Blotzer v. L-3 Commc'ns Corp.
| Decision Date | 05 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-11-274-TUC-JGZ,CV-11-274-TUC-JGZ |
| Parties | Timothy Blotzer and Fred Lilly, Plaintiffs, v. L-3 Communications Corp., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on May 25, 2012. (Doc. 68.) Defendant filed a cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on June 28, 2012.1 (Doc. 70.) Plaintiffs filed a Response/Reply on July 9, 2012 and Defendant filed a Response/Reply on July 24, 2012. (Docs. 72, 74.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant the Plaintiffs' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment and deny the Defendant's Motion.2
In 2009 and 2010, Defendant L-3 Communications Corporation ("L-3") was a contractor performing construction work on a "SBI Net" project in southern Arizona for the United States Department of Homeland Security ("the Project"). (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) The SBI Net system is a series of towers that host detection and communication equipment used to monitor persons entering into the United States from Mexico along the Arizona border. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) The equipment on the towers sends video and data to a command and control building, called the "C-2 Building." (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) Boeing was the primary contractor on the Project and it hired L-3 to perform and manage construction work on the Project. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) The construction work on the Project was managed by L-3's Operations Department. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) Employees within the Operations Department completed some of the construction work themselves, while other construction work was performed by various subcontractors that L-3 retained and managed through its Operations Department. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) While the Operations Department was responsible for completing construction work, L-3's Quality Control Department ("QC") was responsible for checking the completed work to make sure that it complied with applicable specifications. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.)
Plaintiff Fred Lilly began working for L-3 on August 10, 2009 and Plaintiff Timothy Blotzer began working for L-3 on October 5, 2009. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) Plaintiffs worked for L-3 as QC Field Inspectors within the QC department. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) Neither Plaintiff has a college degree; a college education was not required for the position. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 3; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) The compensation associated with the QC Field Inspector position is less than $100,000 annually. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 3; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) Plaintiffs' primary job duty was to inspect construction work as it was completed on the Project to verify whether the work had been completed in strict adherence to the applicable specifications. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) To this end, Plaintiffs' primary job duties involved comparing the engineering plans and specifications with the specific work being inspected in order to identifydiscrepancies and ensure that there was proper workmanship and compliance with the operative grounding and electrical manuals (ie. the Motorola R-56 and the National Electrical Code) as well as the company's internal Work Order Process ("WOPs"), which detailed in a step-by-step fashion how a particular task was to be completed. (Doc. 71, pg. 2; Doc. 73, pg. 2.) Plaintiffs contend that their inspections were assigned by their supervisors; according to Defendants, Plaintiffs inspected the items as construction dictated, in adherence with the Buildbook and as they saw fit in their own judgment. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.) Plaintiffs initially reported to Doug Gordon; in January 2010 they began reporting to Jeff D'Heron. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 2; Doc. 71, pg. 12.)
The parties dispute the nature of Plaintiffs' work. Plaintiffs contend that they regularly performed manual labor and that they completed additional paperwork and received instructions from their supervisor at the beginning and end of each workday. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs completed paperwork throughout the day and were self-directed in their inspections. (Doc. 71, pg. 13.) The parties disagree as to the amount of discretion and authority Plaintiffs had in conducting inspections. The parties agree that Plaintiffs spent most of their workday, including the time spent completing paperwork, in the field. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 3; Doc. 71, pg. 13.) The parties agree that quality inspectors had to rely on their own working knowledge and expertise of the Project as well as industry standards during inspections. (Doc. 71, pg. 3; Doc. 73, pg. 3.)
After inspecting a portion of the Project, Plaintiffs would complete the appropriate portion of L-3's quality document known as the Quality Control Checklist ("QCC"), thereby indicating that the item had passed inspection. (Doc. 71, pg. 3; Doc. 73, pg. 3.) After Plaintiffs had inspected an approved an item, the item would be inspected and approved by the quality inspectors from Boeing and the federal government. (Doc. 71, pg. 3; Doc. 73, pg. 3.) If an item did not pass Plaintiffs' inspection, Plaintiffs would complete a Non-Compliance Report ("NCR") describing what was non-conforming and why. (Doc. 71, pg. 5; Doc. 73, pg. 4.) An NCR could trigger a change to the engineering plans for the Project. (Doc. 71, pg. 5; Doc. 73, pg. 4.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs' jobsrequired them to present to Boeing what work they had approved or rejected and why. (Doc. 71, pg. 4; Doc. 73, pg. 3.) Plaintiffs also attended some meetings at which Boeing presented items to government inspectors. (Doc. 71, pg. 4; Doc. 73, pg. 3.)
At all times during their employment, Plaintiffs were classified as "exempt" employees under L-3's Exempt/Non-Exempt Status Policy, which states that exempt employees are not compensated for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. When they were hired by L-3, Plaintiffs believed they would be working around 50 hours per week. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 6; Doc. 71, pg. 16.) Time records submitted to the Court indicate that Plaintiffs reported to L-3 work periods ranging from 40 to 86 hours per week. (Doc. 68-3, Ex. 6.) Plaintiffs complained repeatedly to Jeff D'Heron about the long hours. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 7; Doc. 71, pg. 17.) L-3 responded to the complaints by adjusting Plaintiffs' salaries. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 7; Doc. 71, pg. 17.) From the beginning of the Project, L-3 had paid Plaintiffs a bi-weekly salary, which was not adjusted depending on the number of hours worked. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 7; Doc. 71, pg. 17.) In February 2010, L-3 began paying Plaintiffs overtime pay in addition to their bi-weekly salary. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 7; Doc. 71, pg. 17.) If Plaintiffs worked 50 hours or less in a work week, they received their bi-weekly salary. For each hour over 50, they received overtime pay. (Doc. 68-2, pg. 7; Doc. 71, pg. 17.) Plaintiffs did not receive overtime pay for hours over 60 in a work week.
On May 4, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Defendants, alleging a single claim: unlawful failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs seek an award of compensatory and liquidated damages. (Id.)
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents "show that there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A genuine issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
A party moving for summary judgment initially must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving party merely needs to point out to the Court the absence of evidence supporting its opponent's claim; it does not need to disprove its opponent's claim. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If a moving party has made this showing, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). The non-moving party may not "replace conclusory allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit." Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
The FLSA is a remedial statute designed to eliminate "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 29 U.S.C. § 202. The FLSA sets a maximum number of hours employees may work per week. Id. at § 207. Unless an FLSA exemption applies, employees may be required to work more than 40 hours per week only if, for every hour worked over the maximum, the employer compensates the employee at a rate "not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." Id. at § 207(a)(1). The overtime pay requirements of the Act do not apply to salaried employees who work in a "bona fide executive, administrative or...
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