Bloomsburg Landlords Ass'n v. Town Of Bloomsburg
Decision Date | 29 December 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 4: CV-94-0148.,4: CV-94-0148. |
Citation | 912 F. Supp. 790 |
Parties | BLOOMSBURG LANDLORDS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF BLOOMSBURG, and Charles J. Felker, Code Enforcement Officer, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Andrew J. Primerano, Kennedy and Lucadamo, Hazleton, PA, for plaintiff.
John A. Mihalik, Bloomsburg, PA, for defendants.
This action was initiated by a complaint filed by plaintiff Bloomsburg Landlords Association, Inc. (Landlords or the association) against the Town of Bloomsburg (Bloomsburg or the town) and Code Enforcement Officer Charles J. Felker. Landlords is a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation organized pursuant to 15 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5101 et seq. to promote the commercial interests of its members, who own and lease residential real estate in Bloomsburg, Columbia County, Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff brings this action to protest the enactment of Town Ordinance No. 766,1 entitled "Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance" (the ordinance) on December 14, 1993. Ordinance No. 766 requires any landlord leasing a residential unit to three or more persons who are not "related to one another through blood to the level of second cousins, adoption or marriage" to:
(Plaintiff's complaint, exhibit "A")
Plaintiff contends that Ordinance No. 766 violates the state and federal constitutional rights of its members. They assert: 1) the violation of their rights under Article I, Section 10(1)3 and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution under section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I) and 2) the violation of their rights under Article 8, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Count II).
As redress for these alleged violations, plaintiff seeks: 1) a declaration that Ordinance No. 766 is "unconstitutional, null and void;" 2) a permanent injunction barring defendant or its agents or officials from "enforcing or attempting to enforce said Ordinance;" 3) a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of the ordinance during the pendency of this action; 4) attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 5) such other and further relief as the court deems proper.
Plaintiff filed a separate motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance during the pendency of this action. Following a conference on plaintiff's motion, the parties stipulated that defendant would refrain from implementing certain provisions of the ordinance pending a final decision on the merits. The parties' stipulation eliminated the need for a court ruling on plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction.
Before the court are cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, we do not find that the challenged ordinance violates the federal or state constitutions. Judgment will be granted in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff on that basis. No permanent injunction will issue.
Motion for summary judgment
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motions and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. He or she can discharge that burden by "showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 and 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 and 2554.
Issues of fact are "`genuine' only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the non-moving party." Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-94 (3d Cir.1988), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those which will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir.1988).
Ordinance No. 766 imposes liability on the landlord for tenants' conduct violative of the ordinance. Specifically, it provides that complaints of disruptive conduct by student tenants will be relayed to the landlord, whose responsibility it will be to take appropriate remedial action.
Article II, Part A of the ordinance provides that:
... Every OWNER of a REGULATED RENTAL UNIT shall regulate the conduct and activity of the OCCUPANTS thereof, both contractually and through enforcement, as more fully set forth below.
(Plaintiff's complaint, exhibit "A," Article II, Part B-4.)
Article III, Part F provides, in relevant part:
When POLICE or the CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER investigate an alleged incident of DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT, he or she shall complete a DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT REPORT upon a finding that the reported incident did, in his or her judgment, constitute "DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT" as defined herein.... In all cases, the CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER shall mail a copy of the DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT REPORT to the OWNER or MANAGER within three working days of the occurrence of the alleged DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT, whether the PERSON making the investigation on behalf of the TOWN as (sic) the CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER or POLICE.
(Plaintiff's complaint, exhibit "A," Article III, Part F, p. 15)
"Disruptive conduct" is defined by the ordinance as:
Any form of conduct, action, incident or behavior perpetrated, caused or permitted, by any OCCUPANT or visitor of a REGULATED DWELLING UNIT that is so loud, untimely (as to hour of the day), offensive, riotous, or that otherwise disturbs other PERSONS of reasonable sensibility in their peaceful enjoyment of their PREMISES such that a report is made to POLICE and/or to the CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER complaining of such conduct, action, incident, or behavior. It is not necessary that such conduct, action, incident or behavior constitute a criminal offense, nor that criminal charges be filed against any person in order for a PERSON to have perpetrated, caused, or permitted the commission of DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT, as defined herein. Provided, however, that no DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT shall be deemed to have occurred unless the CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER or POLICE shall investigate and make a determination that such did occur, and keep written records, including a DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT REPORT, of such occurrences.
Article III of the ordinance sets forth the duties of the occupant, and provides, in relevant part:
(Plaintiff's complaint, exhibit "A," Article III, Parts C and F)
Notice of such conduct on the part of tenants triggers an obligation on the part of the building owner to take appropriate remedial steps. The ordinance provides:
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