the same meaning it has been given by courts in other jurisdictions.
The respondent's position mirrors the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals. That court concluded that the word "disbursements" does not include attorney's fees. While it acknowledges and accepts the uniformity direction in § 3-232, Blitz, 115 Md. App. at 482, 694 A.2d at 118, it believes that to apply it so as to permit the recovery of attorneys' fees in confirmation of an arbitration award proceedings, given the language of that section, would conflict with well established rules of statutory construction.5 Id. at 477, 694 A.2d at 115. In arriving at that conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals points out that § 3-221 of the Act, relating to "Expenses and Fees," expressly addresses attorneys' fees, making their award dependent upon the provisions of the arbitration agreement.6 Thus, the court submits:
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