Bloom v. Vauclain

• Decision Date: 21 March 1938
• Docket Number: 282
• Citation: 329 Pa. 460,198 A. 78
• Parties: Bloom, Appellant, v. Vauclain et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

198 A. 78

329 Pa. 460

Bloom, Appellant, v. Vauclain et al

No. 282

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

March 21, 1938

Argued January 25, 1938

Appeal, No. 282, Jan. T., 1937, from judgment of C.P. No. 3 Phila. Co., June T., 1935, No. 1994, in case of I. H. Bloom v. Samuel M. Vauclain et al. Judgment affirmed.

Assumpsit. Before SMITH, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict directed for defendant Samuel M. Vauclain and judgment entered thereon. Plaintiff appealed.

Errors assigned were direction of verdict for defendant and entry of judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

Morris Linton, with him Howard A. Silver, for appellant.

John Russell, Jr., with him Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, for appellee.

Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, STERN and BARNES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE KEPHART:

Appellant supplied printed matter, "campaign cards," to persons representing themselves as officers of the "Davis-Brown Campaign Committee," an alleged political organization functioning during the State election of 1930. Appellee Vauclain did not personally authorize this work to be done, and the burden was therefore on appellant to show that the purchases were made by the agents of appellee, with his authority. It appeared that appellee was treasurer of the so-called campaign committee and appellant endeavored to show he assented to the purchases. There was no doubt that some sort of a committee existed, but to affix liability on an officer, or one or all of its members, for acts done in its name, it must appear that it existed in some form of a substantial nature, not merely as a loosely formed, voluntary association as this committee appeared to be. Some members were unacquainted with other members, it had no by-laws, and nothing indicates that it held regular meetings or gave authority to anyone to act. Persons dealing with such an organization must do so with the understanding that they run a great risk in finding anyone, other than the one who gave the order, who is legally responsible for bills. Here appellee served as treasurer at the request of a friend of one of the candidates, and held the position by mutual consent rather than election. His duties were merely those of a custodian of campaign contributions, disbursing them upon vouchers signed by the chairman and publicity director. He had no authority to order printing to be done, and could not be held liable for the orders of the publicity director, any more than a candidate could be held liable where he had no part in authorizing the work done. The finding of the court below that appellee took no active part in the campaign and had no control over its conduct, is well substantiated by the record.

The principles of law governing the responsibility of candidates and officers of such committees have been before the courts and in all cases we have adhered to the rule laid down for voluntary associations. The mere fact that one is a candidate, an officer or a member of a political organization does not, of itself, establish his liability, personally or otherwise, for debts incurred by that organization. In Franklin Paper Co. v. Gorman, 76 Pa.Super. Ct. 276, at 280, it was stated: "Voluntary associations, for . . . political . . . purposes, . . . are not partnerships, nor have their members the powers and responsibilities of partners. The officers, or a committee, or any number of members of such a party have no right to contract debts which will be valid against every member of the party, or of the committee, from the mere fact that he is a member of the party, or of the committee. But those who make a contract, not forbidden by law, are personally liable, and all are included in such liability who assented to the undertaking." See also Dunlap Printing Co. v. Ryan et al., 275 Pa. 556. The liability of such members must be based upon principles of agency, and it must be shown that they, as principals, either authorized the transaction or personally held themselves out as being responsible for the obligation...