Bloomfield v. Whirlpool Corp.
| Citation | 984 F.Supp.2d 771 |
| Decision Date | 07 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12–cv–00870. |
| Parties | Brenda BLOOMFIELD, Plaintiff v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Danny L. Caudill, Beggs Caudill, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.
Adam C. Wit, Raven A. Winters, Littler Mendelson, Chicago, IL, Kent D. Riesen, Anspach Meeks Ellenberger, Toledo, OH, for Defendant.
Before me are the cross-motions of Defendant Whirlpool Corp., for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 23), and Plaintiff Brenda Bloomfield, (Doc. No. 27), for partial summary judgment. Both parties have filed briefs in opposition and in reply. For the following reasons, Whirlpool's motion is granted in part and denied in part and Bloomfield's motion is denied.
Bloomfield began working at the Whirlpool factory in Findlay, Ohio in August 2001 as a temporary employee; she became a full-time employee following a 90–day probationary period. In September 2009, Bloomfield began having a dispute with a coworker named Dawn Bower. The two engaged in several verbal confrontations, and each accused the other of harassment. Bower subsequently reported the conflict to Whirlpool's human resources department. Cindy Osting, the plant's Human Resources Manager, interviewed other employees who worked on the assembly line with Bower and Bloomfield and also spoke with the two women. Osting instructed Bloomfield and Bower to communicate only for work-related purposes and to bring any future disagreements to the line supervisor or to Osting.
Several days later, Osting began investigating additional complaints Bloomfield and Bower each made against the other person. Osting gave Bower a verbal warning for using profanity toward Bloomfield and gave Bloomfield a written warning for making inappropriate comments concerning Bower and another employee, Nick Van Sky. Osting also concluded Bloomfield had not been truthful during the investigation and suspended her without pay for two days. (Doc. No. 25–13 at 3). Bloomfield then quoted a verse from the Bible to Osting 1 and told Osting, who was pregnant at the time, she was praying for Osting and her child. Osting believed Bloomfield was threatening her. (Doc. No. 31 at 62). Bloomfield asserts she did not make either statement with ill intentions. Several days later, Bloomfield again began discussing religion with Osting, who asked her to stop and stated she would not discuss religion with Bloomfield. (Doc. No. 25–13 at 3).
Shortly before Christmas in 2009, Bloomfield and her daughter saw Bower and Bower's husband at Wal–Mart. Bloomfield claims Bower told Bloomfield's daughter “I'm sorry that God gave you a mother like that,” and threatened to assault Bloomfield when Bloomfield told Bower she would pray for her. (Doc. No. 39 at 180). Bloomfield filed a petition in the Wyandot County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas, seeking a civil stalking protection order against Bower. (Doc. No. 25–2 at 9–15). The court issued a temporary restraining order, but subsequently denied Bloomfield's request for a protection order. ( Id. at 16–22).
On January 19, 2010, Bloomfield requested and received permission to take a medical leave of absence. (Doc. No. 39 at 208, 211). During her leave of absence, Bloomfield was treated by Dr. Brad Bundy, a psychiatrist. Bloomfield also filed an EEOC charge on March 22, 2010, alleging sex and religious discrimination as well as retaliation, though she did not ultimately pursue litigation in relation to that EEOC Charge. (Doc. No. 28–1).
On April 17, 2010, Bloomfield saw Osting at an Olive Garden restaurant in Findlay, Ohio. Both sides agree Bloomfield made a comment to Osting as she passed by, though they disagree over the exact wording. Osting states Bloomfield said to her “Yours is coming Cindy,” while Bloomfield testified she told Osting “It's coming, Cindy.” (Doc. No. 25–13 at 2; Doc. No. 39 at 222). Osting felt Bloomfield was threatening her, while Bloomfield states she merely was referring to the EEOC charge she had filed a few weeks earlier. (Doc. No. 31 at 58; Doc. No. 39 at 222). Osting reported the interaction to Corri Wilcox, the Human Resources Director at Whirlpool's Findlay location. (Doc. No. 31 at 63).
On July 13, 2010, Bloomfield obtained a note from Dr. Bundy clearing her to return to work from her medical leave on July 21, 2010.2 (Doc. No. 25–2 at 25). When employees return to work following medical leaves of absence, Whirlpool requires them to undergo drug screening and a return-to-work evaluation with a contract physician. In this instance, Whirlpool also requested that the contract physician, Dr. Scott Leslie, refer Bloomfield for an psychiatric evaluation. (Doc. No. 25–9 at 3). Dr. Leslie referred Bloomfield to a psychiatrist, Dr. Charles Burke, for an independent medical examination (“IME”). (Doc. No. 25–7 at 3). Though Bloomfield believed Whirlpool sought the IME as retaliation for her EEOC charge, she attended the appointment with Dr. Burke. (Doc. No. 39 at 250, 255). At the end of the appointment, Bloomfield removed a tape recorder from her purse. ( Id. at 258–59). Dr. Burke told Bloomfield she could not record the session and stated he would erase the tape. Bloomfield refused to permit Dr. Burke to erase the tape and left his office without signing a release form authorizing Dr. Burke to send information on the IME to Dr. Leslie and Whirlpool. (Doc. No. 28–6 at 3).
Dr. Burke informed Whirlpool of what transpired and told Dr. Leslie and Whirlpool “[i]n [his] opinion, this demonstrates non-cooperation with the psychiatric evaluation and [he] would recommend that you follow whatever appropriate administrative action you deem necessary.” ( Id.). Kevin Traxler, a Human Resources Generalist, informed Bloomfield that Whirlpool did not receive documentation from Dr. Burke's IME supporting her ability to return to work and that “[f]ailure to cooperate with the exam is considered insubordinate conduct” under the terms of the employee handbook. (Doc. No. 28–7 at 2). Bloomfield was terminated on August 2, 2010, for failing to produce documentation from the IME supporting her ability to return to work and “continued inappropriate behavior.” ( Id.).
Bloomfield filed an EEOC charge following her termination and received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on January 20, 2012. Bloomfield timely filed suit against Whirlpool on April 11, 2012, stating claims for disability discrimination in violation of federal and state law, sex discrimination, religious discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Title VII.
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). If the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant is entitled to summary judgment if the movant shows that the nonmoving party failed to present evidence “to support an essential element of his or her claim.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
If the movant satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party “must present specific facts setting forth a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party needs only to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor. Id. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “All of [that] evidence and any inferences that may be drawn from that evidence [must be viewed in a] ... light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party, however, must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348. “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment....” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The party opposing the motion “must show she can make good on the promise of the pleadings by laying out enough evidence that will be admissible at trial to demonstrate that a genuine issue on a material fact exists, and that a trial is necessary.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir.2009) (emphasis in original). Summary judgment shall be awarded “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Bloomfield asserts Whirlpool discriminated against her on the basis of her disability in violation of state and federal law. The Supreme Court of Ohio consistently has held courts considering disability discrimination claims pursuant to O.R.C. § 4112.02 may look to case law and regulations interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for guidance. See, e.g., Columbus Civ. Serv. Comm. v. McGlone, 82 Ohio St.3d 569, 697 N.E.2d 204, 206–07 (1998). The parties have not identified any relevant differences between Ohio case law and federal case law and my analysis of Bloomfield's claim under the ADA will apply equally to her claim under O.R.C. § 4112.02. Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 938–39 (6th Cir.2000).
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to ... discharge ... and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An individual has a disability if that person has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an...
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