Blount v. Blount
Decision Date | 15 November 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 5117,5117 |
Citation | 125 So.2d 66 |
Parties | Jessie Wayne BLOUNT v. Louis J. BLOUNT and Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Taylor, Porter, Brooks, Fuller & Phillips, Robt. Vandaworker, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Davis & Clesi, Baton Rouge, for appellees.
Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, JONES, HERGET and LANDRY, JJ.
Suit was filed by Plaintiff to recover damages sustained by him while a guest passenger in a vehicle owned by Defendant, Louis J. Blount, Plaintiff's father, insured by Defendant, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company. Plaintiff sustained injuries when the vehicle, driven by his brother Glynn Frank Blount, ran into the side of a concrete bridge on the highway near Terrell, Texas.
An exception of no cause or right of action was filed on behalf of Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, the basis thereof being that inasmuch as the accident occurred in the State of Texas, Plaintiff would not have a right to proceed under LSA-R.S. 22:655, the Direct Action Statute, as by such Statute actions were restricted to accidents or injuries which occur in the State of Louisiana.
For written reasons assigned, the exception of no cause of action was sustained and Plaintiff's suit dismissed as to Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company.
The case was then tried on its merits against the Defendant, Louis J. Blount, and, for written reasons assigned, judgment was rendered in favor of the Defendant and against Plaintiff, Jessie Wayne Blount, rejecting his demands at his costs.
Plaintiff and his younger brother had been given use of the vehicle and given permission by their father, Louis J. Blount, to drive from Baton Rouge, Louisiana to Keene, Texas, which is approximately five hundred miles distant from Baton Rouge. They left Baton Rouge on the evening of February 25, 1959 at a time between 6:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. and drove to Shreveport, Louisiana, during which time Glynn requested that he be permitted to drive the car and his brother, the Plaintiff, permitted him to do so. Upon their departure from Shreveport about 1:30 a.m. February 26, 1959 they picked up a hitchhiker who accompanied them for approximately thirty-five miles. At the time they stopped to permit the hitchhiker to alight, the Plaintiff got on the back seat of the car and went to sleep after telling his younger brother to awake him in the event that he, Glynn, should become sleepy. Upon reaching a point some 150 miles west of Shreveport while Glynn was still operating the automobile it ran into the side of a concrete bridge, in consequence of which both occupants were injured.
The question of liability is controlled by the substantive law of Texas, Cone v. Smith, La.App., 76 So.2d 46 and Mondello v. Pastiro, La.App., 78 So.2d 64. Furthermore, the parties to this suit, recognizing this principle of law, stipulated that the Texas Guest Statute and the Texas authorities interpreting it control the law of the case.
In Cone v. Smith, (supra), 76 So.2d at page 48, we find quoted the pertinent provisions of Article 6701b of Vernon's Ann. Civil Statutes of Texas, known as the Texas Guest Statute, as follows:
It is to be noted that this statute permits recovery by a guest in those circumstances (1) only where the guest passenger is able to prove that the accident resulted from the intentional act on the part of the owner or operator of the vehicle or (2) was caused by his heedlessness or (3) his reckless disregard of the rights of others. It therefore becomes essential that the Plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence the cause of the accident, and that such cause resulted from the action of the driver within one of the three enumerated circumstances.
According to the evidence given by Glynn Blount, he testified that he remembered--
'* * * getting sleepy, but I didn't think I was going to go to sleep.
And, at page 36, in response to the question:
On cross examination, at page 37:
On page 43:
On March 23, 1959 Glynn Frank Blount gave a statement to an adjuster for the insurance company describing the accident, which he admitted while a witness on the trial of the case:
* * *'
(Pages 39 and 40 of the tr. of test.)
Further, on page 42:
'
In 28 A.L.R.2d § 32, page 60, we find:
'Rule That Mere Fact of Falling Asleep Is Not Gross Negligence.
The case of McMillian v. Sims, Tex.Civ.App., 112 S.W.2d 793 is cited in support of this view.
At page 62, 28 A.L.R.2d § 33, we find:
'Rule That Foreseeability of Falling Asleep Constitutes Test of Gross Negligence.
'While the mere fact of falling asleep while driving does not give rise to an inference of gross negligence, the courts unanimously agree that the driver of an automobile who falls asleep while driving is grossly negligent if he had some prior warning of the likelihood of his going to sleep.
'In accordance with this general rule, the fact that the driver at the wheel fell asleep was held in the following cases, under the circumstances involved, to constitute such misconduct as to amount to gross negligence within the meaning of the applicable guest statute.'
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