Bloomfield Health Care Ctr. of Conn., LLC v. Doyon
Decision Date | 09 October 2018 |
Docket Number | AC 40281 |
Citation | 185 Conn.App. 340,197 A.3d 415 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | BLOOMFIELD HEALTH CARE CENTER OF CONNECTICUT, LLC v. Jason DOYON |
Anne Jasorkowski, with whom, on the brief, was Angelo Maragos, Norwalk, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Lauren A. MacDonald, with whom, on the brief, was Timothy R. Scannell, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).
In Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County, Inc. , v. Cantore , 257 Conn. 531, 532, 543–44, 778 A.2d 93 (2001) ( Jewish Home ), our Supreme Court recognized that a nursing home that has been harmed by the negligence of a conservator is entitled to recover, through an action on a probate bond, the losses it suffered as a result of the conservator's failure to timely file an application for Medicaid benefits on behalf of his or her ward. This appeal asks us to determine whether to recognize a similar right of recovery in a case where no probate bond was obtained.
This appeal arises out of an action by the plaintiff, Bloomfield Health Care Center of Connecticut, LLC, in which it alleged that the defendant, Jason Doyon, breached a duty to use reasonable care in managing the estate of his ward, Samuel Johnson. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the defendant was negligent by failing to apply for and to obtain on a timely basis Medicaid benefits that were necessary to pay the plaintiff for the cost of Johnson's care at the plaintiff's nursing home. The plaintiff now appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that the defendant did not owe it a duty of care and, thus, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We agree with the plaintiff and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, reveals the following facts. The plaintiff operates a chronic care and convalescent nursing home facility in Bloomfield. On April 19, 2013, Johnson was admitted as a resident to the plaintiff's facility. Thereafter, the plaintiff provided care and services to Johnson at a rate of $360 per day. On October 1, 2013, the cost of care increased to $370 per day.
On September 26, 2013, Johnson's daughter, who at the time was acting as his attorney-in-fact, filed an application for Medicaid benefits on behalf of Johnson. On November 26, 2013, Johnson's daughter sold his home. The net proceeds from the sale of the home totaled $48,000.
On January 8, 2014, the Department of Social Services (department) denied Johnson's application for Medicaid benefits for failure to provide required information. The information missing from the application included the disposition of the proceeds from the sale of his home, copies of bank statements, information regarding the surrender of his stocks, and proof that his assets totaled less than $1600.
On February 26, 2014, the plaintiff petitioned the Probate Court to appoint an involuntary conservator to oversee Johnson's estate for the purpose of assisting him with his finances and Medicaid application, and to ensure that it would be compensated for the necessary care it provided to him.1 On April 8, 2014, the court adjudicated Johnson incapable of managing his financial affairs, granted the plaintiff's petition, and appointed the defendant as the conservator of Johnson's estate. The court dispensed with the requirement of a probate bond.
On April 15, 2014, the defendant tendered the $48,000 in proceeds from the sale of Johnson's home to the plaintiff to be applied to Johnson's outstanding bill, which totaled $124,000 at that time. After the proceeds from the sale of Johnson's home were paid to the plaintiff, his only other source of income was $1363 that he received in social security benefits each month, which the defendant subsequently began paying over to the plaintiff.
Although Johnson did not have sufficient remaining funds or income to pay for his care, it was not until nine months later, on January 21, 2015, that the defendant submitted Johnson's application for Medicaid benefits. On February 17, 2015, the department told the defendant that Johnson's application was incomplete and requested that the defendant provide it with additional information by February 28, 2015, including the value of any of Johnson's remaining real property and bank account statements. The defendant failed to provide the department with the requested information, and, on March 24, 2015, Johnson's application was denied.
The defendant filed Johnson's second application for Medicaid benefits on August 12, 2015. The application was granted on September 24, 2015, and Johnson's Medicaid benefits were made retroactive to May 1, 2015. Johnson did not receive any Medicaid benefits for the cost of his care prior to that date. On October 21, 2015, Johnson died.
On February 1, 2016, the plaintiff commenced the present action. The plaintiff alleged in the operative complaint that the defendant's failure to apply for and to obtain on a timely basis Medicaid benefits for Johnson had violated a duty of care that he owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant's negligence caused it to suffer financial harm and loss, and therefore it requested monetary damages.2
On July 19, 2016, the defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint and special defenses. On September 21, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In his memorandum of law in support of his motion, the defendant argued that he did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. Specifically, he argued that he owed a duty of care only to Johnson, his ward, and thus the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the action. The defendant also argued that he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for his actions.
In its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that the defendant owed it a duty of care under a common-law theory of negligence. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that it was readily foreseeable that Johnson would be unable to pay it for the cost of his care if the defendant failed to timely submit a Medicaid application on his behalf and, further, that the plaintiff would suffer harm as a result. The plaintiff also argued that public policy supported its claim that the defendant owed it a duty of care and that there was "no principled reason why a conservator should avoid liability for his negligence simply because there is no probate bond in a particular case." Finally, the plaintiff argued that the defendant was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because the Probate Court never expressly approved the defendant's actions with respect to Johnson's Medicaid application.
On March 13, 2017, the court issued its memorandum of decision granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that "the law does not support the plaintiff's claim that the defendant, solely as a result of his appointment as a conservator, owed any duty to the plaintiff." The court reasoned that "the defendant's duty, and, in fact, his authority to pursue Medicaid benefits on behalf of his ward, does not arise out of any relationship between the plaintiff and him, but solely from his appointment by the Probate Court as conservator, and his duties pursuant to that appointment." The court thus determined that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care because "[t]he purpose of a conservator is not to manage the ward's estate for the benefit of his creditors but for the benefit of the ward." On March 31, 2017, the plaintiff timely filed the present appeal.
The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because it incorrectly concluded that the defendant did not owe it a duty of care. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the defendant owed it a duty to use reasonable care in managing Johnson's estate because (1) the harm caused to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence was foreseeable, and (2) public policy supports recognizing a duty of care in this context. We agree with the plaintiff that the defendant owed it a duty to use reasonable care to timely secure Medicaid benefits for Johnson.
We begin by setting forth the relevant standards that govern our review of a court's decision to grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barbee v. Sysco Connecticut , LLC , 156 Conn. App. 813, 817–18, 114 A.3d 944 (2015).
We begin our analysis by first considering the defendant's role and general duties as conservator of Johnson's estate. General Statutes § 45a-655 sets forth the statutory duties of a conservator of an estate. Section 45a-655(a) provides in relevant...
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