Bloom v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 89-6142 RRB(Gx).,CV 89-6142 RRB(Gx). |
| Citation | 734 F. Supp. 1553 |
| Parties | Mari BLOOM, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., Universal Television, and Randy Cordray, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
Michael Bloom, Dolan, Cohen, Taylor & Peterson, Woodland Hills, Cal., for plaintiff.
Jonathan M. Turner, Garfield, Tepper, Ashworth & Epstein, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.
Defendants Universal City Studios, Inc., Universal Television, and Randy Cordray move for summary judgment. Plaintiff Mari Bloom moves to remand the action to state court. Oral argument was held February 12, 1990 on both counts. After considering the parties' memoranda of points and authorities and their arguments made at the hearing, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion to remand her action to state court is denied.
This action arises out of defendants' termination of plaintiff's employment as assistant head hair stylist on a television series. Plaintiff is Mari Bloom. Defendants are Universal City Studios, Inc. ("Studio"); Universal Television ("Television"); and Randy Cordray ("Cordray") (collectively "defendants").
Plaintiff filed her complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Defendants removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction—specifically, § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendants asserted that § 301 pre-empted Blooms' claims for relief, of which there are five: breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with economic advantage; misrepresentation, and unfair business practices in violation of § 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code.
Based on the pleadings, declarations and other admissible evidence the parties submitted, the following material facts are undisputed:
Material Undisputed Fact Supporting Evidence
1. Bloom is a successful hairstylist. Bloom Decl. 12(c)
motion ¶¶ 2-4
2. Bloom was head hairdresser on two popular television Bloom Decl. 12(c)
series until April 1989, when production ceased for the season. motion ¶ 5
Bloom's guaranteed minimum salary while working on those
series was $1,654 for four days' work
3. On April 15, 1989, defendant Cordray telephoned Bloom to Bloom Decl. 12(c)
offer her a position as assistant head hair stylist on the motion ¶ 6
television series "Let's Get Mom," a new series being produced
by Universal
4. Cordary orally guaranteed Bloom employment until August Bloom Decl. 12(c)
25, 1989, viz., at least eleven hours of work per day for motion ¶ 6(a)-(c).
four days per week for a minimum of seventeen weeks. ¶ 11.
5. From May 1 to May 15, 1989, Bloom was employed as an Bloom Decl. 12(c)
assistant head hair stylist on the production of the television motion ¶¶ 6, 8 & 11;
series "Let's Get Mom." The record is not clear, however, Complt.
whether Studio or Television employed Bloom. Exhibit "A" (Studio
production notice).
6. Universal Television is a division of Universal Studios. Complt. ¶ 2; and
Complt. Exhibit "A".
7. Bloom's oral employment contract was evidenced in two Complt. ¶ 6; and Exhibits
writings: the "Production Notice" and the "Tentative Production "A" and "B".
Schedule/89 Season."
8. The Production Notice provided that "all other provisions Complt. Exhibit "A".
governing the employment agreement between Studio and
Bloom were per IATSE contract," and that "the terms and
conditions of the applicable Basic and/or Local collective
bargaining agreement(s) shall apply, and this deal memo is
subject to and must provide terms no less favorable than the
terms and conditions of such applicable agreement(s)." (Emphasis
added)
9. On May 15, 1989, Studio terminated Bloom, because "Let's Bloom Decl. 12(c)
Get Mom" was being cancelled. motion ¶ 11.
10. From August 1, 1985 through July 31, 1988, there existed Gorham Decl.
a collective bargaining agreement between Studio and plaintiff's 11/26/89 ¶ 5 and
union, Make-up Artists and Hair Stylists Local No. 706. Exhibit "A".
11. From August 1, 1988 until the present, there existed a Gorham Decl.
collective bargaining agreement between Studio and Local 706. 1/19/90 ¶ 2 and Exhibit
"A".
12. Bloom is a member of Local 706. Gorham Decl.
11/26/89, ¶ 4.
13. The August 1, 1988 collective bargaining agreement is not Gorham Decl.
signed, although both Studio and Union have acted as if the 1/19/90. ¶¶ 5-7.
agreement binds them.
14. The collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitration Gorham Decl.
of disputes concerning, inter alia, the guaranteed period 11/26/89 Exhibit
of employment, and the number of guaranteed hours. "A", Article 5 Gorham
Decl. "A",
1/19/90 Exhibit
"A", Article 5.
15. Neither Bloom nor Local 706 have submitted her claim to Gorham Decl.
grievance nor made a demand for arbitration. 11/26/89 ¶ 6.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants contend that (1) § 301 of the Labor—Management Relations Act of 1947 pre-empts all of plaintiff's claims; (2) inasmuch as plaintiff's claims should be recharacterized as a § 301 claim, the claim fails because plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies under the collective bargaining agreement; and (3) plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot lie against Cordray, because he was not a party to the employment contract between Bloom and Studio.
Bloom appears to argue that § 301 does not pre-empt her claims because (a) she is relying on the oral agreement with Cordray and (b) her tort claims do not require analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. Alternatively, plaintiff seeks leave to amend to state an unspecified claim or claims. Bloom also appears to argue that the collective bargaining agreement is unsigned and, therefore, of no effect, that it is ambiguous, and that Studio violated Article 5 of the collective bargaining agreement, which requires Studio to notify Union whenever it negotiates an individual employment contract.
Defendants reply that (1) the collective bargaining agreement is not ambiguous; (2) the fact that the August 1, 1988, collective bargaining agreement is not signed is unimportant; (3) Bloom proffers no facts supporting her argument that Studio violated Article 5; and (4) the Court should impose Rule 11 sanctions because plaintiff failed to address the Ninth Circuit cases concerning § 301 pre-emption.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant "may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment. ..." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). A defendant may so move if the pleadings and supporting material "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. 56(c). A defendant need not present evidence negating the plaintiff's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Instead, a defendant may show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the plaintiff's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. A plaintiff may not simply "rest upon the mere allegations ... of his pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). At least some "significant probative evidence tending to support" the pleading—thus creating a material factual dispute—must be produced.1 T. W. Electrical Service v. Pacific Electrical Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
A dispute is material only if it can reasonably be resolved in favor of either party at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. It is not enough that the plaintiff might possibly discredit at trial the testimony in support of the motion. United Steelworkers Of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 51, 107 L.Ed.2d 20 (1989). Too, "the record on summary judgment controls, not that record plus speculative inferences a trier of fact might add." Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d 1538, 1542 (9th Cir.1988).
Thus, summary judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to (1) produce evidence supporting the existence of all essential elements on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and (2) show that all disputes about material facts or necessary inferences from the facts could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party by the trier of fact. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12; California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818...
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