Bloomer v. Gray

• Decision Date: 06 June 1894
• Docket Number: 1,020
• Parties: BLOOMER, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. GRAY
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

37 N.E. 819

10 Ind.App. 326

BLOOMER, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. GRAY

No. 1,020

Court of Appeals of Indiana

June 6, 1894

From the Wabash Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

H. C Pettit and A. Taylor, for appellant.

J. S Slick and N. G. Hunter, for appellee.

OPINION

ROSS J.

This action was originally commenced against one Joseph Bloomer. During the progress of the suit, and before the trial, Joseph Bloomer died, and his widow, Phoebe E. Bloomer, who was appointed administratrix of his estate, was substituted as defendant.

The material facts alleged in the complaint are, substantially, as follows: That the plaintiff was the owner of 160 acres of land in Grant county, Indiana, of the value of $ 6,400, and the decedent, Joseph Bloomer, was the owner of mill property in Wabash county, Indiana, "consisting of a grist mill, 3 54/100 acres of land, mill machinery and dam."

That the decedent--intending to cheat and defraud the plaintiff, who was weak-minded, and in order to induce him to execute to decedent a deed for his lands--falsely and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that he was the owner of the grist mill, land, and dam aforesaid, which were of the value of $ 6,400; that the mill had a large amount of valuable machinery in it, which was in first-class condition and needed no repairs; that the mill dam connected with and a part of the mill property was nearly new and was in good repair.

"That there was a valuable good-will connected with said mill, and that said mill was very valuable on account of its extensive custom trade in the grinding of corn and wheat and the taking of toll therefrom; that said custom trade of said mill was worth more than five dollars per day in excess of all expenses; and, further, that said mill had never earned for defendant (decedent) less than the sum of five dollars per day."

It is also alleged that these representations were false, and known by decedent to be false at the time he made them, and were made by him for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, relying upon such representations, exchanged his lands for the mill property. It is then averred that the mill property was not worth $ 6,400, but was entirely worthless; that the mill did not contain a large amount of valuable mill machinery, and that the machinery therein was not in good condition and repair, but was old, worn out and of no value whatever; that the dam was worn out and greatly out of repair, the timbers were rotten and the dam useless; that the mill did not have a valuable good-will, neither did it have an extensive custom trade, but in truth and fact, had no custom trade; that, in fact, the mill had been abandoned by decedent on account of the want of trade. There are also the necessary allegations as to his damage, etc.

The appellant assails the sufficiency of the complaint, insisting that there are no facts alleged showing "why the plaintiff could not have known by exercising reasonable intelligence and caution the true condition of the mill and mill property, whether or not it was of the value of $ 6,400, or that it contained valuable machinery; that the machinery was in first-class condition; that it needed no repairs; that the dam was valuable, nearly new, and in good repair, and that the mill had a goodwill, extensive custom and great earnings;" that if the alleged representations were false, they were facts, open and notorious, and of such a character as the decedent must take notice of.

"It is a mistaken assumption that a false representation by one of the parties to a contract puts the other on inquiry as to its truth. Every contracting party has an absolute right to rely on the express statement of an existing fact, the truth of which is known to the opposite party, and unknown to him, as the basis of a mutual engagement; and he is under no obligation to investigate and verify statements, to the truth of which the other party to the contract, with full means of knowledge, has deliberately pledged his faith." Jones v. Hathaway, 77 Ind. 14.

However, it is not every representation, although false and misleading, that entitles a party to recover therefor.

In the case of Gordon v. Parmelee, 84 Mass. 212, the court says: "Assertions concerning the value of property which is the subject of a contract of sale, or in regard to its qualities and characteristics, are the usual and ordinary means adopted by sellers to obtain a high price, and are always understood as affording to buyers no ground for omitting to make inquiries for the purpose of ascertaining the real condition of the property."

If the representations are concerning the market value of the property; its condition and special fitness for particular uses, which are only matters of opinion and estimate, as to which men may differ, their falsity can create no liability....