Block v. Tex. Bd. of Law Examiners
| Decision Date | 01 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | 1-18-CV-386-LY |
| Parties | ALBERT BLOCK, JR. v. TEXAS BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 5); Plaintiff's Response (Dkt. No. 6); Defendant's Reply's (Dkt. No. 9); Plaintiff's Motion for Oral Hearing (Dkt. No. 7); and Defendant's Response (Dkt. No. 10). The District Court referred the motion to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules.
On May 8, 2018, Plaintiff Albert Block, Jr. filed this suit against the Texas Board of Law Examiners ("TBLE"). Block, an attorney licensed by the State of Louisiana, claims that he has suffered and continues to suffer from a number of physical conditions and ailments—including, without limitation, chronic fatigue and severe osteoarthritis—which since 2002 have impacted and impaired his activities of daily living and limited his ability to practice as an attorney. Block claims that his disability is recognized by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Block submitted a request to TBLE on or around May 2017 to obtain a waiver of the active-practice requirement for admission to the State Bar of Texas by motion without examination due to his alleged disabilities. This suit flows from TBLE's denial of Block's request to waive the criteria for admission to the State Bar of Texas without examination. As an applicant authorized to practice law in another state, Block was required to meet the criteria in Rule 13 § 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court Governing Admission to the Bar of Texas without examination. Rule 13 § 1 states:
An Applicant who is authorized to practice law in another state must meet the requirements imposed on any other Applicant under these Rules, except that the Applicant is exempt from the requirement of successfully completing the Texas Bar Examination if the Applicant: (a) has been actively and substantially engaged in the lawful practice of law as the Applicant's principal business or occupation for at least five of the last seven years immediately preceding the filing of the Application; (b) has a J.D. degree from an approved law school; and (c) has not failed the Texas Bar Examination.
On June 23, 2017, a three-member panel of the TBLE held a hearing on Block's request to waive the active-practice requirement. The panel recommended a denial of the request because Block had previously failed the Texas bar exam in July 2015 and February 2016, less than five years prior to his application for a waiver, and because he had not practiced law since 2004.
Block then brought this suit against TBLE alleging violations of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect to TBLE's denial of his request to waive the active-practice requirement. Block also brings claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act alleging that TBLE retaliated against him for requesting the waiver by filing a complaint against him for the unauthorized practice of law. Block claims that the third criteria of Rule 13 § 1 is a "clear violation of the prohibition against discrimination against disabled individuals who but for the inflexible requirement of being actively and substantially engaged in the law [sic] practice of law as your principal business or occupation for at least 5 of the 7 years immediately preceding your application would qualify." (Dkt. No. 6 at2). Block seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against TBLE as well as damages for lost income and retaliation. TBLE seeks dismissal, under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), primarily on sovereign immunity grounds.
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the Arts, 992 F.Supp. 876, 878 (N.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000). Where a defendant attacks jurisdiction based solely on the allegations of the complaint, as here, the plaintiff's factual allegations are presumed to be true. O'Rourke v. United States, 298 F.Supp.2d 531, 534 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Rodriguez, 992 F.Supp. at 878. Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate when the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996); O'Rourke, 298 F.Supp.2d at 534. When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the complaint on its face, without reference to extraneous facts, courts analyze the pleadings under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Myspace, 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). Where a state's sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction, the claims barred by sovereign immunity must be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and not with prejudice. Warnock, 88 F.3d at 343.1 When a Rule 12(b)(1)motion is filed with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court should consider the jurisdictional attack before addressing the 12(b)(6) motion. Rodriguez, 992 F.Supp. at 879.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 (2008). The Supreme Court has explained that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [nonmovant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the [movant] is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The court's review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010).
The Eleventh Amendment renders States immune from any suit in law or equity brought by a State's own citizen against the State without its consent. Tenn. v. Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 1985 (2004). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against a state or state entity, as opposed to a state official, regardless of whether money damages or injunctive relief is sought. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-02 (1984); Briggs v. Miss., 331 F.3d499, 503 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1070 (2004). A State's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to any state agency or entity deemed an "alter ego" or "arm" of the state. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002). It is undisputed here that TBLE is an "arm" of the State of Texas. TBLE is entrusted with determining "the eligibility of candidates for examination for a license to practice law" in Texas. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 82.004. Moreover, TBLE acts under the instructions of the Texas Supreme Court. Id. As such, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's suit against TBLE unless Congress clearly and validly abrogated its sovereign immunity in enacting Title II and Title V of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and, in its abrogation, acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 2001). Both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act contain unequivocal statements of congressional intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the individual States. 42 U.S.C. § 12202; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1); Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 977. The question therefore is whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1985. Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lane, 124 S.Ct at 1985. Regarding Title II, in Lane, a class of paraplegics alleged that Tennessee had denied them physical access to the state's courts in violation of Title IIof the ADA.2 The Court upheld Title II as a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 authority under the Fourteenth Amendment as applicable to cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts. Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1994. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court made abundantly clear that its holding was limited to cases involving the fundamental right of access to the courts:
Petitioner urges us both to examine the broad range of Title II's applications all at once, and to treat that breadth as a mark of the law's invalidity. . . . Whatever might be said about Title II's other applications, the question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States to private suits for money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress had...
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