Bloom v. Bexar County, Tex.

• Citation: 130 F.3d 722
• Decision Date: 19 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-50027,97-50027
• Parties: 11 NDLR P 209 Helen R. BLOOM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 722

130 F.3d 722

11 NDLR P 209

Helen R. BLOOM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-50027.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 19, 1997.

Steven E. Clark, Melissa Ann Ostermann, de la Garza & Clark, Dallas, TX, Philip Martin Ross, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mark Steven Kloster, Susan A. Bowen, Asst. District Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, KING and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Helen R. Bloom worked as a full time court reporter in Bexar County, Texas, for more than seven years, ending in July 1993. In 1989, Judge Andy Mireles, 73rd Judicial District Court, hired Bloom as his official court reporter. Although city and county ordinances banned smoking in the courthouse facility, Judge Mireles permitted smoking in his chambers and offices, over which the county had no control. Bloom began to experience health problems and missed work periodically over the next four years. Bloom's doctor advised her that she was suffering from multiple chemical sensitivity (including sensitivity to environmental tobacco smoke), asthma, and other related medical conditions. The doctor also advised Bloom to stop working in the courthouse building, which had poor ventilation. Bloom requested and received from the district judges a temporary transfer to the Justice Center, across the street from the courthouse.

In June, 1993, Bloom applied to Judge Pat Priest, the local administrative judge, for an open position as a "swing" reporter, which involved relieving court reporters in various courts throughout the county. In her application, Bloom requested modification of the position so that she would not have to work in the old courthouse. Judge Priest informed Bloom that she was not eligible for the swing position because her medical condition would preclude her from relieving court reporters in the old courthouse. Rather than return to work in the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bloom resigned her position.

In June, 1994, after filing and losing a worker's compensation claim, Bloom filed suit in federal court, alleging that Bexar County had discriminated against her in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1997), and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1997). Bloom's complaint alleged that her medical conditions qualified as a disability under the ADA, thereby obligating Bexar County to accommodate her disability. Bloom alleged that Bexar County's failure to accommodate her disability and failure to enforce city and county ordinances prohibiting smoking in the courthouse constituted a constructive discharge which amounted to discrimination. Bloom's complaint sought compensatory damages and a permanent injunction requiring Bexar County to rehire her as a court reporter in the Justice Center or in a comparable position that accommodates her disability.

The federal district court denied Bexar County's first motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Following the exchange of discovery requests and the designation of witnesses, Bexar County again moved for summary judgment, arguing that Bexar County was not Bloom's employer for purposes of the ADA and, therefore, could not have discriminated against her. The district court found that Bexar County could not have discriminated against Bloom in violation of the ADA because, under Texas law, Bexar County had no authority with regard to the hiring, firing, or assigning of court reporters. The court went on to find that, at any rate, Bloom had not demonstrated a "disability" as defined in the ADA. Accordingly, the district court issued a summary judgment in favor of Bexar County. ¹ That same day, the district court denied Bloom's motion for leave to amend her complaint.

Discussion

A. The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Bloom's ADA Claims

In this circuit, we review a district court's summary judgment de novo. Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.1992). In this context, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. Summary judgment is proper if the evidence so viewed shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).

1. Bloom's Claims Under ADA Title I

Regardless of whether Bloom was disabled, the district court properly granted summary judgment because Bexar County was not Bloom's employer for ADA Title I purposes. ADA Title I makes it unlawful for a covered entity to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability "because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A "covered entity" is an "employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). The statutory term "employer" means "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person...." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).

Bexar County is not a "covered entity" with regard to Bloom because Bexar County was not Bloom's employer. In Texas, court reporters are employees of the state, rather than the county. Gill-Massar v. Dallas County, 781 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, no writ). Texas law gives the Texas Supreme Court power to make rules governing the certification and conduct of court reporters. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.002 (West 1997). Court reporters for the Texas district courts are subject solely to the control of the elected state district judges. See Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 301, 306 (5th Cir.1980) (noting that Texas district judges have absolute authority over appointment of official court reporters), cert. denied sub nom. Rheuark v. Dallas County, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 365 (1981). The district judges appoint the court reporters, who hold office "at the pleasure of the court." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.041. A majority of district judges in Bexar County must agree to the necessity and method of hiring additional court reporters, and the presiding judge determines the assignments of any additional reporters so hired. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 52.044; see also Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 301, 306 (noting "district judges in Texas possess absolute discretionary power to hire as many substitute court reporters as they deem necessary ...." and "each district judge possesses absolute authority to appoint an unlimited number of substitute court reporters as need requires and to compel the county to pay their salaries and fees.") (footnotes omitted). The Texas legislature's decision to explicitly vest control of state district court reporters in state district judges rather than counties precludes a finding that Bexar County was Bloom's employer for ADA Title I purposes.

Bloom cites cases supporting the proposition that a defendant need not be the plaintiff's direct employer to be liable under ADA Title I, see Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.1994) (acknowledging the possibility that particular circumstances may arise in which Title I would apply where plaintiff is not technically defendant's employee); United States v. State of Illinois, 3 A.D. Cases 1157, 1994 WL 562180, * 2 (N.D.Ill.1994) ("There is no express requirement that the covered entity be an employer of the qualified individual."); however, Fifth Circuit precedent counsels against such a finding in this case. Carparts and State of Illinois rest on an analogy between ADA Title I and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under which some courts have considered defendants to be "employers" despite the absence of a direct employment relationship with the plaintiff. ² See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18; State of Illinois, 1994 WL 562180 at * 3. Fifth Circuit precedent as to Title VII, however, is to the contrary; therefore, Bloom's analogy, even if accepted, would be unavailing. See Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that Fifth Circuit test for employment relationship under Title VII focuses on control over employee's conduct), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026, 111 S.Ct. 676, 112 L.Ed.2d 668 (1991). Under our test for determining the existence of an employment relationship in the context of a Title VII case, "the right to control an employee's conduct is the 'most important factor.' " Id.; accord., Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist, Inc. 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956, 109 S.Ct. 394, 102 L.Ed.2d 383 (1988).

Bexar County could not have discriminated against Bloom in the manner proscribed by Title I because Bexar County did not have control or authority over "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, [or] other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112. As the federal district court noted below, state judges are elected officials of the State of Texas and are not agents, officials, or employees of the county. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7. No county official has the authority to overrule the district judges with regard to the hiring, firing, or assignment of official court reporters in the state judicial system. See Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 301-02 (noting that county commissioners lack authority to require district judges to obtain advance clearance before hiring additional court reporters). While Bexar County may perform the...