Bloomer v. Todd

Decision Date14 August 1888
Citation19 P. 135,3 Wash.Terr. 599
PartiesBLOOMER v. TODD ET AL.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Appeal from Fourth district court.

Action for damages by Nevada M. Bloomer against John Todd, J. E Gandy, and H. A. Clarke, judges of election, for their refusal to allow plaintiff to vote. There was a demurrer to the complaint, which was sustained, and plaintiff appealed.

M. M. Murray, for appellant.

Geo. Turner, Geo. M. Forster, and J. M. Kinnaird, for appellees.

A S. Austin, amicus curiæ.

JONES, C.J.

The appellant commenced this action in the district court for Spokane county, upon the following complaint: "The above-named plaintiff complains of the above-named defendants, and alleges that the city of Spokane Falls is a municipal corporation, existing as such city under and by virtue of the laws of Washington Territory, and was existing as such city and under and by virtue of such laws at the times hereinafter mentioned. That, by an act of the legislative assembly of Washington Territory, approved November 28, 1885, the said city of Spokane is divided into four wards, and all that portion lying west of Howard street and south of Riverside avenue constitutes and is within the Fourth ward of said city. That under and pursuant to an act of the legislative assembly of Washington Territory approved January 29, 1886, entitled 'An act to amend an act entitled "An act to amend an act to incorporate the city of Spokane Falls," approved November 28, 1883,' an election was duly held in said city of Spokane Falls, and in each ward thereof, including the said Fourth ward thereof, on the first Tuesday, to-wit, on the 3d day of April, 1888, for the election, by the qualified voters of said city, of a mayor and other administrative officers, and for the election in each ward respectively, and in said Fourth ward, of members of the city council. That the plaintiff is, and at times herein stated, and on said 3d day of April, 1888, was a female citizen of the United States, and was on said date more than twenty-one years of age. That she was then, and for more than one year prior thereto had been, a resident and a citizen and a qualified elector of the territory of Washington, and had then and for more than one month immediately preceding said election resided within the said city of Spokane Falls, and for more than five days prior to said election within the Fourth ward of said city, and was on said 3d day of April, 1888, a qualified elector in said Fourth ward of said city. That the defendants, John Todd, J. E. Gandy, and H. A. Clarke, were duly constituted and appointed judges of election for said election in and for said Fourth ward of said city, and that the said defendants accepted such appointment, and on said 3d day of April, 1888, duly qualified as such judges, and entered upon the duty of holding and conducting said election in and for said Fourth ward of said city, and did hold and conduct the same. That the plaintiff, on said 3d day of April, 1888, and between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon and six o'clock in the afternoon, presented herself at the place appointed for holding said election in said ward, and for receiving votes therefor, and where the said defendants as judges of said election were holding and conducting said election, and tendered to said defendants as such judges of election a white paper four inches in width and twelve inches in length, containing the names of the persons for whom she intended and desired to vote at said election for the office of mayor of said city and for other administrative officers thereof and for the office of councilman from said Fourth ward, and insisted and demanded of the said defendants as such judges of election that they receive the same as a ballot at said election; but the said defendants, disregarding their duties in the premises, did fraudulently and maliciously, and without any sufficient cause, and with the intent to injure plaintiff, refuse to receive said ballot then and there tendered to them by the plaintiff, and refused to permit the plaintiff to vote at said election, by which refusal, made fraudulently and maliciously and without any sufficient cause, and with intent to injure the plaintiff, as aforesaid, the plaintiff was deprived of the right to vote in said ward at said election, to her great ignominy and disgrace, and to her damage in the sum of five thousand dollars. Wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants for the sum of five thousand dollars, and for her costs of suit." To which complaint the appellees demurred as follows: "The said defendants demur to the complaint filed in this action, and for cause of demurrer allege that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." The district court sustained this demurrer, and judgment was entered thereon, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

In this court the facts are admitted to be as follows: The plaintiff is a woman, and, unless disqualified by reason of her sex, is a qualified elector of the Fourth ward of Spokane Falls, and was such on the 3d day of April last. The defendants were the duly-appointed and acting judges of election, at an election regularly held on the 3d day of April, 1888, in said city, and Fourth ward thereof, for the election of a mayor and other executive officers of said city of Spokane Falls, and for members of the city council of said city, including a member of the council from said Fourth ward, on which day an election was held in said city and ward. On said day, and while defendants were acting as such judges of election in said ward, and within the hours prescribed by law for voting therein, the plaintiff presented herself at the place where said election was being held and conducted in said ward by the defendants, and tendered them a printed ballot in the form prescribed by statute, containing the names of the persons for whom she desired to vote, which the defendants refused to receive, and refused to permit her to vote at such election. This action is brought to recover damages from the defendants for thus wrongfully depriving her of the privilege of voting. The defendants demur upon the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The only point raised by the defendants in the court below was as to the validity of the act of the legislative assembly, approved January 18, 1888, conferring the privilege of suffrage upon women; and it is assumed that no other question will be raised in this court. The correctness of the decision of the district court on the act of the legislature in question is the only point here to be considered. That act (chapter 51, Laws 1888) reads as follows: "That all citizens of the United States, male and female, above the age of twenty-one years, and all American half-breeds, male and female, over that age, who have adopted the habits of the whites, and all other inhabitants, male or female, of this territory, above that age, who have declared on oath their intentions to become citizens of the United States at least six months previous to the day of election, and shall have taken an oath to support the constitution and government of the United States at least six months previous to the day of election, and who shall have resided six months in the territory, sixty days in the county, and thirty days in the precinct next preceding the day of election, and none other, shall be entitled to vote at any election in this territory provided, that no officer, soldier, seaman, mariner, or other person in the army or navy, or attached to troops in the services of the United States, shall be allowed to vote at any election in this territory, by reason of being on service therein, unless said territory is, and has been for the period of six months, his permanent domicile: provided, he was a citizen of this territory at the time of his enlistment: and provided, further, that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to make it lawful for women to serve as jurors."

In the construction of statutes certain rules have obtained, well considered in many cases in different courts and in text-books, so that a court cannot be misled if these rules are followed. Human language being incapable of always accurately expressing the intentions of the legislature recourse is had to the customs and institutions existing at the time of the enactment of a law, in order that the actual intention of the legislature may be ascertained. This is not simply interpretation. Interpretation differs from construction in this: that it is used for the purpose of ascertaining the true sense of any form of words, while construction involves the drawing of conclusions regarding subjects that are not always included in the direct expression. In all constitutional governments the powers of government are divided or allotted to different officers or departments, and each of these has by constitutional limitation certain powers, generally independent of each other, and usually involving the duty of interpretation, and often of construction, upon each of the several departments or officers who have the administration of the government in charge. Constitutions have not as a rule provided for a tribunal whose specific duty is that of solving difficult questions which may arise under it prior to the necessary solution resulting from litigation. Frequently, but not always, constitutions provide for the taking the advice of the judiciary by the legislature prior to the enactment of a law, but in this territory no such duty is devolved upon the courts, and the construction or interpretation of statutes is an after-duty devolving upon them. The executive department of this...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • State v. Rivers, 63412-2
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 24 Octubre 1996
    ...in all cases, as to the meaning of words, and the force to be given them at the time when they were used...." Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash.Terr. 599, 615, 19 P. 135, 1 L.R.A. 111 (1888). Cruel At the time of ratification, cruelty was generally understood to encompass two elements: (1) punishment......
  • Jongeward v. BNSF Ry. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • 31 Mayo 2012
    ...adopted by the court.”). We therefore do not consider the modern view of trespass, but the historical view. See Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 599, 615, 19 P. 135 (1888) (“The ordinary use of words at the time when used, and the meaning adopted at that time, is usually the best guide for as......
  • AM. FED. OF ST., CTY. & MUN. EMP. v. State of Wash., C82-465T.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District of Washington)
    • 14 Diciembre 1983
    ...9, supra. 11 In 1888 one Nevada M. Bloomer filed a lawsuit in the District Court at Spokane Falls, Washington. Bloomer v. Todd, et al., 3 Wash. Terr. 599, 19 P. 135 (1888). She was suing certain judges of election who were conducting the regular municipal election in one of the wards in the......
  • Kerlin v. City of Devils Lake
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota
    • 26 Abril 1913
    ......169, 29 Am. Rep. 582; Minor. v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L.Ed. 627;. Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531; Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 599, 1 L.R.A. 111, 19 P. 135;. Cooley, Const. Law, 260; Story, Const. §§ 577-584;. Black, Const. Lim. 752; 2 Bryce Am. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT