Bloomer v. Todd
Decision Date | 14 August 1888 |
Citation | 19 P. 135,3 Wash.Terr. 599 |
Parties | BLOOMER v. TODD ET AL. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Appeal from Fourth district court.
Action for damages by Nevada M. Bloomer against John Todd, J. E Gandy, and H. A. Clarke, judges of election, for their refusal to allow plaintiff to vote. There was a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained, and plaintiff appealed.
M. M. Murray, for appellant.
Geo. Turner, Geo. M. Forster, and J. M. Kinnaird, for appellees.
A S. Austin, amicus curiæ.
The appellant commenced this action in the district court for Spokane county, upon the following complaint: To which complaint the appellees demurred as follows: "The said defendants demur to the complaint filed in this action, and for cause of demurrer allege that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." The district court sustained this demurrer, and judgment was entered thereon, from which judgment this appeal is taken.
In this court the facts are admitted to be as follows: The plaintiff is a woman, and, unless disqualified by reason of her sex, is a qualified elector of the Fourth ward of Spokane Falls, and was such on the 3d day of April last. The defendants were the duly-appointed and acting judges of election, at an election regularly held on the 3d day of April, 1888, in said city, and Fourth ward thereof, for the election of a mayor and other executive officers of said city of Spokane Falls, and for members of the city council of said city, including a member of the council from said Fourth ward, on which day an election was held in said city and ward. On said day, and while defendants were acting as such judges of election in said ward, and within the hours prescribed by law for voting therein, the plaintiff presented herself at the place where said election was being held and conducted in said ward by the defendants, and tendered them a printed ballot in the form prescribed by statute, containing the names of the persons for whom she desired to vote, which the defendants refused to receive, and refused to permit her to vote at such election. This action is brought to recover damages from the defendants for thus wrongfully depriving her of the privilege of voting. The defendants demur upon the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The only point raised by the defendants in the court below was as to the validity of the act of the legislative assembly, approved January 18, 1888, conferring the privilege of suffrage upon women; and it is assumed that no other question will be raised in this court. The correctness of the decision of the district court on the act of the legislature in question is the only point here to be considered. That act (chapter 51, Laws 1888) reads as follows: "That all citizens of the United States, male and female, above the age of twenty-one years, and all American half-breeds, male and female, over that age, who have adopted the habits of the whites, and all other inhabitants, male or female, of this territory, above that age, who have declared on oath their intentions to become citizens of the United States at least six months previous to the day of election, and shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and government of the United States at least six months previous to the day of election, and who shall have resided six months in the territory, sixty days in the county, and thirty days in the precinct next preceding the day of election, and none other, shall be entitled to vote at any election in this territory provided, that no officer, soldier, seaman, mariner, or other person in the army or navy, or attached to troops in the services of the United States, shall be allowed to vote at any election in this territory, by reason of being on service therein, unless said territory is, and has been for the period of six months, his permanent domicile: provided, he was a citizen of this territory at the time of his enlistment: and provided, further, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to make it lawful for women to serve as jurors."
In the construction of statutes certain rules have obtained, well considered in many cases in different courts and in text-books, so that a court cannot be misled if these rules are followed. Human language being incapable of always accurately expressing the intentions of the legislature recourse is had to the customs and institutions existing at the time of the enactment of a law, in order that the actual intention of the legislature may be ascertained. This is not simply interpretation. Interpretation differs from construction in this: that it is used for the purpose of ascertaining the true sense of any form of words, while construction involves the drawing of conclusions regarding subjects that are not always included in the direct expression. In all constitutional governments the powers of government are divided or allotted to different officers or departments, and each of these has by constitutional limitation certain powers, generally independent of each other, and usually involving the duty of interpretation, and often of construction, upon each of the several departments or officers who have the administration of the government in charge. Constitutions have not as a rule provided for a tribunal whose specific duty is that of solving difficult questions which may arise under it prior to the necessary solution resulting from litigation. Frequently, but not always, constitutions provide for the taking the advice of the judiciary by the legislature prior to the enactment of a law, but in this territory no such duty is devolved upon the courts, and the construction or interpretation of statutes is an after-duty devolving upon them. The executive department of this...
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State v. Rivers, 63412-2
...in all cases, as to the meaning of words, and the force to be given them at the time when they were used...." Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash.Terr. 599, 615, 19 P. 135, 1 L.R.A. 111 (1888). Cruel At the time of ratification, cruelty was generally understood to encompass two elements: (1) punishment......
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Jongeward v. BNSF Ry. Co.
...adopted by the court.”). We therefore do not consider the modern view of trespass, but the historical view. See Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 599, 615, 19 P. 135 (1888) (“The ordinary use of words at the time when used, and the meaning adopted at that time, is usually the best guide for as......
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AM. FED. OF ST., CTY. & MUN. EMP. v. State of Wash., C82-465T.
...9, supra. 11 In 1888 one Nevada M. Bloomer filed a lawsuit in the District Court at Spokane Falls, Washington. Bloomer v. Todd, et al., 3 Wash. Terr. 599, 19 P. 135 (1888). She was suing certain judges of election who were conducting the regular municipal election in one of the wards in the......
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Kerlin v. City of Devils Lake
......169, 29 Am. Rep. 582; Minor. v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L.Ed. 627;. Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531; Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 599, 1 L.R.A. 111, 19 P. 135;. Cooley, Const. Law, 260; Story, Const. §§ 577-584;. Black, Const. Lim. 752; 2 Bryce Am. ......