Bloodworth v. Berryhill, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-00104-HBB
Decision Date | 30 May 2018 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-00104-HBB |
Parties | MICHAEL L. BLOODWORTH PLAINTIFF v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security DEFENDANT |
Court | United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Western District of Kentucky |
Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Michael L. Bloodworth ("Plaintiff") seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both the Plaintiff (DN 15) and Defendant (DN 22) have filed a Fact and Law Summary. For the reasons that follow, the final decision of the Commissioner is reversed and this matter is remanded, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties have consented to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case, including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 11). By Order entered October 19, 2017 (DN 12), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a written request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on August 6, 20141 (Tr. 201-02). Plaintiff alleged that he became disabled on July 9, 2009, as a result of a plate and screws in his left arm, right leg, and right arm (treatment for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident); anxiety/panic attacks; irritability; trouble sleeping at regular times; and depression (Tr. 201, 218-19). On September 22, 2016, Administrative Law Judge Lisa R. Hall ("ALJ") conducted a video hearing from Paducah, Kentucky (Tr. 35, 37). Plaintiff and her attorney, Sarah Martin, participated from Madisonville, Kentucky (Id.). James Adams, the testifying vocational expert, was present in the hearing room in Paducah, Kentucky (Id.).
In a decision dated February 23, 2017, the ALJ evaluated this adult disability claim pursuant to the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the Commissioner (Tr. 18-30). The ALJ observed that Plaintiff's date last insured was December 31, 2014 (Tr. 20). At the first step, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity from November 7, 2010, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2014, his date last insured (Id.). At the second step, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff had the following severe impairments residuals of a motor vehicle accident, depression, and anxiety (Id.). At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Tr. 20-21).
At the fourth step, the ALJ made the following determination:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he should never climb ladders, kneel orcrawl. He can occasionally engage in other postural activities. He can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks, meaning tasks which apply commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral or diagrammatic form, with the ability to deal with problems involving several concrete variables in or from standardized situations. The claimant can frequently interact with coworkers and supervisors, and occasionally with the general public.
(Tr. 22). Relying on testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of his past relevant work (Tr. 28).
The ALJ proceeded to the fifth step where he considered Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), age, education, and past work experience as well as testimony from the vocational expert (Tr. 29-30). The ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy (Tr. 30). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act, from November 7, 2010 through December 31, 2014, the date last insured (Id.).
Plaintiff timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision (Tr. 198-200). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 1-4).
Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final decision of the Commissioner are supported by "substantial evidence," 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence exists whena reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way." Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a case for substantial evidence, the Court "may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Cohen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).
As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 1-4). At that point, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) ( ). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ, not the Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-696 (6th Cir. 1993).
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See "Evaluation of disability in general," 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:
Here, at the fifth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from November 7, 2010 through December 31, 2014.
Plaintiff's fact and law summary and supporting memorandum set forth challenges to Finding Nos. 3, 5, and 10 (DN 16; DN 16-1 PageID # 630-35). Plaintiff argues that Finding No. 3 fails to recognize all of his severe physical impairments (DN 16-1 PageID # 630-31). Plaintiff challenges Finding No. 5 by asserting that substantial evidence does not support these underlyingdeterminations: (1) Plaintiff's severe impairments allow him to perform light work; (2) the medical opinion of Dr. Cole is not entitled to great weight; and (3) Plaintiff's statements regarding pain and other limitations are not fully credible (Id. PageID # 631-33, 634-35). And finally, Plaintiff contends Finding No. 10 is not supported by substantial evidence because the vocational expert's testimony is based on obsolete job descriptions from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) (Id. PageID # 633-34).
The Court will begin by addressing Plaintiff's challenge to Finding No. 3. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the motor vehicle accident he suffered a closed head injury, bilateral rib fractures, pneumothorax (bruised lung), pulmonary contusions, fracture of T12, L1 and L2 vertebrae, hepatic contusion, open right wrist fracture, closed left wrist fracture, and a right tibia plateau fracture (DN 15-1 PageID # 619-20). Further, he points out that he underwent multiple surgeries and in-patient rehabilitation lasting nearly a month (Id.). Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have recognized these injuries or their resulting conditions (chronic pain syndrome, neuropathy, post-traumatic arthritis in his AC joint) and his hernia are severe impairments (Id.). Instead, Finding No. 3 minimizes them by characterizing them as "residuals" of a motor vehicle accident (Id.).
Defendant points out that the ALJ thoroughly discussed the injuries Plaintiff sustained in the motor vehicle accident as well as the...
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