Bloomsburg Land Imp. Co. v. Borough of Bloomsburg
| Decision Date | 24 May 1906 |
| Docket Number | 59 |
| Citation | 215 Pa. 452,64 A. 602 |
| Parties | Bloomsburg Land Improvement Company, Appellant, v. Bloomsburg |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 10, 1906
Appeal, No. 59, Jan. T., 1906, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. Columbia Co., Dec. T., 1898, No. 158, for defendant non obstante veredicto in case of Bloomsburg Land Improvement Company v. Bloomsburg Borough.
Judgment affirmed on the opinion of the court below.
H. M Hinckley, with him N. U. Funk, for appellant.
Grant Herring, for appellee.
Before STAPLES, P. J., specially presiding.
Assumpsit for rent.
At the trial the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $ 2,109, subject to question of law reserved.
On motion for judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, STAPLES, P.J., filed the following opinion:
The substantial facts in the above case, as involving the questions of law herein decided, and which facts are necessary in order to sustain a verdict irrespective of any conclusions of law, are about as follows:
The town of Bloomsburg was chartered by an Act of Assembly of March 4, 1870, P.L. 343, and by its acts of incorporation, certain sections of the Act of April 3, 1851, P.L. 320, regulating boroughs, were extended to the town of Bloomsburg, among these being section 1, clause 4, which empowered it "to hold, purchase and convey such real and personal estate as the purposes of the borough shall require, not exceeding the amount limited in its charter;" and also section 2, clause 4, which empowered it as follows: "to regulate the roads, streets, lanes, alleys, courts, common sewers, public squares, and common grounds, foot walks, pavements, gutters, culverts and drains and the heights, grades and widths, slopes and forms thereof; and they shall have all other needful jurisdiction over the same;" and also section 2, clause 17, which empowered it as follows: "to make such other regulations as may be necessary for the health and cleanliness of the borough."
On June 13, 1891, the plaintiff, a private corporation, leased to the defendant town, eight acres of land upon which are numerous oak trees, situated within the limits of the town of Bloomsburg, and known as Oak Grove Park, for the term of one year at $1,000 rental per year, payable semiannually, with the privilege of renewals. The defendant town at that time was incorporated and contained about 5,000 inhabitants and had within its territorial limits between three and four square miles. The said Oak Grove Park was situate within the town limits surrounded by a six feet fence and had on it a dancing pavilion, a fountain, ice-cooler with water pipes inside and ice put on the outside of the pipes so that cold water could be obtained, and a place to keep provisions in; two kitchens, with cook stove in each, tubs in the kitchen connected with water, large water-closets, toilet rooms, two large swings and two small swings and large tables, benches and seats through the grove and two or three booths erected for the purpose of furnishing refreshments.
It may clearly be inferred from the evidence that at the time the lease was made and discussed that there entered into the consideration of the same the fact that the town as lessee could obtain considerable revenue from the said park by renting it out to picnic parties and also by charging a certain small price for each and every person who entered the same, and that it was in no sense to be considered a park open to the public and free to be used by anyone who desired so to do; and in fact, one of the grounds upon which the plaintiff sought to recover was, that the defendant had had the use of the property and had derived revenue from the same.
It may further be stated as a fact that the said Oak Grove Park was not situated either in the center of the town or near to the same, nor did it enter into any plan of the town as laid out in streets, etc., by the municipal authorities. Upon the contrary, it was removed from the business and thickly populated portion, and, in no sense, convenient to the pedestrian public.
At the termination of the year for which the said property had been leased by the town authorities, negotiations were had towards a renewal of the lease, which was opposed by a number of the members of the town council, and during which negotiations the borough solicitor produced and read at one of the town council meetings an opinion in which he held that the town council had no right or power to lease said property. Notwithstanding the opposition and the advice so given, the borough council by a vote of four to three authorized the renewal of the lease for one year with the privilege of a number of years, and an option to purchase the property, the annual rent being fixed at $500 per annum. The town remained in actual possession of the said park for a period of three years after the first year, for which first year it paid. At the end of the three years it delivered the key and the possession of the park to the plaintiff company or one of its representatives, the park itself having been considerably damaged during the period it was in the possession or control of the defendant town, swings having been broken and torn down, the water-closets put out of repair and, in short, the property being returned generally dilapidated and damaged to at least the extent of $500, and for which the town has since made no reparation.
The claim of the plaintiff in this case was that it was entitled to have and receive from the said town of Bloomsburg three years' rent at the rate of $500 per annum, and $500 for damage done, with interest from 1898, at which time suit was brought. That further, if it should be decided that the town had no right to enter into such contract, that having entered upon the premises and used the same and received revenue from the same, the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendant town on a quantum meruit.
The defendant town resisted both claims upon the ground that it was not liable, because the contract itself was ultra vires and being so, a claim on a quantum meruit could not be sustained.
The plaintiff in support of its claim contended that the town had the power to enter into such contract, relying upon the clauses of the act of April 3, 1851, hereinbefore fully quoted; that it had the right to hold such real estate for the purposes of the borough requirements; that clause 4, sec. 2 of said act, giving it the power to regulate roads, streets, . . . public squares and common grounds, included a park similar to that involved in this controversy, and that clause 17 of sec. 2, giving it the right to make such other regulations as might be necessary for the health and cleanliness of the town could fairly be argued to include a park as it was needed for the health and cleanliness of the people.
This brings us to the consideration of the question of what are the powers of a municipal corporation such as the defendant, and in this connection we think the opinion of Chief Justice MERCUR, in Whelen's Appeal, 108 Pa. 162, clearly sets them forth; wherein he says:
With the principles as above stated and which we believe to be correct and followed by our courts, we are at loss to understand how the contract as executed can be brought within any of the powers or authorities granted to a borough or the town of Bloomsburg, which had granted to it some of the privileges of a borough.
We are unable to find any such interpretation of the law as included the purchase and holding of parks as within the power or authority to hold, purchase and convey real estate as expressed in sec. 1, article 4, of said act of April 3, 1851, nor do we think that it can be argued that, because of the authority as expressed in sec. 2, article 4, namely: to regulate the roads, streets, lanes, alleys, courts, common sewers, and public squares, a park, such as the one in controversy, was included in the term "public squares," and therefore the town had the right to enter into the contract, leasing the said Oak Grove Park and occupying and using it as hereinbefore stated.
There is a wide distinction between the general definition and common understanding of "public squares" and a "park" like that involved.
In the case of Rung v. Shoneberger, 2 Watts, 23, a public square is defined and explained as follows: ...
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