Blocker v. Regional Medical Center At Memphis

• Decision Date: 05 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Parties: Carolyn BLOCKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER AT MEMPHIS and United States Security Insurance Companies, Defendants-Appellees. /C 1 722 S.W.2d 660
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 660

722 S.W.2d 660

Carolyn BLOCKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER AT MEMPHIS and United States

Security Insurance Companies, Defendants-Appellees.

No. S/C 1

722 S.W.2d 660

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Jackson.

Jan. 5, 1987.

Lewie R. Polk, III, Mark Allen, Gerber, Gerber, and Agee, Memphis, for plaintiff-appellant.

H. Fredrick Zimmermann, Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman, McBride, and Prewitt, Memphis, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

DROWOTA, Justice.

The sole issue presented by this Worker's Compensation appeal is whether the statute of limitations, T.C.A. Sec. 50-6-203, bars Plaintiff's action. The trial court granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss on the basis of this defense. Plaintiff, Carolyn Blocker, has appealed the trial court's decision in favor of Defendants, Regional Medical Center at Memphis and U.S. Security Fire & Casualty Insurance Companies.

This case comes to this Court in the posture of a summary judgment. Rule 12.02(6), T.R.C.P. Thus the standard of review is that provided for Rule 56, T.R.C.P. In determining whether Rule 56, T.R.C.P., has been correctly applied,

"this Court views the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and competent affidavits in a light most favorable to the opponent of the motion. Likewise, all legitimate conclusions from the record should be drawn in favor of the opponent of the motion."

Price v. Mercury Supply Co., Inc., 682 S.W.2d 924, 929 (Tenn.App.), permission to appeal denied (Tenn.1984) (citations omitted). See also Poore v. Magnavox Co. of Tennessee, 666 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tenn.1984). Moreover, "[t]he burden is on the moving party to show the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Jones v. Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 651 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tenn.1983). Nevertheless, the opponent of the motion may not rest solely upon the allegations of the pleadings and must come forward with some showing to dispute the movant's assertions. See Kelton v. Snell, 689 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tenn.App.), permission to appeal denied (Tenn.1985); Price v. Mercury Supply Co., Inc., supra, at 929. See also Rule 56.05, T.R.C.P. "When weighing such a motion, if the mind of the court entertains any doubt whether or not a genuine issue exists as to any material fact it is its duty to overrule the motion." Poore v. Magnavox Co. of Tennessee, supra, at 49 (citation omitted).

The pleadings in this case were commenced with the Complaint filed on March 4, 1985. Plaintiff alleged that she had suffered a work-related injury to her arm on April 22, 1982. On April 8, 1985, Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss, alleging that while the injury was suffered on April 22, 1982, the last voluntary payment of benefits was made January 3, 1983, and thus the statute of limitations had run on Plaintiff's claim. These Motions were supported by the affidavit of Richard Smart, a claims adjuster for the insurer. Mr. Smart stated that all benefits for this compensable injury had been paid and that the last such payment was made on January 3, 1983. Subsequently, on April 19, 1985, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint to reflect that the original injury of April 22, 1982, had been treated continuously from that date by a company designated physician and had been aggravated or reinjured on October 28, 1983. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss was filed on April 30, 1985. Plaintiff alleged that she had undergone a continuous course of medical treatment for her injury and had received temporary total disability benefits during the periods in which she was unable to work; she also stated that her medical treatment had been provided by a physician to whom the Defendants made payments of worker's compensation benefits and to whom she had been referred by Defendants. She continued under this physician's care and had last seen him recently. She further averred that this injury had been subsequently aggravated or reinjured after she returned to work on November 10, 1982. This pleading was supported by the affidavits of Plaintiff and her trial attorney. Plaintiff stated that she had last seen the employer designated physician for treatment of her injury in April, 1985. Plaintiff's attorney stated that he had received a letter, dated February 22, 1985, from Mr. Smart; the attached letter from the Defendant insurer conceded that the injury of October 28, 1983, had been compensable and may have been related to the April, 1982, injury, but Mr. Smart asserted the Defendants' reliance on the statute of limitations. Plaintiff had returned to work after the October, 1983, incident on January 9, 1984. On June 28, 1985, a consent order was entered allowing Plaintiff to amend her Complaint.

In response to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, filed April 30, 1985, Defendants filed Answers on July 9, 1985, stating that two injuries may be involved, one reported in April, 1982, and the other in October, 1983. Supplemental affidavits were subsequently filed on September 19, 1985, in support of Defendants' pending Motions to Dismiss. Beverly Beasley, a patient representative in the office of the treating physician to whom Defendants had referred Plaintiff, stated that Plaintiff had been seen in the office after January 5, 1984, but these visits had not been paid for by Defendant insurer; rather, they had been paid for by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. The last payment by Defendant insurer was for the office visit of January 5, 1984. Cindy McGrath, a claims adjuster for the insurer, stated that she had processed Plaintiff's October, 1983, worker's compensation claim. Plaintiff had been paid temporary total disability benefits until January 9, 1984; the last payment of medical expenses had been made on January 26, 1984. Ms. McGrath further stated that Defendant had not paid additional benefits after January 26, 1984. A second affidavit of Mr. Smart reiterated that the insurer had not voluntarily paid worker's compensation benefits for the April, 1982, injury since January 3, 1983. On November 15, 1985, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order dismissing Plaintiff's action as barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff then filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

A Worker's Compensation appeal from a summary judgment is not controlled by the material evidence rule; it is governed by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. If any material evidence indicates that a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment is inappropriate. Particularly in certain kinds of cases summary judgment should be entered cautiously, and this Court has previously emphasized that "questions involving the commencement of the statute of limitations in worker's compensation cases most often are factual in nature." McLerran v. Mid-South Stone, Inc., 695 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tenn.1985). See also Hibner v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 619 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tenn.1981) ("The determination of the time the statute of limitations begins to run often is troublesome, not from the standpoint of what triggers the running of the statute but from a factual standpoint.").

In this case, Defendants contend that no facts exist to toll the running of the one year statute from the date of the last voluntary payment of compensation and that no genuine issue of material fact exists on this record. Defendants also assert that the cases do not require that the employee have actual knowledge that the employer has ceased providing voluntary payments of compensation. In any case, Plaintiff offered no evidence that she didn't know of the employer's decision to cease making voluntary provision of compensation.

Cases involving substantially the same issues and circumstances as those presented here have been decided repeatedly by this Court. These cases often entail the factual issue of when or whether the employer or insurer effectively ceased providing voluntary compensation. See, e.g., Lusk v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 655 S.W.2d 917, 919-920 (Tenn.1983); Crowder v. Klopman Mills, 627 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tenn.1982); Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Williams, 580 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tenn.1979); State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cupples, 567 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tenn.1978); Bellar v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 559 S.W.2d 788, 789-790 (Tenn.1978); Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. A.J. King Lumber Co., 553 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tenn.1977); Norton Co. v. Coffin, 553 S.W.2d 751, 752-753 (Tenn.1977); Union Carbide Corp. v. Cannon, 523 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tenn.1975); Brewer v. Pocahontas Fuel Co., 221 Tenn. 130, 134, 425 S.W.2d 582, 585 (1968); Fields v. Lowe Furniture Corp., 220 Tenn. 212, 216-217, 415 S.W.2d 340, 341-343 (1967). More importantly, while actual knowledge that voluntary payments have been terminated is not necessarily required, the cases consistently depend upon the conduct of the parties and what the employee knew or should have known in the circumstances. See, e.g., Banks v. St. Francis Hospital, 697 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tenn.1985); Jones v. Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 679 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tenn.1984); Osborne v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tenn.1984); Lusk v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., supra, at 919-920; Crowder v. Klopman Mills, supra, at 932-933; Humphreys v. Allstate Insurance Co., 627 S.W.2d 933, 934-935 (Tenn.1982); Hibner v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., supra, at 110-111; Bellar v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., supra, at 789; Norton Co. v. Coffin, supra, at 752; Union Carbide Corp. v. Cannon, supra, at 363-364; Fields v. Lowe Furniture Corp., supra, 220 Tenn. at 217-218, 415 S.W.2d at 342-343. Cf. Ryan v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 485 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tenn.1972) (Where employee was unequivocally informed by letter that his worker's compensation claim had been denied, statute of limitations would bar recovery.). Further, although mere referral by the employer of the employee to a physician for evaluation...