Bloemker v. Detroit Diesel Corp.
Decision Date | 20 December 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 85A02-9901-CV-19.,85A02-9901-CV-19. |
Citation | 720 N.E.2d 753 |
Parties | Bob Allen BLOEMKER, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. DETROIT DIESEL CORPORATION, PTI Industries, Incorporated, and North Manchester Foundry, Inc., Appellees-Defendants. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Harry A. Wilson, Jr., Wilson Kehoe & Winingham, John A. Payton, Lehman Payton, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant.
Sydney L. Steele, Jon K. Stowell, Lowe Gray Steele & Darko, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana, Edward L. Murphy, Jr., Tina M. Yordy, Miller Carson Boxberger & Murphy LLP, Fort Wayne, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees.
Plaintiff-Appellant Bob Allen Bloemker (Bloemker) appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Detroit Diesel Corporation (Detroit Diesel) and North Manchester Foundry, Inc. (North Manchester) on Bloemker's negligence claim.2
We affirm.
Bloemker raises several issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive of the issues in this case, and restate as follows:
Whether Detroit Diesel and North Manchester were suppliers under either section 388 or 392 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which impose a duty upon those who supply chattels to others.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because a decision has already been rendered in this case by this court on different issues, we find the facts as outlined in that case to be controlling in this case as well. Bloemker v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 655 N.E.2d 117 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. granted.
Bloemker, 655 N.E.2d at 118-119.
The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to consider the case in conjunction with McGlothlin v. M & U Trucking, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 135 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. granted, which presented the same issue of whether a supplier of a chattel has a duty of reasonable care to inspect and discover latent as well as patent defects in the chattel. Bloemker v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 687 N.E.2d 358 (Ind.1997). The Supreme Court rejected the latent/patent distinction that would impose no duty to inspect, discover, and warn of latent defects, and stated that the proper consideration was to look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 388 and 392 to guide the resolution of these issues. McGlothlin v. M & U Trucking, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 1243, 1245 (Ind.1997), reh'g denied. For this reason, the Court vacated the trial court's entry of summary judgment in Bloemker and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the case in light of McGlothlin.
On September 1, 1998, North Manchester filed its second Motion for Summary Judgment contending that it owed no duty to Bloemker. On September 4, 1998, Detroit Diesel filed its second Motion for Summary Judgment contending that it owed no duty to Bloemker under either section 388 or section 392 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. On December 9, 1998, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of North Manchester and Detroit Diesel. Bloemker now appeals.
I. Supplier under §§ 388 & 392
Initially, we note our standard of review. The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation which can be determined as a matter of law. Funk v. Funk, 563 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. denied. When reviewing the propriety of the grant of summary judgment, we stand in the same position as the trial court. Reed v. Luzny, 627 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Summary judgment is only appropriate when the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C). Once the movant has sustained this initial burden, the opposing party must respond by designating all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and any other matters on which it relies which demonstrate that a genuine issue exists for trial. Id. We consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. However, we may sustain the trial court's decision upon any theory supported by the designated materials. T.R. 56(C).
The tort of negligence consists of three elements: 1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; 2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and 3) injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by that breach. J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 808 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). The first element, the existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff, is usually a question of law for the court's resolution. Wickey v. Sparks, 642 N.E.2d 262, 265 (Ind.Ct.App.1994),trans. denied. Although summary judgment is rarely appropriate in a negligence action, Osmulski v. Becze, 638 N.E.2d 828, 838 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), it may be suitable to determine the legal question of whether a duty exists. Brewster v. Rankins, 600 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Absent a duty, there can be no breach, and thus, no basis for recovery under a negligence theory. Hawn v. Padgett, 598 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Therefore, the threshold issue to be determined in this case is whether Detroit Diesel and North Manchester were "suppliers" of the injury-causing pattern in order to impose a duty under either §§ 388 or 392 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
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