Bloomberg v. Pugh Bros. Co.

• Citation: 121 A. 430
• Decision Date: 05 July 1923
• Docket Number: No. 5582.,5582.
• Parties: BLOOMBERG v. PUGH BROS. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

121 A. 430

BLOOMBERG

v. PUGH BROS. CO.

No. 5582.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 5, 1923.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Edward W. Blodgett, Judge.

Action by Harry Bloomberg against the Pugh Bros. Company. Nonsuit was ordered, and plaintiff excepted. Exception sustained, and case remitted for new trial.

George Helford and Wm. C. H. Brand, both of Providence, for plaintiff.

Quinn, Kernan & Quinn, of Providence, for defendant.

SWEETLAND, C. J. This is an action of trespass on the case for deceit.

The case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, on motion of the defendant said justice ordered that the plaintiff be nonsuited.

The claim of the plaintiff is that by reason of false and fraudulent representations of the defendant's agent he was induced to enter into a contract in writing with the defendant for the purchase of a motor truck upon which he paid an initial installment of $300. Learning of the fraudulent nature of the representations which caused him to enter into the contract he returned the truck to the defendant, and now seeks in this action to recover his damages arising from said fraud. From the evidence which the plaintiff was permitted to introduce, and from the offers of evidence which were improperly refused, it appears that on September 29, 1920, there was published in the advertising section of a public newspaper in Providence, under the column headed "Automobiles," the following advertisement:

"Truck. Will guarantee work for nearly new 3 1/2 ton dump truck if bought at once. Easy terms. Address P-428 Journal office."

The plaintiff's response to this advertisement brought one Frey, an agent of the defendant, to his home. The main reason for the interest of the plaintiff in the matter was his desire to enter the trucking business with an assured amount of work and customers. Negotiations followed between the plaintiff and the defendant's agent, which the plaintiff was not permitted fully to show in evidence, but which, from the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action, he should have been permitted to present to the jury. Partly by a letter and other written memoranda given to him by said agent, and partly by testimony, the plaintiff sought to prove representations, on the part of said agent, to the effect that the defendant controlled the trucking business of a list of prominent mercantile concerns in Providence, with authority to transfer that business to the plaintiff, and also the promise to do so if the plaintiff would purchase the motor truck. The plaintiff claimed that the agent made other representations as to the amount and value of the business of the concerns which the agent stated that the defendant controlled. Induced solely by these representations and promise the plaintiff entered into a written contract with the defendant for the purchase of said truck for $3,500 and paid $300 on the contract.

A jury might properly find from the evidence which was admitted, and that which was offered, if it had been admitted, that the representations of the defendant's agent were entirely false and fraudulent. The written contract for the sale and purchase of said motor truck contains the following paragraph:

"The foregoing contains the whole agreement between the parties to this contract, and they, and each of them, shall be estopped from asserting, as an inducement to make said contract, any misrepresentation upon the part of cither of the parties hereto, or any agent or servant of either of the parties hereto. Should any such misrepresentation be alleged in any suit at law or proceeding in equity, then either of the parties hereto may plead this contract in bar thereof."

There was sufficient evidence to warrant a jury in finding that in conducting the negotiations for the sale of said truck, and in executing the contract in the name of the defendant, Prey was acting as agent for the defendant. Further, the plaintiff offered to present evidence that Frey had authority to bind the defendant. The plaintiff should...