BLOUNT BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. Troitino, 19889.
Decision Date | 10 February 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 19889.,19889. |
Citation | 127 US App. DC 99,381 F.2d 267 |
Parties | BLOUNT BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant, v. Joseph TROITINO, doing business as Troitino Construction Company, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Frederick A. Ballard, Washington, D. C., and Frank H. McFadden, Birmingham, Ala., of the bar of the Supreme Court of Alabama, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, for appellant.
Kahl K. Spriggs, Washington, D. C., with whom John F. Myers, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, and DANAHER and TAMM, Circuit Judges.
On November 3, 1960, the appellant, Blount Brothers Construction Company, entered into a contract with the District of Columbia by the terms of which it agreed to construct a portion of the highway and railroad-trestle development in southwest Washington known as the Southwest Freeway. On April 20, 1961, a subcontract was entered into by Blount and the appellee, Troitino Construction Company, in which the latter agreed to furnish and install the stonework required by the prime contract.
The construction called for by the prime contract and subcontract was completed, and accepted by the District of Columbia, which paid the contract price to Blount. After that, and on May 24, 1965, Troitino sued Blount in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for $82,397.26, allegedly due as an unpaid balance for the performance of the subcontract and for certain extra work.
Blount filed on June 15, 1965, a motion for an order directing Troitino to arbitrate "the disputes which have arisen under the contract between" them "as required by Article XIII1 of the contract; and staying further proceedings herein pending issuance of the arbitration award." The motion was denied by Judge Youngdahl July 21, 1965, on the grounds that the record did not show an issue referable to arbitration, and did not show that the contract sued on involved a transaction in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The order of denial recited that it was "without prejudice to the defendant Blount to make a new motion containing a proper and complete factual and legal foundation."
Blount filed on August 3, 1965, a memorandum denominated "Supplemental Motion to Enforce Agreement for Arbitration and for Stay of Further Proceedings Pending Arbitration," to which it attached an affidavit of its counsel in which he stated the issues as he understood them. It also attached affidavits of certain employees purporting to show that the contracts involved interstate commerce.
Apparently this supplemental motion was argued before Judge Jones on August 26, 1965, but was continued for a further showing by Blount. It came on for hearing on October 28, 1965, before Judge McGarraghy, who, after hearing argument, denied the motion on November 5, 1965.
Blount filed on November 15, 1965, an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim for $300,000. On the next day — November 16 — Blount moved for rehearing of its motion to enforce arbitration and for a stay. The motion was denied by Judge McGarraghy November 23, 1965. On December 3, 1965, Blount filed a notice of appeal from the order of November 5 which denied its supplemental motion.
Before considering the interesting arguments of learned counsel concerning the merits of the appeal, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction. The order appealed from is indubitably interlocutory. If jurisdiction exists, it must arise from 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1), which is as follows:
It is settled that an order denying a motion to enforce arbitration and a concomitant stay is not equivalent to an order refusing an injunction. Division 689, etc. v. Capital Transit Co., 97 U.S. App.D.C. 4, 227 F.2d 19 (1955); John Thompson Beacon Windows v. Ferro, Inc., 98 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 232 F.2d 366 (1956). In the latter case, after holding that the District Court order overruling a motion to compel arbitration was not a final order, we said:
* * *"
See also Lummus Company v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Company, 297 F.2d 80 (2nd Cir. 1961).
The Supreme Court said, in the recent case of Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. Horne's Market, 385 U.S. 23, 87 S.Ct. 193, 17 L.Ed.2d 23 (1966):
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