Blount v. Mandel, Civ. No. Y-75-207.
| Citation | 400 F. Supp. 1190 |
| Decision Date | 13 August 1975 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. Y-75-207. |
| Parties | Clarence W. BLOUNT et al. v. Marvin MANDEL, Governor of the State of Maryland, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Walter S. Levin, James R. Whattam, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.
Henry R. Lord, George A. Nilson, Gerald Langbaum, Baltimore, Md., for defendants.
Plaintiffs in this action are two registered Maryland voters and six members of the Maryland General Assembly who hold full time positions with local Boards of Education.1 Defendants are Governor Marvin Mandel, Attorney General Francis Burch, Comptroller of the Treasury Louis Goldstein and State Treasurer William S. James.
On November 3, 1970, the voters of the State of Maryland ratified an amendment to the Maryland Constitution which created the General Assembly Compensation Commission. See Ch. 576, 1970 Md.Laws 1671, codified as Md. Const. art. III, § 15(2) and (3). This commission was charged with establishing the compensation of members of the Maryland General Assembly. The nine-member commission issued its first report on January 28, 1971. The report set the annual salary for all members of the General Assembly, except the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, at $11,000. In a footnote to its report, however, the Commission noted:
It has come to the attention of the Commission that a small number of Legislators hold salaried positions with the State of Maryland or with political subdivisions of the State, presumably receiving a leave of absence from such employment during the legislative session. The Commission believes that such practice should be discontinued and urges the General Assembly to give consideration to this recommendation, particularly in light of the increased compensation recommended in the resolution.
of Members of the General Assembly, Part VI (Recommendations), § A, at 2625 (Jan. 28, 1971).
The General Assembly took no action on the recommendation.2 On January 24, 1974, the Commission issued its second report which took effect with the force of law on January 8, 1975. The Commission noted with disapproval the trend toward increased political activity by public employees and determined to take steps "to prevent or discourage dual governmental service." The Commission found such dual employment to be undesirable:
It was the unanimous view of those witnesses questioned on the subject that dual public employment was fraught with political conflict of interest and other problems and that a different basis of compensation would be proper. Considerable question was raised as to whether an individual's legislative effectiveness, not to mention the public's confidence in government, might not be seriously compromised by that individual's being subject to the competing and often inconsistent demands on both his time and loyalty from two different branches or levels of government and also by public criticism of the same individual receiving two public pay checks covering the same years.
The Report of the General Assembly Compensation Commission Accompanying the Resolution of that Commission Determining the Compensation and Allowances of Members of the General Assembly, Part VII (Recommendations), § B, at 18 (Jan. 24, 1974) hereinafter cited as Compensation Commission Report II.
The Commission also pointed to Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which provides:
That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.
The Commission noted that although Article 8 has not been construed by the Maryland courts to prohibit public employees of the State from serving as legislators, an Attorney General opinion issued in 1972 expressed considerable doubt as to whether a state legislator was precluded from participating in other state employment. 56 Op.Att'y Gen. 266, 273 (1972). While the Commission concluded that it did not have the power to preclude members of the General Assembly from serving as legislators while also serving as public employees, it found that it did have the power to discourage dual employment indirectly by establishing a different and disadvantageous formula for compensation for members of the General Assembly who were also public employees of the State. Compensation Commission Report II, supra at 17.
That new formula was reflected in Item 1(a) of the January 24, 1974, resolution of the Compensation Commission:
Compensation Commission Report II, supra at R-1 to R-2. This formula provides for a total legislative salary for the plaintiffs of $3,500 plus an amount equal to any compensation lost with respect to other employment by reason of performance of legislative duties. See Compensation Commission Report II, supra at 20.
The plaintiffs instituted this action shortly after the Commission's resolutions took effect. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and requests the convening of a three-judge court. Plaintiffs rest jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and claim that on its face, and as applied to the plaintiffs, Item 1(a) of the Commission's resolutions has a chilling effect on the fundamental freedoms of seeking and holding political office, speech, political association and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, in violation of due process and equal protection of the laws as protected by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants have responded, challenging the Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy and opposing the convocation of a three-judge court.
Because the Court concludes that abstention is proper and that a single judge may abstain without referring the matter to a three-judge court, the only questions which must be answered before abstention are those which go to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. The defendants have raised two such defenses: first, that the case does not present a justiciable controversy because it involves a "political question"; and second, that a substantial constitutional question does not exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3
Although the federal courts do not shrink from deciding political cases, they will not adjudicate what have come to be known as "political questions." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).
The defendants maintain that since the authority to establish legislative compensation is vested solely in the Maryland legislature, the federal judiciary may not review that essentially "political" decision. Plaintiffs have replied that the Maryland Compensation Commission is independent of all branches of government, and its decisions are therefore reviewable.
Both parties have mistaken the fundamental nature of the "political question" doctrine. Its purpose is to maintain the separation of powers mandated by the Federal Constitution between the three branches of the Federal Government. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Thus, in "political question" cases, the courts have been concerned with whether there has been a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue presented to the federal judiciary to a coordinate political department" of the Federal Government. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The federal judiciary will therefore abstain from taking jurisdiction when the issue presented to the court would be more correctly entrusted to another branch of government.4
However, as stated in Baker v. Carr, supra 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S.Ct. at 706, "in the other `political question' cases, it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the `political question.'" See, 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 3534, at 304 n. 37 and accompanying text (1975). The political question doctrine has nothing whatever to do with the power of the federal judiciary to review the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States ex rel. Petillo v. State of NJ
... ... Howard YEAGER et al., Respondents ... Civ. A. Nos. 1252-73, 1808-73 ... United States District Court, D. New ... ...
-
Lister v. Lucey, 77-1757
...Murphy, 526 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1975); but see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 457 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505; Blount v. Mandel, 400 F.Supp. 1190 (D.Md.1975). Because of our disposition of the case, because plaintiffs did not challenge the district court ruling on this ground and ......
-
Bridgeport Hydraulic v. COUNCIL ON WATER, ETC.
...for dismissal by this Court. Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366, 77 S.Ct. 838, 1 L.Ed.2d 894 (1957); Blount v. Mandel, 400 F.Supp. 1190, 1202 (D.Md.1975). PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND ENTER FINAL Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,......
-
Chertkof v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
...at 875; Lake Carriers Association v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 1757, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972); Blount v. Mandel, 400 F.Supp. 1190, 1200-02 (D.Md.1975). Nevertheless, the court will not dismiss or stay this proceeding while the parties litigate in state court. In the exerc......