Bloom v. Library Corp.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:15-CV-11 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | JOSHUA BLOOM, Plaintiff, v. THE LIBRARY CORPORATION and ANNETTE MURPHY, Defendants. |
(GROH)
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Joshua Bloom's Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) [ECF No. 25], filed on May 26, 2015. Also before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 21], filed by Defendants Annette Murphy and the Library Corporation ("TLC") on April 30, 2015. Bloom moves the Court to grant appropriate relief under Rule 56(d), which allows the Court to defer consideration of or to deny a pending motion when a nonmovant shows that he cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Bloom's motion for relief and accordingly orders that the Defendants' motion is DENIED.
Bloom filed his original complaint against Murphy and TLC in the Circuit Court of Berkeley County, West Virginia, on November 7, 2014. In that complaint, Bloom alleged that he entered into an employment agreement with TLC in early 2007 and, in relianceupon that agreement, he and his wife resigned from their jobs and moved from New York to West Virginia, where they purchased a home. Bloom averred that he performed well in his role as TLC's chief technology officer and contributed to TLC's success during his approximately seven years with the company. The basis for the instant lawsuit is a dispute concerning Bloom's termination from his role at TLC. Bloom alleged that on November 8, 2013, Murphy-TLC's co-founder, president, chief executive officer ("CEO") and chairman of the board-informed him that he was fired. Bloom alleged that he was fired without cause. In his complaint, Bloom asserted that TLC and Murphy committed violations of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act ("WPCA"), and were also liable for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Defendants were not served with a copy of the original complaint. On November 26, 2014, Bloom filed an amended complaint, which reiterated the same allegations made in the original complaint, but which included as an attachment an unsigned employment agreement. Bloom avers that the attached agreement represents the employment agreement he entered into with TLC in early 2007. The Defendants contend that the unsigned document is not a binding agreement.
Murphy filed a notice of removal with this Court on February 10, 2015, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Murphy alleged that this Court possessed valid diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because Bloom, a citizen of Pennsylvania, and Murphy, a citizen of a Florida, were not citizens of the same state, and because the amount in controversy exceeded the sum of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Murphy further argued that, although her Co-Defendant, TLC, was then and is now a Maryland corporation with a principal place of business in West Virginia, and is therefore considered to be acitizen of both Maryland and West Virginia, the forum defendant rule did not preclude Murphy's removal of this case because at the time of removal TLC had not been properly joined and served as a defendant under § 1441(b)(2). Bloom contested Murphy's removal by way of a motion to remand filed on February 25, 2015. The Court denied the motion to remand, finding that Murphy was a Florida citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and that the forum defendant rule did not preclude removal under § 1441(b)(2) as TLC had not been properly joined and served at the time of removal.
Now before the Court are two motions concerning the relief Bloom is seeking under the WPCA. See W. Va. Code § 21-5-4 to -18. The WPCA is "remedial legislation designed to protect working people and assist them in the collection of compensation wrongly withheld." Citynet, LLC v. Toney, 772 S.E.2d 36, 49 (W. Va. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Count 1 of his amended complaint, Bloom alleged that TLC-and Murphy, as TLC's officer-violated the WPCA by failing to pay him the termination benefit provided in the alleged employment agreement within an appropriate time period.1 Bloom alleged that his termination benefit constituted "accrued wages and/or fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to Plaintiff." On April 30, 2015, the Defendants moved for partial summary judgment, asking this Court to "find that severance paymentsare not wages" as defined by the WPCA and that Bloom is unable to recover under Count 1 of his amended complaint. Bloom responded in opposition to that motion on May 21, 2015. Bloom argues that his termination benefit was intended to be compensation for work performed and constituted a "fringe benefit" and "wages" under the WPCA. Bloom further argues that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the terms of the parties employment agreement, in large part because the Defendants contest the validity of the unsigned agreement attached to Bloom's amended complaint while other evidence in the record contains references to a contract concerning Bloom's employment with TLC. Bloom contends that these issues create multiple genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment at this early stage in the proceedings. The Defendants replied in support of their motion on May 29, 2015.
On May 26, 2015, while the motion for partial summary judgment was pending, Bloom filed a motion for relief under Rule 56(d), in which he requests that this court either deny or defer ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment. Attached to the motion is a declaration executed by Bloom's attorney, which articulates the specific reasons discovery is necessary for Bloom to present facts essential to justify his opposition to summary judgment. The Defendants filed a response to the motion for relief on June 9, 2015. The Defendants argue that their motion for partial summary judgment presents a question of statutory interpretation, which requires no fact-finding and can therefore be ruled upon prior to the close of discovery. In his reply brief, Bloom reiterates his argument that discovery is necessary before the Court can address the issues raised by the Defendants' motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, the Court must conduct "the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250.
The party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That is, once the movant has met its burden to show an absence of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must then come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-35; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).
Generally, a court should only grant summary judgment "after adequate time for discovery." See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "Summary judgment before discovery forces the non-moving party into a fencing match without a sword or mask." McCray v. Md. Dep't of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). An exception to this principle applies when a motion presents "purely legal questions" which can be resolved "at any time without anyfactual determinations, and thus may be decided prior to the conclusion of discovery." Negri v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 5:11-CV-3, 2011 WL 5041214, at *5 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 24, 2011). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), a nonmovant faced with contesting a motion for summary judgment may seek relief when certain facts are unavailable to him. Rule 56(d) provides as follows:
The declaration or affidavit provided by the nonmovant in support of a Rule 56(d) motion must specify the reasons necessitating additional discovery or otherwise notify the district court as to which specific facts are yet to be discovered. See McCray, 741 F.3d at 484.
A motion for summary judgment should be denied when "the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5). Allowing sufficient time for discovery is "considered especially important when the relevant facts are exclusively in the control of the opposing party." Id. at 246-47 (quoting 10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2741 (3d ed. 1998)). Under these principles, a nonmovant's request to conduct discovery under Rule 56 is ...
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