Blount v. Boston

• Decision Date: 01 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 90,90
• Citation: 351 Md. 360,718 A.2d 1111
• Parties: Clarence W. BLOUNT et al. v. Frank D. BOSTON, Jr. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 360

351 Md. 360

718 A.2d 1111

Clarence W. BLOUNT et al. v. Frank D. BOSTON, Jr.

No. 90, Sept. Term, 1998.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Sept. 1, 1998.

Subsequent Opinion Oct. 6, 1998.

George L. Russell, Jr. (George A. Nilson, Anthony P. Ashton, Piper & Marbury, on brief), Baltimore, for appellants.

Steven A. Allen, Una M. Perez (Hodes, Ulman, Pessin & Katz, P.A., on brief), Towson, for appellee.

Argued before Bell, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ., and ROBERT L. KARWACKI, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.

PER CURIAN ORDER.

For reasons to be stated in an opinion later to be filed, it is this 1st day of September, 1998,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County is reversed; mandate to issue forthwith; costs to be paid by appellee.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The legal issue in this case is whether a long-time member of the Maryland General Assembly, who is a candidate for re-election, has abandoned his domicile in the Baltimore City legislative district which he has been representing and established a new domicile in Baltimore County.

The defendant-appellant, Senator Clarence W. Blount, was a candidate for the Democratic Party nomination at the primary election held on September 15, 1998, and is a candidate for re-election at the November 1998 general election, to the Maryland Senate, representing the 41st legislative district located entirely within Baltimore City. The plaintiff-appellee, Frank D. Boston, Jr., was running against Senator Blount in the primary election for the nomination of the Democratic Party for State Senator from the 41st district. The plaintiff-appellee brought this action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to have Senator Blount's name stricken from the primary election ballot, contending that Senator Blount did not meet the Constitutional residency requirements to represent the 41st legislative district. After a trial, the circuit court on August 26, 1998, held that Senator Blount was not eligible to serve as a Senator representing the 41st legislative district, and the court ordered that his name be removed from the primary election ballot. An immediate appeal was taken, and this Court, on August 27, 1998, issued a writ of certiorari. After oral argument before this Court on September 1, 1998, we issued an order reversing the judgment of the circuit court. We now state our reasons for that order.

I.

Before recounting the particular facts of this case, it would be helpful to set forth the well-settled principles of Maryland law which govern cases of this nature.

Article III, § 9, of the Maryland Constitution requires that, to be eligible to serve as a member of the General Assembly, a person must have "resided" in the legislative district which he or she has been chosen to represent for at least six months prior to the election or, if the district has not been established for six months, for as long as it has been established. ¹ As recently pointed out in Roberts v. Lakin, 340 Md. 147, 153, 665 A.2d 1024, 1026 (1995), "[t]his Court has expressly held that the word 'resided' in Article III, § 9, means 'domiciled.' "

The Court in Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 496, 325 A.2d 392, 395-396 (1974), addressed and rejected an argument that the term "resided" in Article III, § 9, of the Constitution referred to actual physical abode instead of domicile, saying:

"Preliminarily, a question has been raised in this case concerning the meaning of the term 'resided' in Article III, Section 9, of the Maryland Constitution. It is suggested that the word 'reside' or its equivalent, as used in constitutional or statutory provisions setting forth qualifications for political office or voting, means actual physical presence or abode rather than domicile. Some language in the opinion in Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66, 70-71, 20 A. 434 (1890), arguably supports the distinction. However, to the extent that it does, the language from the Shaeffer case was specifically disapproved by this Court in Gallagher v. Bd. of Elections, 219 Md. 192, 206, 148 A.2d 390 (1959).

"From Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830 (1896), and Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md. 556, 559, 40 A. 379 (1898), until the present, this Court has consistently held that the words 'reside' or 'resident' in a constitutional provision or statute delineating rights, duties, obligations, privileges, etc., would be construed to mean 'domicile' unless a contrary intent be shown. Thus, our predecessors stated in Howard v. Skinner, supra, 87 Md. at 559 : 'Residence, as contemplated by the framers of our Constitution, for political or voting purposes, means a place of fixed present domicile.' "

See also, e.g., Garcia v. Angulo, 335 Md. 475, 477, 644 A.2d 498, 499 (1994) (" 'resident of this State' in the [statute] ... means a domiciliary of Maryland"); Wamsley v. Wamsley, 333 Md. 454, 458, 635 A.2d 1322, 1324 (1994) ("We have held consistently that 'the words "reside" or "resident" in a constitutional provision or statute delineating rights, duties, obligations, privileges, etc. would be construed to mean "domicile" unless a contrary intent is shown' "); Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 116, 371 A.2d 1094, 1102 (1977) ("the words 'reside' or 'resident' [with regard to members of a party central committee] mean 'domicile' "); Hawks v. Gottschall, 241 Md. 147, 149, 215 A.2d 745, 746 (1966) (" 'a resident of this State' as used in the [statute] ... means a person who has acquired a domiciliary status in the State of Maryland"); Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 178-179, 186 A.2d 482, 485 (1962) ("the Maryland decisions have given the term 'residence', for political or voting purposes, the legal significance of 'domicile' "); Gallagher v. Bd. of Elections, 219 Md. 192, 207, 148 A.2d 390, 398-399 (1959) (with respect to the requirement in the Baltimore City Charter that a candidate for Mayor be a resident of Baltimore City for ten years preceding the election, the Court concluded "that the framers of the Charter intended the residence required ... to be the equivalent of a 'present, fixed domicile' " and that it does not mean "an actual and physical residence"); Rasin v. Leaverton, 181 Md. 91, 93, 28 A.2d 612, 613 (1942) ("The requirement in the Constitution of residence for political or voting purposes is one of a place of fixed, present domicile"); Wagner v. Scurlock, 166 Md. 284, 291, 170 A. 539, 542 (1934) (residence in statute means domicile); Howard v. Skinner, 87 Md. 556, 559, 40 A. 379, 380 (1898) ("Residence, as contemplated by the framers of our Constitution, for political or voting purposes, means a place of fixed present domicile ").

Consequently, any inquiry into whether a member of or candidate for the Maryland General Assembly meets the "residency" requirements set forth in Article III, § 9, must focus upon the member's or candidate's domicile.

The concept of domicile is somewhat elusive, and there is no single definition of the term which will mechanically determine each person's domicile once the pertinent facts are known. One's domicile "has been defined as the place 'with which he has a settled connection for legal purposes,' " Bainum v. Kalen, supra, 272 Md. at 497, 325 A.2d at 396, quoting Shenton v. Abbott, 178 Md. 526, 530, 15 A.2d 906, 908 (1940). It has also been defined, in the same judicial opinions,

"as that place where a man [or woman] has his [or her] true, fixed, permanent home, habitation and principal establishment, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and to which place he [or she] has, whenever ... absent, the intention of returning." Shenton v. Abbott, supra, 178 Md. at 530, 15 A.2d at 908.

In addition, domicile has been defined as the place that is "the 'centre of [a person's] affairs,' and the place where the business of his life [is] transacted." Thomas v. Warner, 83 Md. 14, 20, 34 A. 830, 831 (1896). A person's domicile is ordinarily "where he and his family habitually dwell," ibid. One claiming a particular place as his domicile "identifies himself and all his interests" with the place and there "exercises the rights and performs the duties of a citizen." Ibid.

Although a person may have several places of abode or dwelling, he or she " 'can have only one domicile at a time.' " Bainum, 272 Md. at 497, 325 A.2d at 396, quoting Shenton v. Abbott, supra, 178 Md. at 530, 15 A.2d at 908. Furthermore, under Maryland law, domicile is a unitary concept; the "meaning of domicile and the basic principles for determining domicile have been the same in this State regardless of the context in which the issue of domicile arose." Toll v. Moreno, 284 Md. 425, 438, 397 A.2d 1009, 1015 (1979).

For the substantial majority of Marylanders, there is little or no question about their domicile. Typically, such person has only one place of abode which is designated as his or her residence for virtually all purposes, such as voting, income tax returns, driver's license, motor vehicle registration, school attendance, receipt of mail, banking, contracts and legal documents the keeping of personal belongings, membership in organizations, etc. That place clearly constitutes his or her domicile. The difficult and close cases arise with respect to those persons who have more than one place of abode or who have other significant contacts with more than one place.

This Court has held on numerous occasions that the "controlling factor in determining a person's domicile is his intent. One's domicile, generally, is that place where he intends it to be." Bainum, 272 Md. at 497, 325 A.2d at 396. See, e.g., Garcia v. Angulo, supra, 335 Md. at 487, 644 A.2d at 504; Comptroller v. Haskin, 298 Md. 681, 691, 472 A.2d 70, 75 (1984); Toll v. Moreno, supra, 284 Md. at 443, 397 A.2d at 1018; Dorf v. Skolnik, supra, 280 Md. at 116-117, 371 A.2d at 1102; Gallagher v. Bd. of Elections, supra, 219 Md. at 208, 148 A.2d at 399; Wagner v....