Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 October 1884 |
| Docket Number | 11,618 |
| Citation | 97 Ind. 478 |
| Parties | Bloom et al. v. Franklin Life Insurance Company |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Superior Court of Marion County.
Judgment affirmed.
H. D McMullen, D. T. Downey and F. Heiner, for appellants.
B Harrison, W. H. H. Miller and J. B. Elam, for appellee.
The policy of insurance upon which the appellant's complaint is founded contains a provision that if the assured shall die by reason of intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquors, or in the known violation of the laws of the States or of the United States, the policy shall be void. The answer of the appellee, after setting forth the provision of the policy, proceeds as follows: "And this defendant avers that the said August Bloom, the assured, came to his death in the following manner, to wit: On or about the 29th day of December, 1881, the said August Bloom, while in a state of intoxication from the use of intoxicating liquors, did commit an assault and battery upon one Wilhelmina Bloom, the wife of his brother, Albert Bloom, at the town of Aurora, and State of Indiana, and while thus engaged in perpetrating said assault and battery, and while violently beating, bruising, choking and maltreating her, the said wife of his brother, he, the said August, being at the time in a state of intoxication, his brother, the said Albert, did then and there, for the purpose of lawfully defending his wife against said assault and battery, strike the said August Bloom upon the head with a jack plane, or some other wooden instrument, thereby fracturing the skull of him, the said August, and causing his death within a few hours thereafter."
There can be no question as to the force and validity of the provision of the policy declaring it to be of no effect in the event that the assured shall come to his death from the effects of intemperance, or while engaged in wilful violation of the law. We do not, indeed, understand the appellant as insisting upon the invalidity of this provision, but as asserting that the facts stated do not show that the assured died from the effects of intemperance, or that he met his death while engaged in knowingly violating the law.
We do not think that an answer, averring that the assured came to his death while engaged in violating the law, need be framed with the same precision as would be necessary in an indictment in a criminal prosecution. The rules of pleading in civil cases are not so rigid and strict as they are in prosecutions for criminal offences. We can not, therefore, accept as a just standard the rule which obtains in cases of indictments, but even in such cases the pleading is good if it describes the offence in the language of the statute, or in language of equivalent meaning.
The answer charges that the assured did commit an assault and battery, and then sets forth the facts constituting the offence. It is true that the language of the statute defining the offence is not pursued, but we do not think this was necessary, for all that it was incumbent upon the appellee to do was to state such facts as would enable the court to conclude as matter of law, that there was an assault and battery committed. The facts stated warrant this conclusion. It is not necessary in a complaint to anticipate defences, nor is it necessary in an answer to anticipate matters that might be replied in avoidance. In the one case it is sufficient to make a prima facie cause of action, and in the other, to make a prima facie defence. We can see no reason for taking this case out of the general rule. It is true forfeitures are odious and that courts are slow to enforce them, but this consideration does not affect the rules of pleading. The reluctance of courts to enforce forfeitures does not change the rules of pleading, but does, in a high degree, affect the causes assigned in support of the claim of forfeiture. The question, under the rule against enforcing forfeitures is not in what manner are the grounds of forfeiture pleaded, but it is, what are the grounds? Are they so important and material as to compel a declaration of forfeiture? If, in this case, the answer shows that the assured came to his death in the known violation of law, then there is a cause of forfeiture shown, no matter how inartistically drawn the pleading may be; for the inquiry is, not as to the manner of pleading, but as to the substance of the plea. It seems quite clear that the facts stated would be abundantly sufficient in a complaint to recover damages for an assault and battery, and if this be true, there is no reason why they should not be sufficient when the assault and battery is pleaded as a defence. If the facts are such as show an assault and battery, then, if an assault and battery is a defence, the pleading is sufficient, no matter what may be the character of the action in which it is interposed. The pleading under immediate mention does state facts constituting an assault and battery, and does show an offence involving a wilful violation of law. At all events the facts stated in the answer, and admitted by the demurrer, are enough to put the appellants to a reply.
Granting it to be true, as decided in Cluff v. Mutual, etc., Insurance Company, 13 Allen 308, that the violation of law must, in order to avoid the policy, be a breach of some criminal statute, still the answer is good, for courts judicially know that an assault and battery is an offence punishable as a crime. The words "assault and battery," employed in the answer, have, and for centuries have had, a definite and settled meaning, and we can assign that meaning to them, not only without encroaching upon any rule of law, but in close harmony with long and firmly settled principles. We may, with justice and propriety, apply to the pleading before us the rule adopted in Burk v. State, 27 Ind. 430, where it was held that a crime was well defined if the Legislature employed a phrase of a definite and settled meaning. In that case the phrase was "public nuisance," and it was held to be a sufficient definition of the offence. State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185, vide opinion, 196; S. C., 38 Am. R. 117. Taking the general words used in the answer, in conjunction with the statement of specific facts, and it appears, with reasonable certainty, that there was a violation of a criminal statute. We do not affirm that the words "assault and battery" would of themselves be sufficient. Not that, by any means; but we do affirm that the words, used as they are in that clause of the answer, reading, "while thus engaged in perpetrating said assault and battery, and while violently beating, bruising, choking and maltreating her, the said wife of his brother," are to be considered in determining the character of the violence used upon the person of Mrs. Bloom. The words have a settled meaning quite as full and definite as the word "unlawful," and it is but following the ruling in Burk v. State, supra, to give them their well known meaning. If the word "unlawful" had been used, the substantial requisites of an indictment would have been present. State v. Smith, 44 Ind. 557. It seems to us that the words used, taken in connection with those with which they are immediately associated, and in connection with the clause contained in the concluding part of the answer, which reads, "And this defendant says that by reason of his said intoxication and of his said violation of the law in committing such assault and battery, the said August Bloom was then and there in the known violation of the laws of Indiana," fully show that an offence punishable by the criminal laws of the State was committed by the assured. We do not hold that the averments in the concluding part of the answer control, but we do hold that in determining the whole tenor and drift of the pleading they are proper for consideration.
The soundness of the decision in Cluff v. Mutual etc., Ins. Co., supra, upon the point immediately under discussion, is questioned in the well considered case of Bradley v. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., 45 N.Y. 422, and was denied in the same case by the Supreme Court of New York. It does seem a wide stretch of judicial power to affirm that a clause reading, "Or in case he shall die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by reason of intemperance from the use of intoxicating liquors, or by the hands of justice, or in the known violation of any law of these States, or of the United States, or of the said provinces, or of any other country which he may be permitted under this policy to visit or reside in, this policy shall be void," refers solely to criminal laws. If the words employed are taken in their usual signification, it would seem quite clear that death in the known violation of any law, criminal or civil, would make the policy inoperative. An illustration was put by Grover, J., in Bradley v. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., supra, which goes far to show the unsoundness of the decision in Cluff v. Mutual, etc., Ins. Co., supra: "Again, suppose the death occurred from...
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